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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I aim to develop an empirical account of moral judgment. Chapter 1 
lays some philosophical and methodological groundwork. Next, in Chapters 2 and 3, I 
review and critically discuss past literature on moral judgment. In recent decades, 
automaticity research has led to the view that our social judgments are conducted 
automatically, and uncontrolled by conscious reasoning. In Chapter 2, I push back 
against this view, arguing that moral judgments are readily shaped by reasoning 
processes. Next, in Chapter 3, I differentiate a few empirical claims about the 
relationship between affective processes and moral judgment, and I arbitrate between 
them. I then aim to characterize the psychological processes that cause these affective 
responses, arguing for the involvement of a sensory and motor simulation of the 
behavior. This exercise gives rise to new empirical hypotheses, which are then tested in 
Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, I present a collaborative, empirical study that examines 
the aversions to harmful and disgusting behavior. Our results suggest that – across both 
purity and harm –condemnation of immoral behavior arises principally from a personal 
aversion to performing the target action, which shapes third-party judgments through 
the partly unconscious simulation of the agent‘s perspective. In Chapter 5, I present 
some analyses that examine the broader influence of evaluative focus on moral and 
political attitudes. Finally, Chapter 6 argues that the proposed psychological account of 
moral judgment is consistent with evidence from a wider range of disciplines, from 
neuroscience and animal cognition, to evolutionary theory and sociology of religion.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Descriptive philosophy and naturalism 
Moral philosophers have typically sought to answer questions about how it is we 
should live ethically-speaking: What are our duties and responsibilities towards others? 
How might we determine what the right thing to do is? These efforts have yielded a 
variety of normative ethical theories, such as virtue ethics (Aristotle, 1991), deontology 
(Kant, 1785/1964), and utilitarianism (Mill, 1863), each of which provides its own 
guidelines for differentiating morally right conduct from morally wrong conduct.  
Alongside this normative ethical aim, a parallel enterprise has focused on 
understanding the status of morality more broadly as an object of study. Is morality a 
kind of science, and so a matter of discovering objective facts about the moral truth? If 
so, what kind of facts are moral facts, and how do we ordinarily acquire knowledge 
about them? Did morality evolve as a natural phenomenon, or is it a cultural invention? 
What does it mean to say that something is ―morally right/wrong‖? Since Plato, these 
sorts of descriptive questions have occupied philosophers who aimed to understand the 
place of moral phenomena within the natural and social world.  
Hume famously pronounced these to be two fundamentally distinct projects in 
moral philosophy, and warned us that (descriptive) ―observations concerning human 
affair‖ could not by themselves entail any claims about the (normative) moral truth: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning 
human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the 
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that 
is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, 
expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be 
observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for 
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction 
from others, which are entirely different from it (Hume, 1739, 335). 
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Ever since, many moral philosophers have echoed the idea that knowledge of all 
the relevant descriptive facts cannot by itself entail any normative conclusions. We may 
know all the facts about the natural laws that ensure that a particular course of action, 
e.g., swinging a hammer at an old lady, gives rise to some needless pain. And yet, to 
ground the normative claim that ―one ought not to swing the hammer‖, we need an 
additional assumption, along the lines of (N1) one ought not cause needless pain to 
others. We may try to derive this latter claim from natural facts, but this is difficult to 
do also. For instance, we may try to derive N1 from certain descriptive facts like (F1) 
causing needless pain tends to decrease the welfare of society, or (F2) rational people 
typically reject norms that allow inflicting needless pain. However, this step merely 
creates new normative assumptions in each case, i.e., that (N1‘) one ought not decrease 
the welfare of society and (N2‘) one ought to do whatever it is rational to accept in 
one’s system of norms. So ultimately, with some exceptions (see Searle, 1964), 
philosophers have been convinced that normative standards like (N1‘) and (N2‘) cannot 
derive from a descriptive understanding of the relevant facts alone. This insight, 
credited to Hume, is summarized by the mantra ―you cannot derive an ought from an 
is‖, and has established an impervious divide between normative and descriptive 
projects in ethics. My dissertation will fall squarely on the descriptive side, and I will 
heed Hume‘s advice to make no claims about what we ought to do on the basis of this 
work. 
1.1.1. Naturalist metaphysics 
How to proceed with a descriptive project depends critically on one‘s 
metaphysical views. In the following paragraphs I will put forth my own metaphysical 
assumptions, which in philosophical circles are known as naturalistic (Papineau, 1993; 
Sellars, 1956). It is useful to distinguish the ontological from the methodological 
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dimensions of naturalism, though I will be adopting both. First of all, I will make the 
following ontological assumption: 
(1) Ontological naturalism: Everything that exists is constituted of (/reducible to) 
physical, spatiotemporal objects and/or properties. 
This view rules out the existence of immaterial phenomena, i.e., any 
supernatural or non-natural objects (or properties) that are not constituted by physical, 
spatiotemporal objects (or properties). For instance, in making this assumption, I am 
granting that people‘s moral judgments must be reducible to the psychological and 
neural states that instantiate them. Similarly, the moral properties of an event (if they are 
to exist at all) must ultimately be reducible to its physical, spatiotemporal properties.  
One reason to adopt a naturalist ontology has to do with advocating the causal 
efficacy of moral phenomena. A popular view has it that the physical world is causally 
closed, meaning that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (Kim, 1993). 
So if we want to retain the assumption that an agent‘s moral judgments, can at least 
sometimes cause changes in her behavior (e.g., if a moral concern for the environment 
leads one to vote for a candidate with a better environmental campaign), then we shall 
have to accept that moral judgments are physically constituted. Therefore a naturalist 
ontology of this sort rules out any metaethical view which posits moral phenomena that 
are not physically constituted (e.g., Adams, 2002).  
A second, closely-related assumption that I will be making concerns the 
methodology by which we discover descriptive facts and construct an ontology: 
(2) Methodological naturalism: Whatever exists can be observed using the best 
standard observational procedures in the natural sciences. 
This assumption requires that the ontology of our philosophical theories derive 
from the entities, relations and properties observed using scientific methods. That is, 
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whatever exists in philosophical theories must be documented by some natural and/or 
social science.  
So according to methodological naturalism, descriptive philosophy is in many 
ways continuous with science. This has engendered some worries about the 
distinctiveness of philosophy, which I will attempt briefly to assuage. In short, even 
while both rely on empirical data, philosophy and the sciences answer different kinds of 
questions using these data. For example, while the primatologist may have an inherent 
interest in the bonobo‘s social behaviors, the philosopher seeks to understand the same 
body of work in order to answer broader and more resilient questions about, say, the 
nature of mind-reading. Because of these characteristics of philosophical issues, the 
philosopher will have to critically examine evidence from across numerous disciplines – 
primatology, but also linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology 
perhaps – and synthesize their relevant findings so as to answer or at least constrain the 
space of plausible theories about the philosophical question at stake. This is analogous 
to the way in which scientific theories must integrate and synthesize evidence across 
numerous experiments, in order to construct scientific theories (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Methodological naturalism. 
So, for naturalists, philosophical theories are still synthetic theories about the 
natural world, informed by research across multiple scientific disciplines and ultimately 
answerable with empirical data. This inherent dependency on science has caused 
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their discipline. The worry is that, on the naturalist picture, there are no skills or 
knowledge that are unique to philosophy. Scholars in other disciplines have all the 
requisite tools to do philosophy, and if anything it is philosophers who lack the 
technical skills required to collect new data with which to inform their theories. 
However, I have shown that, in adopting methodological naturalism, although we 
eliminate any fundamental methodological differences between science and philosophy, 
there are differences in their theoretical objectives which suffice to make philosophy a 
unique intellectual endeavor. 
 
1.2. The psychology of moral judgment 
In my dissertation, I aim to adopt this naturalistic approach to the examination of 
issues in descriptive ethics. To provide a comprehensive theory of morality would 
require a cohesive explanation of diverse aspects: how the mental practice of making 
moral judgments (moral psychology), links up with the meaning of our moral language 
(moral semantics), while explaining how it is that we learn or acquire these moral views 
(moral epistemology). This much I cannot take on within the span of this dissertation, so 
I will delve into one corner of this puzzle: the psychology.  
A central ambition of philosophical moral psychology is to give an account of 
what our minds are up to when we form and issue moral judgments. First, I would like 
to stop to consider what is meant by ‗moral judgment‘. Moral judgment, as I will be 
understanding it throughout my dissertation, is (i) a mental state. In other words, it is a 
psychological state that an individual can instantiate at a given time: e.g., feeling tired, 
believing there is coffee in the mug, or thinking about a pink elephant. In this sense, 
moral judgments are not statements, or any kind of public, linguistic expressions of a 
moral judgment (although these are, of course, related). They are (ii) evaluative; i.e., 
they ascribe value – rightness/wrongness, goodness/badness, permissibility, obligatory-
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ness, forbidden-ness, or whatever. These value ascriptions are directed at (iii) people‘s 
behavior. They ascribe moral value to things that people might do, like donating part of 
one‘s income to charity or urinating in public. Related judgments about the moral 
character of others, or about whether agents ought to be held accountable for their 
actions, or about deserved punishment for a given offense fall outside the range of this 
study.  
Whose moral judgments are relevant to this study? The moral judgments of 
anyone with a basic aptitude with moral concepts are considered informative. As such, 
the theoretical conclusions that I defend throughout are based on inductive claims. They 
describe probabilistic relations that have been observed by sampling from this large, 
target class of folk moral judgments. This leaves ample room for individual variability 
in people‘s moral judgment, and renders a claim about moral judgment compatible with 
the existence of numerous counterexamples. 
Having cleared this up, let us take a look at the historical perspectives on the 
debate concerning the psychology of moral judgment. Two fundamental camps derive 
from a popular distinction, attributed to Hume (1739), between cognitive and non-
cognitive mental states (see also Smith, 1987). On one hand, cognitive mental states 
attempt to represent the world as it is (e.g., believing one will win the lottery this week). 
Therefore, cognitive mental states should be responsive to evidence that bears on the 
truth or falsity of their propositional content. That is, the apprehension of a fact that is 
contrary to one‘s belief ought to count as evidence against the belief. On the other hand, 
we have non-cognitive mental states, like emotions, desires, hopes, fears, etc (e.g., 
hoping one will win the lottery this week). Rather than representing the world, non-
cognitive mental states express the agent‘s emotions or attitudes towards it. Because 
non-cognitive states do not represent the world, facts that are contrary to their 
propositional content do not count as evidence against them.  
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The cognitive/non-cognitive distinction has proven useful in explaining people‘s 
intentional behavior. Essentially, cognitive mental states (e.g., the belief that the corner 
store has ice cream) can be paired with non-cognitive mental states (e.g., the desire for 
ice cream) in order to generate plans and intentional actions (e.g., going to buy ice 
cream). In addition, as I said, we can mount the primary camps in philosophical moral 
psychology onto this distinction: cognitivists about moral judgment argue that moral 
judgments are primarily belief-like, while non-cognitivists argue they are composed 
principally of some emotion or other non-cognitive attitude. We shall look closely at 
these opposing philosophical perspectives in the following sections. 
1.2.1. Cognitivism 
For cognitivists, moral judgments are beliefs that represent the actions or events 
in question as instantiating certain moral properties (i.e., wrongness, obligatory-ness, or 
whatever). These moral properties are then determined by, for example, what rational 
agents would accept as their duty, or what actions bring about the best consequences for 
aggregate welfare, and so on. Immanuel Kant (1785/1964) famously defended 
cognitivism; and more recently, Christine Korsgaard (1996) and Michael Smith (1994) 
have put forth versions of this view. Certain desiderata, however, are shared by 
cognitivist proposals across the board. For cognitivists, moral judgments are essentially 
an exercise of reason, in two concrete ways: 
First, because moral judgments represent actions and/or events, they are truth 
evaluable. That is, moral judgments are true (/false) if the actions or events in question 
exhibit (/do not exhibit) the properties ascribed to them. This desideratum is, of course, 
compatible with all moral beliefs being false (see error theory in Mackie, 1977).  
Second, for rationalist cognitivists, moral judgments are also inferential. That is, 
they are derived from general moral principles along with facts about the specific action 
or event. For example: 
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1. General moral principle: Intentionally killing a sentient being is prima facie 
morally wrong. 
2. Context-specific fact: Eating meat requires intentionally killing a sentient 
being. 
c. Context-specific moral judgment: Eating meat is prima facie morally wrong. 
Cognitivism has some intuitive plausibility. One reason to believe that moral 
judgments are cognitive has to do with the pervasiveness of moral disagreement. I.e., it 
is obvious that people disagree vigorously about moral issues, and it would seem that 
disagreement implies truth-evaluability. 
Consider a prototypical non-cognitive mental state, such as desiring candy, 
being afraid of spiders, or wishing to be a famous rock star. These mental states are not 
truth evaluable in the relevant sense. An audience may question the propriety, normalcy 
of the agent‘s attitude, or simply not share the attitude in question, but none of this is 
inconsistent with the agent‘s having that attitude. In other words, non-cognitive attitudes 
are not matters that we can disagree about in the full sense. By contrast, cognitive 
mental states are typically truth evaluable. If an agent has a belief about some particular 
matter and someone else has a different (i.e., inconsistent) belief about it, it is 
appropriate and common for them to disagree with each other. This may involve 
bringing evidence or reasons to bear to justify one‘s belief, and perhaps also to convince 
one another of the truth of one‘s belief. So, in sum, the fact that people disagree and 
argue profusely about matters of right and wrong (consider the prolific debates 
surrounding euthanasia, abortion and so on) suggests that moral judgments may be truth 
evaluable, and therefore, cognitive. 
1.2.2. Non-cognitivism 
Meanwhile, non-cognitivist philosophers since Hume argued that, rather than 
representing actions as having certain properties, moral judgments primarily involve the 
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expression of an emotion or attitude in relation to the action (Hume, 1751/1894; Ayer, 
1952; Hare, 1952). Within non-cognitivism, there is a marked diversity concerning 
precisely which attitudes are conveyed in moral judgment: sentiments of moral approval 
and disapproval, the prescription of the behavior in question (Stevenson, 1944), or one‘s 
personal acceptance of a norm governing the action (Gibbard, 1990) to list a few 
examples. And yet, in different ways, most non-cognitivists accept Hume‘s classic 
claim that moral attitudes ―cannot be the work of the judgement, but of the heart; and is 
not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment‖ (Hume, 
1751/1894, 290). 
Ayer then furthered the case for non-cognitivism through an analysis of moral 
language. He pointed out that moral statements like ―You acted wrongly in stealing that 
money‖ do not add any propositional content to the statement ―You stole that money‖. 
Rather, they add the speaker‘s attitude of condemnation towards the action:  
It is as if I had said, ―You stole that money‖ in a peculiar tone of horror, or 
written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. […] If now I 
generalise my previous statement and say, ―Stealing money is wrong‖, I produce 
a sentence that has no factual meaning -- that is, expresses no proposition that 
can be either true or false. […] I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments 
(Ayer, 1952, 107). 
Some intuitive considerations favor non-cognitivism also. In particular, 
numerous philosophers have noted the fact that when people make moral judgments 
they tend to feel at least partly (and defeasibly) motivated to act in accordance with their 
judgment. This intuition is not universally shared (see Copp, 1997), but a great many of 
us find it difficult to conceive of ordinary people making sincere moral judgments while 
failing to have any disposition or motivation whatsoever to act accordingly. This feature 
of moral practice (known as motivational internalism) has led numerous philosophers 
toward non-cognitivist views of moral judgment. This is because it is widely accepted 
that (outside the moral domain) beliefs do not by themselves motivate action. My 
believing that the nearest gas station sells ice cream doesn‘t by itself motivate me to do 
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anything about this. By contrast, my desire for ice cream, even in the absence of any 
associated beliefs (where it is available, how much it is healthy to eat, etc.), is enough to 
motivate me to act, perhaps by leading me to look for some ice cream. In other words, 
non-cognitive mental states like desires, hopes and emotions do have motivational 
force. Therefore, if we share the intuition that moral judgments are typically motivating, 
we might be inclined prima facie to favor a non-cognitivist account of moral judgment. 
 
1.3. Naturalizing moral judgment 
As we saw, both cognitivism and non-cognitivism each have some intuitive 
plausibility. At the same time, I highlighted certain aspects of moral practice that they 
cannot explain so easily. Throughout the 20
th
 century, philosophers concerned with 
developing a descriptive theory of morality were involved in an ongoing exchange of 
intuition pumps and intricate arguments intended to favor their particular versions of 
one of these broad-stroked accounts: Non-cognitivists have argued that disagreement is 
possible even in a non-cognitive account of moral judgment, cognitivists have argued 
that moral judgments can be motivating in a cognitivist account of moral judgment, and 
so on. New theoretical perspectives have emerged from this exchange, many of which 
blur the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction I outlined above.  
However, from the naturalistic perspective I am adopting, these intuitive 
considerations cannot count as evidence for a descriptive theory. Persuasive arguments 
and intuitions undoubtedly motivate the hypotheses we form, but they cannot provide 
evidence for them. As I said, for the naturalist, philosophical theories are synthetic 
theories about the natural world. So the truth about moral judgment (i.e., which version 
of cognitivism, or non-cognitivism is true) depends not on the success of philosophical 
arguments but rather exclusively on empirical facts about the phenomenon of moral 
judgment. 
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The experimental approach to moral psychology has engendered a third family 
of accounts, as an alternative to cognitivism and non-cognitivism. These accounts are 
referred to as intuitionism in moral psychology circles (not to be equated with 
intuitionism as understood in philosophy circles), in that they posit non-affective 
intuitions – which can be classified neither as cognitive, nor as non-cognitive – as the 
basis of moral judgment (Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009; Mikhail, 2000, 2007).  
Intuitions differ in some respects from non-cognitive mental states, like 
emotions. For instance, the content of an intuitive mental state is a proposition, in our 
case, the ascription of a moral property to an action or event (see Huemer, 2005). So, 
unlike non-cognitive mental states, intuitions are representational. Yet, at the same time, 
intuitions are also different from cognitive mental states. Whereas beliefs are normally 
inferred from reasons, other beliefs, observations and so on, intuitions are typically non-
inferential and self-evident like sense perceptions (Kornblith, 1998; Gopnik & 
Schwitzgebel, 1998). According to intuitionists when we observe someone killing an 
innocent person, for example, we have the spontaneous and self-evident intuition that 
this is morally wrong, without inference and by mere observation. So, in essence, for 
intuitionists, moral judgment is the immediate perception of the moral value ascribed to 
an action or event. 
1.3.1. Characterizing intuition and affect 
Whereas for intuitionists moral judgment primarily describes or ascribes moral 
properties to the action under evaluation, for non-cognitivists it primarily expresses the 
evaluator‘s attitude of disapproval or approval related to said action. This difference is 
worthy of more detailed attention, so in what follows I will clarify two fundamental 
differences between the concepts of moral intuition and moral affect. First: 
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Intuitions necessarily have propositional content, but affect does not. 
Intuitions are the kind of mental state that carries propositional content (i.e., the 
intuition that p). These propositions need not be consciously held to be true; instead 
they may dispose one to believe that p, or to enact behavioral dispositions in accordance 
with p being the case (Gendler, 2008). Consider the following paradigm cases (I have 
italicized in each case what that propositional content might be): 
 When asked to choose between a set of identical consumer products, people 
intuitively prefer the right-most product (see pantyhose study in Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). 
 ―A ball and a bat cost $1.10. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?‖ Many people intuitively believe that the ball costs 10 
cents (see Cognitive Reflection Task in Frederick, 2005). 
 If someone asks me whether to wear a coat outside when its 20ºC, I know 
intuitively that you don’t need to wear a coat when it’s 20ºC outside. If 
someone asks me whether to wear a coat when it‘s 293.15 Kelvin, my 
answer will be the same. But, this time, it is not the result of intuition 
(Gilovich, 2012). 
Intuitions like these may result from fairly complex mental operations, that are 
deployed quickly, escape introspective awareness and in some cases contradict our 
rationally held, overt beliefs (Zajonc, 1980). For instance, an integrated network of our 
visual and linguistic systems enables a quick computation over the properties of 
electromagnetic radiation to derive its associated color term. This computation is 
unconscious and happens very quickly. In the moral domain, intuitionist views, like 
universal moral grammar, posit that core moral judgment is like the above intuitions: it 
exhibits propositional content, such as the ascription of deontic properties to actions 
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under consideration (e.g., attributing impermissibility, to the target action of breaking 
one’s promise to a dead relative. See Mikhail, 2007).  
A second difference between affect and intuition is that:  
Affect necessarily has a valence and a magnitude whereas intuitions do not. 
We commonly talk of affective signals in terms of positive versus negative 
affect, behavior-inhibiting versus behavior-activating, approach-related versus 
avoidance-related; all of these pairs of terms reflect the basic insight that affective 
signals have the property of valence. Similarly, labels like blunted/reduced and 
heightened affect, demonstrate that we understand affect to have some magnitude as 
well. We can therefore differentiate thick emotional concepts along these two 
dimensions of their underlying affective states. For instance, feeling pleased has a 
positive valence, while feeling upset has a negative valence. Meanwhile, feeling 
distraught and feeling annoyed both have a negative valence, but are differentiated 
along the dimension of magnitude: feeling distraught has a greater magnitude than 
feeling annoyed has. (Notice that intuitions need not have these properties. With the 
exception perhaps of the ―pantyhose‖ intuition1, the above intuitions do not have 
valence and magnitude as constituent properties.) On a non-cognitivist account, moral 
judgments are more like these affective states; they do not carry propositional content 
but are necessarily linked to the evaluator‘s phenomenal experience of some sensation, 
either positive or negative and that can be stronger or weaker, in response to the 
consideration of the action. 
 
1.4. Conclusion 
I have reviewed some of the principal positions in the debate surrounding the 
psychology of moral judgment. Scientists from various disciplines – social psychology 
                                                 
1
 If one accepts my differentiation of affect and intuition, it might make sense to 
characterize this phenomenon as an affect-laden intuition. 
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(Haidt, 2001), but also cognitive neuroscience (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002b), 
cultural anthropology (Shweder et al., 1997), and primatology (de Waal, 2009) to name 
a few – have examined morality as a natural phenomenon by employing their 
corresponding methodologies. Throughout the following chapters, I will provide my 
own interpretation of these findings and present some original experimental results with 
the goal of defending a novel, naturalistic theory of moral judgment.  
In the following two chapters, I will review and critically discuss a variety of 
psychological evidence concerning moral judgment. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I will 
examine the putative role of reason in making moral judgments. In past decades, ample 
evidence on automaticity in decision-making led to the widespread view that many of 
our social judgments are conducted automatically, and uncontrolled by our conscious 
reasoning (Zajonc, 1980). Rather, reasoning is employed essentially for purposes of 
confabulation, i.e., to justify and explain our own conduct ex post facto (Fotopoulou, 
Conway, & Solms, 2007). This research program, which has since covered considerable 
ground in moral psychology, therefore casts doubt on the plausibility of cognitivism 
about moral judgment.  
Just as recent evidence on decision-making and social cognition undermines the 
power of reason to govern behavior, it has equally vindicated the influence of emotion 
and affective processes more generally. So, in Chapter 3, I will try to differentiate some 
of the empirical claims that have been made surrounding the relationship between 
affective processes and moral judgment, and I will arbitrate between them. I will also 
aim, in the second half of the chapter, to characterize the psychological processes that 
causally produce these emotional responses, a question that has received markedly less 
attention. In essence, these two chapters together will serve as an exercise in analyzing 
past experimental studies in order to generate new hypotheses that shed light on the 
question of moral psychology. These hypotheses are then tested in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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In Chapter 4, I present a set of original, collaborative studies that examine 
people‘s normal aversion to immoral behavior. In these studies, we differentiate two 
putative kinds of affect in moral judgment: the aversion to the outcomes of the action 
(e.g., empathic concern) versus the intrinsic aversion to the action. We then ask whether 
the condemnation of harmful and disgusting behavior stems principally from either 
aversion. Our results draw support for the role of action aversion in moral judgments 
across both domains, and more broadly for the role of mental simulation in moral 
judgment.  
Next, in Chapter 5, I present a set of studies that examine the influence of reason 
on moral attitudes. Here we find that individual differences in thinking style are linked 
with contrasting approaches to moral judgment. Specifically, the tendency to enjoy 
effortful thought and employ reasoning is linked with judging actions based on an 
assessment of the outcomes that they bring about. Meanwhile, the tendency to shy away 
from hard thinking and rely on gut feelings, known as an intuitive cognitive style, is 
associated with moralizing behavior on the basis of a consideration of the action itself. 
We also find that an emphasis on outcomes is associated with a morality centered on 
harm and fairness concerns, and an emphasis on actions was associated with a broader 
set of moral concerns including loyalty to the ingroup, respect for authority and purity-
related norms. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I interpret the above findings and develop a new account of 
the human faculty for making moral judgments. Our findings provide evidence for two 
approaches to moral evaluation: One approach involves an evaluative simulation of the 
agent‘s behavior, and another involves an assessment of the outcomes befalling any 
victims and beneficiaries. These approaches can be construed in terms of a dual-process 
theory of moral judgment, congruent with several lines of research across a broader set 
of disciplines. First, evidence from neuroimaging studies indicates the double 
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dissociation of two networks responsible for action versus outcome-based judgments. 
Second, computational models and behavioral studies in the learning algorithm 
literature document two approaches to decision-making that resemble action- and 
outcome-based decision processes. Third, evolutionary considerations suggest that some 
of our deeply-rooted aversions to actions may have provided an adaptive advantage to 
members of ancestral communities. So, the evaluative simulation approach serves as a 
heuristic that delivers the same decision as the outcome-based strategy in many 
contexts, but faster and with less cognitive effort. In Chapter 6, I argue that these 
different lines of evidence converge in support of the dual-process theory outlined 
above.  
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Chapter 2. Dual process theories and the role of reasoning in moral judgment 
 
2.1. Introduction 
A popular, but nevertheless contentious, framework for understanding human 
judgment and decision-making involves an appeal to a division between two 
fundamentally distinct types of mental processes. The origins of this widespread 
intuition – that human cognition is essentially of two opposed kinds – can be traced as 
far back as Ancient Greek discussions of the parts of the soul in Aristotle (1999) and 
Plato (1991), and located in modern works about the mind as the distinction between 
reason and passion in Hume (1739), or between reason and the unconscious in Freud 
(1990; see also James, 1890/1950). Freud‘s (1990) dual theory of information 
processing distinguished between a primary system that is associative and unconscious, 
and a secondary system that is conscious and capable of rational thought. James (1890) 
regarded human reasoning also as either an experiential-associative type of thinking, or 
of an analytical-deliberative kind.  
More recently, since the dawn of automaticity research in the cognitive sciences, 
numerous influential theories in psychology have assumed a fundamental differentiation 
between two systems in the mind (Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). These systems have 
received diverse labels – heuristic versus analytic (Evans, 1989), associative versus 
rule-based (Sloman, 1996), automatic versus controlled (Stanovich & West, 1998) – and 
are often characterized by various other attributes, fast versus slow, intuitive versus 
reflective, high capacity versus low capacity, unconscious versus conscious, domain-
specific versus domain-general, implicit versus explicit, and so on (see Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Distinctions of this sort have become the matter of much 
contemporary research on human reasoning and learning (Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Daw 
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& Shohamy, 2008; Dienes & Perner, 1999; Kahneman, 2011; Reber, 1993; Stanovich, 
2011; Stanovich & West, 2000; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005; Sutton & Barto, 1999), 
especially in the domain of social cognition (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Kruglanski & Orehek, 2007; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). 
Though the precise formulation of two systems has remained far from clear, it is 
understood that each of these distinctions differentiates two cognitive systems, and 
theories that posit the operation of two such systems are known as dual process or dual 
systems theories. This owes to certain core features of dual systems that these accounts, 
at least implicitly, accept. It is important, before entering a discussion about the proper 
characterization of moral psychology from a dual systems perspective, that we outline 
four of these central features (see Table 1):  
Table 1. Four central features of dual-process theories. 
Feature Description References 
1) Parallel 
processing: 
These two cognitive systems – System 1 and System 
2 – can  operate in parallel, i.e., simultaneously. 
Epstein, 1994. 
Sloman, 1996. 




System 1 is associative, whereas System 2 is 
algorithmic. 
Epstein, 1994.  
James, 1890.  
Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983.  
3) Temporal 
primacy: 
Operation of System 1 is fast and unaware whereas 
operation of the System 2 is slow and controllable. 
Evans & Over, 
1996. Freud, 1900. 
Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983.  
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4) Evolutionary 
primacy: 
System 1 has a longer evolutionary history than 
System 2. 
Evans, 2003.  
Stanovich & West,  
2000. 
 
In the investigation of moral judgment specifically, a dual process framework 
has also garnered substantial popularity. Although not without its numerous detractors 
(Bartels, 2008, Nichols & Mallon, 2006, Mikhail, 2007), several theorists have either 
explicitly defended a dual-process view of moral judgment (Cushman, 2012; Greene, 
2007; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001), or profited from this kind of characterization 
of moral cognition (Baron, 1994; Sunstein, 2005). 
In this chapter, I will review two highly influential dual-process accounts of 
moral judgment, Haidt‘s (2001) social intuitionist model and Greene‘s (2007) dual-
process account of utilitarianism and deontology. Haidt and Greene agree that our moral 
judgments are often the result of System 1 processes: fast, unconscious and the result of 
a moral sense which evolved to facilitate life in small-scale, ancestral communities. This 
moral sense is partly shared, not just with our ancestors, but with non-human primates 
also (see de Waal, 2009), and has equipped us with a set of ―hard-wired‖, spontaneous 
responses that readily influence our moral attitudes. 
Yet the focus of this chapter is on a particular disagreement between Haidt and 
Greene, concerning the influence of System 2 processing on moral judgment. I will 
argue that this disagreement should be resolved by conceding that Greene‘s theory 
better accounts for the variety of data about the relationship between moral judgment 
and controlled cognition. Lastly, I will pose some problems for the characterization of 
controlled processing as rational, and elaborate a particular account of System 2 
processing in moral judgment, according to which it involves the integration of rational 
and affective processes. Specifically, I will argue that System 2 moral judgments are 
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2.2. Haidt’s social intuitionist model 
In an early study of the condemnation of harmless moral violations, Haidt and 
colleagues (2000) examined participants‘ moral judgments about a case of harmless 
consensual incest: 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on 
summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near 
the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making 
love. At very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was 
already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. 
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that 
night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What 
do you think about that, was it OK for them to make love?  
This experiment serves as an exemplar of Haidt‘s (2001) dual-process theory of 
moral judgment, known as the social intuitionist model. A majority of the participants in 
this study judged this case to be wrong. Then, when prompted by the experimenter, 
appealed to some constructed reason citing a harmful outcome which was in fact 
precluded by the design of the vignette. Ultimately, participants clung onto the 
judgment that the behavior is wrong, even though they could not give an adequate 
justification for the judgment. This finding illustrates social intuitionism in a nutshell. 
According to social intuitionism, moral judgments are influenced by ―a small set of 
intuitions that evolution has prepared the human mind to develop‖ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 
2008, 181). These intuitions are ―the sudden appearance in consciousness or at the 
fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like–dislike, good–bad) about the 
character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone 
through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion‖ (ibid, 2008, 188). 
                                                 
2
 Notice, however, that I will not argue for a dual-process view here, a task which I 
leave for Chapter 6. 
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By contrast, the role of System 2 processing is (as demonstrated in this experiment) 
limited to constructing a verbal justification that supports one‘s prior moral intuition 
when faced with the social demand to do so (see also Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
The social intuitionist model, though, stresses the influence of System 1 
processes on moral judgment and behavior, while reason‘s influence on moral judgment 
is limited to cases of reasoned persuasion. That is, social intuitionism ―gives moral 
reasoning a causal role in moral judgment, but only when reasoning runs through other 
people‖ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, 193). Since justifications carry an affective valence, 
―reasoned persuasion works not by providing logically compelling arguments but by 
triggering new affectively valenced intuitions in the listener‖ (Haidt, 2001, 819).3 In 
other words, the affective force of the justification elicits congruence from the listener, 
independently of the content of the justification. In this way, social intuitionism is 
indeed ―social‖, by stressing the influences of interpersonal relationships, and of the 
verbal exchange of reasons, in reshaping one‘s moral intuitions. 
Meanwhile, the direct influence of cognitive processing on moral judgment, 
according to social intuitionism, is hypothesized to be rare. Sometimes, reasoned 
judgment may take place when the initial System 1 intuition is weak, and/or System 2 
processing capacity is high enough to counteract the intuition. Other times, private 
reflection may take place when various intuitions arise and the final judgment is 
determined ―either by going with the strongest intuition or by allowing reason to choose 
among the alternatives on the basis of the conscious application of a rule or principle‖ 
(ibid).  
                                                 
3
 Reasoned persuasion should be contrasted with social persuasion, a distinct 
mechanism in Haidt‘s social intuitionist model, by which social interactions shape 
moral attitudes. In social persuasion, ―the mere fact that friends, allies and 
acquaintances have made a moral judgment exerts a direct influence on others, even if 
no reasoned persuasion is used‖ (2001, 819). Therefore reasoned persuasion requires 
deliberation, whereas social persuasion does not. 
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2.3. Greene’s dual process theory 
A contrasting dual-process account of moral judgment has been put forth by 
Greene (2007) and colleagues (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). The basic insight of this 
theory is that a proper understanding of our evolved, moral minds ought to differentiate 
between evolutionarily ancient (or personal) moral violations that would have been 
familiar to our evolutionary ancestors – such as physical violence, or the perils of incest 
-- and evolutionarily new (or impersonal) ones that are unique to the modern 
environment – such as tax evasion and contamination by greenhouse gases. Ex 
hypothesi, an evolved moral sensibility would likely exhibit System 1 responses to 
personal violations but not impersonal violations. Therefore, while System 1 processes 
may guide moral judgments about evolutionarily ancient forms of harm, System 2 may 
exert a greater influence on judgments about evolutionarily modern kinds of moral 
violations.  
This approach provides an attractive interpretation of diverse empirical data on 
moral judgment. For instance, it may explain the pattern of intuitions elicited by the 
famous trolley problem (Fischer & Ravizza, 1992; Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985). 
Consider the following switch dilemma: 
A runaway trolley is racing down the tracks toward a group of five people who 
will be killed if it continues on its present course. However, you can save the 
five people by pulling a lever that will divert the trolley onto a different set of 
tracks. On this second set of tracks, there is only one person, who will be killed 
if you divert the train.  
Is it morally permissible to turn the trolley by pulling the switch, thus saving the 
five? 
As is well-known, in this switch version of the dilemma people usually say that 
it would indeed be morally permissible. On Greene‘s view this is motivated by a simple 
(System 2) cost-benefit analysis. By contrast, consider the footbridge version: 
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Once again, the trolley is headed for five people, and it will kill them if it 
continues on its present course. You are standing on a footbridge over the tracks, 
next to a large man. You can save the five people by pushing the man off the 
footbridge and into the path of the trolley, where his weight will stop the train in 
time to save the five people.  
Is it morally permissible to stop the trolley by pushing the man, thus saving the 
five?  
People ordinarily judge that this would be morally wrong (Petrinovich, O'Neill, 
& Jorgensen, 1993). In this case, an evolutionarily ancient (System 1) aversion to 
forceful, intentional harm outweighs cost-benefit considerations. Greene gives an 
analogous explanation of the moralization of numerous sexual taboos, such as incest 
and homosexuality. The moral condemnation of these behaviors is argued to originate in 
evolutionarily ancient affective responses while more permissive attitudes are supported 
by controlled processing (Paxton, Ungar & Greene, 2012). Moreover, Greene and 
colleagues link these distinct neurocognitive systems to two broad traditions in the 
history of normative ethics – deontology and utilitarianism; specifically: 
The social-emotional responses that we‘ve inherited from our primate ancestors 
(due, presumably, to some adaptive advantage they conferred), shaped and 
refined by culture bound experience, undergird the absolute prohibitions that are 
central to deontology. In contrast, the ―moral calculus‖ that defines utilitarianism 
is made possible by more recently evolved structures in the frontal lobes that 
support abstract thinking and high-level cognitive control (Greene et al., 2004, 
398). 
  
2.4. The role of controlled processing 
In sum, Haidt‘s and Greene‘s accounts share some core features: they both grant 
the primacy of System 1 processes in moral judgment, and they give an evolutionary 
account of these affect-laden intuitions. An obvious locus of disagreement between 
these views, however, concerns the role that each theory attributes to controlled 
processes of reasoning in shaping moral judgment. To recapitulate, on the social 
intuitionist view, controlled processes do not directly shape moral judgment (save in 
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exceptional circumstances). We might term Haidt‘s view a futility view, according to 
which controlled cognition is largely futile in moral judgment. On Greene‘s view, 
controlled processes regularly influence moral judgment, specifically by promoting a 
calculation of aggregate welfare. This view might be labeled an efficacy view, i.e., 
where cognitive processes are indeed attributed a direct causal influence on moral 
judgment.  
In what follows, I will bring prior evidence to bear in order to arbitrate between 
a futility and an efficacy view about the role of controlled processes in moral judgment. 
First, I will present an overview of the empirical literature and show that it draws 
support for an efficacy view. I will then articulate some potential responses on behalf of 
the futility view, and ultimately argue that these do not go through. Finally, I will 
distinguish a few versions of the efficacy view and defend a novel view which, though 
compatible with Greene‘s account, provides some much-needed detail to the coarsely 
defined role of controlled processing in moral judgment. 
Numerous findings draw preliminary support for the efficacy view. These 
findings can be fruitfully categorized into two principal kinds. In one group of findings, 
individual difference studies demonstrate correlations between dispositional differences 
in the reliance on controlled processing and distinct moral judgment patterns (Bartels, 
2008; Feltz & Cokely, 2008; see also Chapter 5). In another, experimental studies show 
that the experimental induction of controlled processing influences moral judgment 
(Paxton et al., 2012). 
2.4.1. Individual difference studies 
Primary evidence for the relationship between dispositional reliance on 
controlled processing and moral judgment comes from studies that index controlled 
processing through various, related measures of cognitive style.  
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For instance, Bartels (2008) employs a self-reported measure of thinking style, 
the Reflective-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). 
On the REI, participants rate their level of agreement with statements like ‗‗I prefer to 
do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that requires 
little thought‖ that suggest a deliberative thinking style, and others like ‗‗Using my gut 
feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life‖, that suggest a 
tendency to rely on intuition. This study finds that participants who agree with 
statements like the former tend to endorse harm for the greater good while participants 
who agree with the latter category of statements tend to condemn harm for the greater 
good.  
There are obvious limitations to a self-report paradigm. Most notably, on scales 
that measure desirable (or undesirable) personality traits, participants are often inclined 
to respond normatively rather than in a way that reflects them accurately. In addition, 
subjectivity in anchoring and interpreting the values on scales, render a self-report 
methodology limited at the least.  
This problem can be addressed by employing performance measures rather than 
self-report measures of a given psychological trait. To this end, Frederick (2005), 
designed the Cognitive Reflection Test, a set of a few questions that have intuitively 
appealing yet evidently false answers. Consider the following example:  
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
People frequently give the first response that comes to mind, $.10, without 
thinking further and realizing that the bat would then have to cost $1.10, and therefore 
that the total cost would be $1.20 (instead of $1.10). Upon considering this problem 
more closely the correct answer is clearly $.05. The items on the CRT share this basic 
structure: An automatic and incorrect response springs to mind due perhaps to surface 
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features of the problem, while the correct answer can be apprehended through further 
consideration. So, the CRT appears to serve as a valuable performance measure of 
participants‘ reliance on intuition versus reflection. 
Two recent studies have examined the relationship between CRT scores and 
responding on trolley-type moral dilemmas (Feltz & Cokely, 2008; Paxton et al., 2012). 
These studies find that the more right answers a given participant provides, the more 
likely he/she is to endorse harming one to save many in personal dilemma contexts, like 
the footbridge dilemma. 
Crucially, the dimension of cognitive style measures a personality trait that is 
somewhat independent of reasoning ability. Reasoning abilities are no guarantee against 
making the kind of judgment errors provoked by the CRT. In fact, in the original (2005) 
study, Frederick found that large numbers of highly select university students provided 
the intuitive but wrong answer. The prevalence of the erroneous answer indicates that 
the mind spontaneously recruits ―thrifty‖ System 1 processes. Rather than measuring 
reasoning abilities, the CRT tracks participants‘ willingness or tendency to engage these 
reasoning (i.e., System 2) abilities in circumstances in which an intuitive (System 1) 
response is available. In this sense, cognitive style is the willingness or tendency to 
engage reflection to address a problem, and not the ability to do so.  
However, endorsement of harm in footbridge-type dilemmas is associated with 
measures of cognitive ability also. Moore, Clark and Kane (2008) examined the 
relationship between working memory capacity (WMC) and moral judgment. WMC 
refers to the ability to hold multiple pieces of information in mind for short-term 
processing. As a measure of WMC, participants were asked to complete a processing 
task, such as verifying the meaningfulness of a sentence, the result a simple equation, 
judging whether a pattern is symmetrical while keeping in mind a working memory 
probe, i.e., an ordered list of letters or the location of several squares on the screen. 
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Participants‘ success rate in remembering the memory probes served as the measure of 
working memory capacity. Moore and colleagues (2008) found that participants with 
greater WMC were more likely to endorse harmful action for the greater good than were 
participants with lesser WMC, and this effect was selective for personal moral 
dilemmas. In addition, high WMC participants showed less variability in their responses 
to personal dilemmas than did low WMC participants, but this effect too was limited to 
the personal cases.  
Convergent evidence for this claim derives from neuroimaging studies that 
examine brain activity during moral judgment tasks. Greene and colleagues (2004) 
found that, across subjects, endorsement of harm in personal dilemmas was associated 
with increased activity in the anterior DLPFC (BA 10), right inferior parietal lobe (BA 
40) and in anterior regions of the posterior cingulate (BA 23/31). The anterior DLPFC 
and inferior parietal lobes are regularly observed to activate during working memory 
tasks and other comparable tasks requiring cognitive effort and/or abstract reasoning 
(Wager & Smith, 2003).  
2.4.1.1. The reflective deontologist objection 
An all-too-common, yet misguided, objection to these studies is predicated on 
the observation that numerous highly reflective individuals – including, influential 
moral philosophers such as Immanuel Kant – would disapprove of intentionally 
sacrificing one to save many. It is sometimes suggested that this observation challenges 
the proposed interpretation of the above studies, but this is not the case and I will 
explain why.  
The objective of most naturalistic theories is to give a general account of moral 
judgment; i.e., to provide an account how most people (i.e., psychotypical humans) 
make moral judgments most of the time. Of course, depending on the specific methods 
by which data are collected certain subsets of this target sample will be excluded (e.g., 
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in typical online studies, people who cannot read in English and people who do not have 
access to a computer are largely excluded). To the extent that these methods succeed in 
sampling randomly from the true population (of English speaking individuals with 
computer access), the resulting sample will include influential philosophers, reflective 
deontologists, intuitive utilitarians and so on roughly in the proportions in which they 
appear in the true population. And, as far as we can tell, when we do so, the result we 
obtain is the one reported above. 
 
Figure 2. The reflective deontologist objection:  A visual presentation. 
Of course, the resulting trend captures only some proportion of the total 
variability in moral judgment. This means that knowing a certain individual‘s cognitive 
style only determines a certain range within which the individual‘s moral judgment lies 
with a certain probability. For outliers like Kant and other reflective individuals who 
disapprove of the welfare sacrifice (see the RD data point in Figure 2), this trend does a 
particularly poor job of predicting their moral judgment. But, this is to be expected; we 
can explain this by pointing to decades of scholarly reflection on morality as a likely 
influence on the moral judgments of deontological philosophers. So, it is important to 
recognize from the outset that the existence of outliers (or counterexamples), like Kant, 
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does not undermine the observation of a probabilistic trend within a broader, target 
population.  
2.4.1.2. The reshaping objection 
Though in principle the above studies yield support for an efficacy view, there 
are numerous alternative explanations that one could give in line with a futility view. 
The following passage gives us a sense of how social intuitionists might reply to these 
data, in order to defend the futility view:  
Gut feelings say ―no, don‘t kill the child,‖ yet as soon as one leans toward 
making the ―no‖ response, one must deal with the consequence that the choice 
leads to death for many people, including the baby. Greene‘s fMRI data show 
that, in these difﬁcult cases in particular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
active, indicating ―cooler‖ reasoning processes at work. But does a slow ―yes‖ 
response indicate the victory of the sort of reasoning a philosopher would 
respect over dumb emotional processes? We think such cases are rather the 
paradigm of the sort of affective reasoning that James and Damasio described: 
there is indeed a conﬂict between potential responses, and additional areas of the 
brain become active to help resolve this conﬂict, but ultimately the person 
decides based on a feeling of rightness, rather than a deduction of some kind 
(Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, 195). 
This passage indicates a potential response social intuitionists might provide, 
which I will refer to as the reshaping reply. The reshaping reply is the following: When 
a dispositionally reflective person makes a permissive judgment about the footbridge 
dilemma, they do not – as Greene‘s account would have it – override a forceful and 
deeply rooted condemnatory intuition with an exercise of cognitive control, and impose 
a permissive judgment generated by System 2 processing. Instead, over time the 
reflective individual has reshaped their very intuitions such that when they face a moral 
dilemma their automatic intuition is in fact a permissive one. This reshaping could, as 
Haidt suggests, happen in a dialectical context via socialization with other reflective 
thinkers. In other words, the social intuitionist interpretation of these results is that 
controlled cognition exerts an indirect effect on moral judgment, by facilitating a 
different intuition. In this way, the proximate cause of more permissive moral 
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judgments about the footbridge dilemma is not a System 2 process but rather another 
System 1 intuition that has been revised over time by the tendency to engage in 
reflection, perhaps embedded in social, discursive practices. 
This response thereby maintains that the moral judgments are intuitions, while 
granting (as the empirical evidence demands) that cognitive processing may lead over 
time to more permissive moral attitudes about these cases. (The question of why this is 
so I will leave for Chapter 6). For now, let us grant that the reshaping reply undermines 
the apparent implication of the correlational data, and look next at the experimental 
studies, which may turn out to be incompatible with holding the futility view. 
2.4.2. Experimental studies 
So-called experimental paradigms provide an alternate strategy for empirical 
testing, which in principle enables us to test whether System 2 processes causally 
influence moral judgment or instead follow in the wake of moral judgment-making (as 
is upheld by the futility view). With this methodology, initial equivalence is established 
between research participants composing more than one group, or condition. Thereafter, 
participants in the experimental condition(s) are subjected to a manipulation, while 
participants in the corresponding control condition are not. This manipulation should be 
designed to modify, boost or inhibit, certain psychological properties or dispositions. In 
our present case, the relevant psychological capacity is the reliance on System 2 
processing. Next, participants complete the tasks of interest, containing the dependent 
variables which we seek to measure. If initial equivalence was established between the 
groups, and one group was subjected to a manipulation to which the other group was 
not, any measurable differences on the subsequent task are attributable to the causal 
influence of the manipulation. In our present case, manipulating affect prior to a moral 
judgment task – i.e., in order to boost reliance on affective cues – purportedly serves to 
examine the causal link from affect to moral judgment.  
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A recent study employed this approach, examining the influence of temporary 
boosts in reasoning processes on moral judgment (Paxton et al., 2012). Paxton and 
colleagues (2012) employed two manipulations aimed at promoting skepticism about 
one‘s intuitive judgments and fostering a reflective approach to moral judgment. In a 
first manipulation, participants completed the CRT prior to making moral judgments 
(versus after making moral judgments in the control group).  
Paxton and colleagues observed that this manipulation led to increased 
endorsement of harm in personal moral dilemmas as predicted by Greene‘s dual process 
theory: participants who completed the CRT prior to the moral dilemmas judged the 
actions as more permissible than did participants who completed the CRT after the 
moral dilemmas. The suggestion here is that completion of the CRT induces more 
reflective responding in subsequent tasks, as participants have successfully engaged a 
System 2 response where a System 1 response was available (see also Pinillos, Smith, 
Nair, Marchetto, & Mun, 2011). 
This influence of controlled cognitive processes is not limited to moral 
judgments about harm. It is found also in judgments about violations of the purity 
domain. Paxton and colleagues (2012) manipulated controlled processing before 
participants judged Haidt‘s harmless incest case. Half of the participants read a strong 
debunking argument for the evolutionary basis of the disgust response to incest, while 
the other half read a weak argument. In each group, half of the participants were 
requested to respond immediately and the other half were required to delay their 
response by at least two minutes to promote reflection, yielding four groups of 
participants. Paxton and colleagues observed that giving people enough time to ponder 
the strong argument selectively made participants‘ judgments about the case more 
lenient. (That is, neither viewing the strong argument alone independent of reflection 
time, nor being given time to reflect independent of argument strength influenced moral 
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judgments significantly.) This once again suggests that System 2 processing – slow 
deliberation over consciously held information – influences moral judgment.  
Together, the two manipulations led participants to revise their intuitive, System 
1 response, and engage cognitive processes to provide a counterintuitive, System 2 
response instead. At face value, these experimental results support the efficacy view 
about the role of controlled processing. 
2.4.2.1. Social intuitionist replies  
Here again the social intuitionist will likely issue a version of the reply outlined 
earlier, i.e., that controlled cognition indirectly shapes moral judgment by triggering an 
alternative intuition. But, even if social intuitionists will argue that intuition ultimately 
shapes moral judgment, it seems that here they must concede that controlled cognition is 
involved in something beyond the dialectical exchange of post hoc justifications. After 
all, the influence of these manipulations on moral judgment cannot be explained by 
differences in the opportunity for social and dialectical exchange. It is not obvious that 
viewing an argument on-screen counts as a ‗social‘ exchange, but let‘s suppose it does. 
Still, reasoned persuasion – as described in the social intuitionist model – cannot explain 
this pattern of results. Recall that, when reasoned persuasion takes place, it is the 
affective valence of A‘s (the computer‘s) reasoning that influence B‘s (the participant‘s) 
moral judgment. But both the strong and weak arguments in the above experiment 
exhibit the same attitude of permissibility towards consensual, non-reproductive incest.  
So, if this effect were attributable to reasoned persuasion, we would expect the strong 
and weak arguments to influence participants equally. 
It seems instead that what is influencing participants‘ judgments is precisely the 
rationality of the argument. Social intuitionists will at least have to concede that 
controlled processing is implicated in something like suppressing the predominant 
intuition, i.e., concerning the wrongness of pushing the man off the footbridge in one 
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case, and of consensual incest in the other. This is compatible with the futility view, just 
as long as the proximate cause of utilitarian judgment is still some System 1 process. 
Still, this departs significantly from the standard, social intuitionist account of the role 
of controlled processing. 
A further question in this social intuitionist interpretation of the above data 
concerns the origin of the utilitarian intuition. Supposing utilitarian attitudes were to 
stem from a System 1 process, social intuitionists would still have to offer some account 
of what kind of intuitions these judgments stem from, while respecting the four core 
features of System 1 intuition, which I presented at the beginning of this chapter.  Let us 
differentiate two potential replies, which I will then consider in sequence: 
1. Reshaping reply: The participant did not have a prior utilitarian intuition. The 
manipulations of controlled processing (the argument and deliberation time, and 
the CRT) originated a novel utilitarian intuition. 
2. Framing reply: The participant had a utilitarian intuition prior to the 
manipulation. The manipulations of controlled processing (the argument and 
deliberation time, and the CRT) bring out this dormant utilitarian intuition.  
The first response, a variant of the reshaping reply discusser earlier, seems less 
compatible with the results of the experimental studies than it was with the individual 
difference studies. This is due at least to a couple of considerations. The first is that the 
reshaping response (to these causal data) violates one of the core features of System 1 
processing. This feature of dual-process theories, about the evolutionary-ontogenetic 
primacy of intuition states that System 1 processes originate early in phylogeny and/or 
ontogeny, by comparison to System 2 processes (Evans, 2003). This precludes labeling 
as a System 1 response any psychological state that both originated and manifested 
within the average span of a testing session. A second consideration against the 
reshaping response is that social persuasion, as understood by Haidt (2001), cannot 
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account for the reshaping of participants‘ intuitions. On several counts, it appears that 
the reshaping response to the causal data fails.  
Next let‘s consider the framing reply. According to this view, these experimental 
manipulations serve to frame moral questions in such a light that brings ―dormant‖ (but 
pre-existing) utilitarian intuitions to the forefront. This explanation seems more 
plausible than the reshaping reply. But what kind of intuition would this dormant 
utilitarian intuition be?  
To answer this question, let‘s borrow Haidt‘s own five-part taxonomy of moral 
intuitions (Haidt & Graham, 2007). According to Haidt and Graham (2007), human 
moral intuitions belong to five, distinct moral foundations. That is, moral intuitions can 
be fruitfully categorized into five clusters, and both evolutionary (Haidt & Graham, 
2007) and statistical (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009) considerations support this 
classification. According to moral foundations theorists, the human mind is predisposed 
to acquire moral intuitions corresponding to each of these five foundations, as observed 
in numerous moral codes across cultures (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The foundations of 
harm and fairness encompass norms that proscribe harm to others and unjust behavior, 
and are suggested to relate to the evolution of the mammalian attachment system, 
empathy and mind-reading, and the development of reciprocal altruism. The loyalty and 
authority foundations are composed of norms that establish societal order and maintain 
intra-group relations e.g., norms about loyalty to superiors, patriotic duties, respect for 
elders, as well as govern attitudes towards the outgroup. These foundations are proposed 
to be closely linked to the evolution of small-scale, hunter-gatherer and tribal 
communities and their hierarchical structures. Finally, the purity foundation contains a 
wide range of norms concerning food, hygiene, proper use of the body, including sexual 
behavior, and religious mandates about transcending carnal and animal impulses, and 
cultivating a spiritual sense. These norms evolved originally to deter the ingestion of 
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contaminant substances, but now serve a broader purpose of establishing standards of 
decency and propriety. So, which moral foundation might inspire the intuition to 
condone killing one to save many? What about the intuition to demoralize consensual 
incest? 
A good candidate, at least with respect to our first question, would be fairness. 
This intuition, thought to have a relatively long evolutionary history (Haidt & Graham, 
2007; Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), could lead us to consider it morally right to value 
each of the lives of the five distal victims just as we value the life of the one proximal 
victim, with the likely consequence of promoting a utilitarian judgment about this case.
4
 
It is less clear, by contrast, what kind of intuition would yield the de-moralization of 
sexual taboos, such as consensual incest. But, even if we suppose that there is a latent 
intuition in support of de-moralization. Still, the framing reply fails to account for the 
temporal primacy of System 1 processes. Temporal primacy, remember, claims that 
System 1 responses are elicited quickly by the presence of the relevant stimuli. Quite 
the contrary, in Paxton and colleagues‘ experiment, permissive moral judgments 
required a certain lag. In this sense, it remains somewhat unclear whether these 
judgments – the endorsement of personal harm in footbridge-type dilemmas, and the 
demoralization of sexual taboos – might be properly characterized as System 1 
responses. 
2.4.3. Summing things up 
To sum things up, at face value these data lend credence to the efficacy view. I 
outlined some interpretations of these data that a social intuitionist might provide. First, 
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 Indeed, some unpublished evidence shows that fairness may undergird this moral 
view. We conducted a multiple regression analysis predicting moral judgments about 
footbridge style cases with harm and fairness scores as independent predictors. This 
analysis revealed distinct effects of both scores, such that harm increased 
condemnation and fairness decreased condemnation of footbridge dilemma cases. 
This suggests that fairness concerns may undergird the endorsement of personal harm 
for the greater good. 
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with respect to the individual difference studies, social intuitionists might argue that 
dispositionally reflective people have reshaped their intuitions over time through 
dialectical exchange with like-minded individuals; a reply which holds some ground. 
Second, with respect to the experimental studies, Paxton and colleagues‘ causal 
manipulations frame moral issues in ways that support certain, fairness-related, 
intuitions which are otherwise dormant and favor utilitarian responding.  
One might find these alternative explanations more or less convincing, but in 
any case they are elaborate, or even tedious, by comparison to Greene‘s parsimonious 
explanation. In addition, social intuitionists must explain a looming and mysterious 
connection between controlled processing and these alternate utilitarian intuitions: Why 
do reflective thinkers tend to demoralize personal harm and purity violations? And why 
do these experimental manipulations favor permissive moral attitudes over the 
spontaneous, condemnatory responses? There are no hints in the social intuitionist 
literature about what this connection might be. 
Though we have not yet arbitrated between the efficacy and futility views, in 
passing we have demonstrated that the role of System 2 processing is likely greater than 
social intuitionism has characterized it as being. The influence of controlled cognition 
on moral judgment is not limited to that of providing justifications in the context of 
dialectical exchange, but includes also an involvement in the suppression of 
predominant moral intuitions (such as those serving to condemn utilitarian trade-offs 
and purity violations). Having established this much, in the next section I will present 
some data that weighs in on our primary discussion: i.e., the debate between the efficacy 
and futility views.  
2.4.4. Are moral judgments algorithmic? 
As we saw earlier, multiple features of utilitarian moral judgment – its latency, 
its susceptibility to argument, and so on – suggest that it may be primarily a controlled, 
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System 1 response rather than an intuitive, System 2 response. However, these 
considerations are not decisive since we can imagine plausible interpretations of the 
relevant findings from a social intuitionist perspective. I will now review some evidence 
from a recent neuroimaging study (Shenhav & Greene, 2010) that rather convincingly 
demonstrates that utilitarian moral judgment violates an important postulate of System 1 
processing: it is algorithmic (or compositional), rather than associative. That is, rather 
than a sudden flash of valenced affect, utilitarian moral judgment is the product of a 
mental operation that consists of several steps. 
In the aforementioned neuroimaging study, Shenhav and Greene (2010) 
presented participants with a series of moral dilemmas. For each moral dilemma, the 
probability and magnitude of the consequences were manipulated. For instance, in one 
scenario, the agent is on a rescue boat headed to save a drowning man when she 
receives another emergency call alerting her of another wreckage involving a larger 
number M of passengers. There is another rescue boat that is near the larger wreckage 
and which will succeed in saving the M passengers with probability P. Participants are 
requested to judge whether it would be morally acceptable or unacceptable to head 
towards the larger wreckage and leave the single drowning man to die. The 
experimenters systematically manipulated M and P, and recorded participants‘ moral 
judgments as well as their neural activity during trials.  
The neural data revealed distinct brain regions that tracked the probability of 
loss of life, 1 – P (in the right anterior insula), the magnitude of harm or number of lives 
in the larger wreckage, M (in the central insula, dorsal striatum, and anterior and 
posterior cingulate cortices), and the expected value of heading towards the larger 
wreckage, M - M × P - 1 (in the ventral striatum, ventromedial prefrontal and medial 
orbitofrontal cortices). In addition, participants‘ moral judgments (about whether it 
would be permissible to head toward the larger wreckage and leave the single victim to 
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drown) were sensitive to the expected value of the action. This study therefore 
demonstrates that distinct neural mechanisms encode the probability, magnitude and 
expected value of behavioral options in a moral context (and that, as shown in previous 
studies too, this expected value calculus influences participants‘ moral judgments about 
these cases). Notice that this evidence strongly suggests that utilitarian moral judgment 
implicates an algorithmic, System 2 process, rather than some (perhaps fairness-related) 
intuitive flash. That is, participants are retrieving the information about probability, 
retrieving the information about the magnitude of harm, and deriving the product of 
these two values.  
These data are incompatible with the futility view. It is hard to imagine a 
convincing social intuitionist interpretation of these results that would serve to put the 
futility view back on the table. The social intuitionist would have to argue against the 
cumulative evidence that these distinct pieces of information in utilitarian calculus are 
being tracked by different neural regions and that this mental operation influences 
subsequent moral judgments. The claim that, even in these cases, moral judgment is a 
System 1 response is likely to garner meager support. Of course, social intuitionists 
might cast doubt on the external validity of Shenhav and Greene‘s experimental design 
altogether. In other words, they might grant that this study documents the occurrence in 
the lab of a calculated utilitarian reasoning, but question the representativeness of these 
moral dilemmas. That is, they might claim that this experimental task is too dissimilar 
to normal moral decision-making contexts for the elicited judgments to represent 
ordinary moral judgment. This I think will ultimately fail also. People ordinarily make 
moral and non-moral decisions that are consistent with the maximization of subjective 
value. Though indeed the probability and magnitude information were made explicit 
and salient in this experiment, there is little reason to believe that – when this 
information must be sought, and perhaps these values estimated – fundamentally 
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different cognitive processes are recruited instead (which don‘t involve the value 
calculus based on probability and magnitude). In sum, we ought to retain Greene‘s more 
parsimonious interpretation of these data, according to which these data demonstrate 
that the demoralization of personal harm and purity violations depend on an algorithmic 
mental operation, i.e., on controlled processes of reasoning.  
 
2.5. Is welfare calculus affectively motivated? 
In this last section, I will advance one last claim about the nature and operation 
of System 2 in moral judgment. I will argue that to characterize the dual systems, and 
their corresponding roles in moral judgment, as ―rational‖ and ―emotional‖ is 
misguided. The evidence reviewed above may explain why this first-pass distinction 
gained some traction in early theoretical discussions: i.e., both the reasoned debunking 
of System 1 responses and the algorithmic processing involved in constructing 
utilitarian judgment can be thought of as ―rational‖ processes. However, in this section, 
I will demonstrate that moral judgments cannot be composed of rational processes 
alone. I will then defend an alternate view according to which both System 1 and 
System 2 approaches to moral judgment are rooted in affective processes. On this 
account, the controlled system accomplishes utilitarian moral judgment by computing 
an algorithmic calculus, motivated by an affective valuation of patient welfare. 
Specifically, I will argue that determining the magnitude (but not the probability) of an 
outcome recruits an affective psychological mechanism. Therefore, without this 
affective basis (which I will seek to explain in the remainder of this chapter), one could 
not make a normal, System 2 moral judgment.
5
  
Recall that, in Shenhav and Greene‘s study, utilitarian judgment was made up of 
two neurocognitive components – probability and magnitude – and their product, value. 
                                                 
5
 As a side note, it is not clear whether the claim I will put forth here, that affect is 
involved in utilitarian moral judgment, is at odds with Greene‘s (2007) view. 
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Making a utilitarian judgment involves aggregating the outcomes of an action A, each of 
which has a probability Pi, magnitude Mi and an expected value of Mi × Pi. Consider the 
mental states that might undergird each of these components. Assessing the expected 
probability P1 of outcome O1 is straightforwardly a matter of having a belief about the 
conditional probability of O1 on A (i.e., about the likelihood that the outcome will ensue 
if the action is carried out). It is easy to see that this capacity does not require an 
affective basis (but only a belief about the probabilistic, causal relations that obtain). By 
contrast, in order to assess the moral magnitude of an outcome, my claim in this section 
is that having the relevant beliefs about an outcome O (for instance, concerning the 
number of times O will happen) does not suffice. Encoding the magnitude of an 
outcome requires in addition a valenced attitude towards the outcome itself. 
A couple of core requirements of utilitarian decision-making, I will argue, 
substantiate this point. Consider, first of all, the ability to compare outcomes, 
specifically, outcomes that are different in kind. This characteristic of ordinary 
utilitarian judgment is somewhat obfuscated in the experimental literature where moral 
judgment tasks often present unrealistically quantifiable trade-offs: sacrificing one life 
vs. saving five lives, and so on. But in many real life contexts, the utilitarian comparison 
of outcomes is not as straightforward, because one‘s behavioral options involve 
qualitatively (and not merely quantitatively) distinct outcomes. So, utilitarian decision-
making requires also the ability to compute the expected value of qualitatively distinct 
outcomes, and in particular, to determine their relative magnitude. For instance, it seems 
patently obvious that the magnitude of breaking a leg exceeds the magnitude of losing a 
finger nail. But how psychologically do we carry out this comparison? Some 
mechanism enables us to determine (rather rapidly) that breaking a leg entails a greater 
degree of harm, a longer term incapacitation, etc., than does losing a finger nail, and 
correspondingly in utilitarian decision-making we prefer the losing a finger nail 
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outcome to the breaking a leg outcome (supposing, let‘s say, that the expected 
probability of both outcomes is the same).  
Second, consider a related capacity that plausibly requires an affective 
underpinning, i.e., the capacity to value others‘ welfare at all. Making controlled moral 
judgments implicates the capacity to value or prefer utilitarian outcomes and not merely 
to identify them as such. In crude terms, one might say that a controlled moral judgment 
does not merely yield the belief that ―saving a life is more than saving no lives‖ but 
rather the preference for saving a life, i.e., ―saving a life is (morally) better than saving 
no lives‖. This points towards the presence some underlying non-cognitive attitude 
towards others‘ welfare. By analogy, consider the non-moral choice between a brick and 
a bottle of apple juice. In addition to having beliefs about these alternatives, in order to 
prefer one option over the other one must have a certain non-cognitive attitude, for 
instance, thirst. The evaluator‘s thirst grants value to the apple juice, but not to the 
brick. Similarly, there must be some non-cognitive attitude, brought to bear in utilitarian 
decision-making that grants (negative) value to the outcome ―the old lady broke her 
back‖, but not to ―the cardboard box broke‖. With this non-cognitive attitude (but not 
without it), the evaluator may have the preference for the latter outcome over the former 
outcome. This non-cognitive moral attitude would grant value simpliciter to the welfare 
of others (and, when aggregated across the multiple, probabilistic outcomes of an 
action, yields a preference for utilitarian courses of action).  
In sum, I have shown that ascribing a moral magnitude to the outcomes of an 
action requires some affective mechanism. Specifically, I have outlined two abilities 
that are commonly recruited by everyday utilitarian decision-making, and which are 
hard to account for in terms of rational or deliberative processes alone: (i) the 
comparison of qualitatively distinct outcomes, and (ii) the valuation of others‘ welfare 
simpliciter. These core requirements point towards the involvement of some non-
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cognitive moral attitude that motivates the welfare calculus in utilitarian decision-
making. 
2.5.1. Simulation theory of empathy  
The above considerations point tentatively towards the existence of a non-
cognitive attitude towards others‘ welfare that enables the ascription of valence and 
relative magnitude to distinct outcomes. In this section, I will propose a candidate 
affective mechanism that could yield this non-cognitive attitude: empathy. This 
psychological capacity was first examined closely by the Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophers (Hume, 1739; Smith, 1759/2011), and in recent years, has received notable 
empirical substantiation in the neurosciences and cognitive psychology, under the rubric 
of the simulation theory of empathy (for a review see Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti, 
2004). In reviewing the pertinent literature, I will demonstrate how empathy induced via 
simulation of the patients‘ perspective might compose the affective basis of System 2 
moral judgment, and that it can facilitate the valuation and comparison of distinct moral 
outcomes.  
It is well known that several Scottish Enlightenment philosophers argued that 
―sympathy‖ provides the foundation of morality. Consider, for instance, the following 
passages from Hume and Smith: 
We may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of sympathy. The 
minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can anyone be 
actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, 
susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates 
itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, 
and beget correspondent movements in every human creature. When I see the 
effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately 
passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the 
passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I 
perceive the causes of any emotion, my mind is conveyed to the effects, and is 
actuated with a like emotion (Hume, 1739, 3.3.1). 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves 
enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in 
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some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his 
sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not 
altogether unlike them (Smith, 1759, 1.1.1). 
The basic picture on their view was that, whether triggered by imagination or 
observation, the evaluator could simulate the patient‘s experience, perhaps including her 
beliefs, desires and motivational set, and in so doing, experience a similar emotion or 
hedonic state to that experienced by the patient.  
In the contemporary cognitive sciences, this philosophical account has received 
remarkable validation. The foremost advance in the empirical investigation of 
simulation-based empathy was the original discovery of single mirror neurons in 
macaque monkeys (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992), and 
analogous networks later in humans (Iacoboni et al., 1999). These mirror neurons fire 
both for own execution of the action, and for observation of a similar action in another 
individual. Later work expanded from the recognition of motor actions to explore the 
role of mirror neurons in the social ascription of emotional states to others. It is this 
body of work which brings to bear closely on the capacity for empathy discussed by 
Hume and Smith. Several studies have now demonstrated the existence of mirror 
neurons for the recognition of emotions (via facial expressions) and pain, activated 
indifferently when participants re requested to either imitate or merely observe 
emotional facial expressions (see e.g., Carr et al., 2003).  
Mirror neuron activation has also been observed in the experience of pain: 
participants who observe others‘ pain exhibit activation in networks that are linked to 
the first-hand experience of pain (Avenanti, Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006; 
Botvinick et al., 2005; Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004). A number of other 
studies, using magnetoencephalography and functional MRI, have since demonstrated 
that empathy for pain involves also the somatosensory cortex (Cheng, Yang, Lin, Lee, 
& Decety, 2008; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007; Moriguchi el al., 2007; 
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Ogino et al., 2007). Critically, an empathic response, facilitated by mirror neuronal 
activation, is observed not only following observation of pain and emotional states, but 
also following the mere imagination of another‘s experience of pain (Singer et al., 
2004). Precisely because observation and imagination of pain and emotional states in 
others activate neural networks for own experience of the perceived state, these 
representations of others‘ welfare activate somatic and autonomic responses to own 
experience of pain, and thereby initiate certain appropriate, pro-social behavioral 
responses (Preston & de Waal, 2002). Now let‘s examine how this psychological faculty 
might fulfill our desiderata; i.e., how simulation may yield some non-cognitive attitude 
towards others‘ welfare, and facilitate the attribution of a moral valence and magnitude 
to specific outcomes.  
First, the representations of others‘ hedonic states inherit the relevant properties 
from first-hand instantiation of comparable hedonic or affective states. This will likely 
include the association of a valence (e.g., positive) to recognizable emotional states 
(e.g., excitement). So, the third-party attribution inherits the valence associated to the 
first-person knowledge of the particular affective state. Second, mental simulation 
yields a certain non-cognitive attitude towards other‘s welfare for similar reasons. By 
processing the instantiation of others‘ emotional and hedonic states through mirror 
neuronal circuitry, one is motivated to respond in similar ways (though perhaps not in 
the same degree) than one responds to own states, resulting in the prosocial valuation of 
others‘ welfare.  
What about the ability to compare outcomes by ascribing relative magnitudes? 
Does simulation grant this ability? Indeed observation of emotional states of different 
magnitude yields differences in the strength of mirror neuronal activation and ensuing 
autonomic response (Harrison, Singer, Rotshtein, Dolan, & Critchley, 2006). It is 
known, for instance, that pupils are decreased in size with the experience in sadness. 
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Harrison and colleagues therefore presented images of sad faces while manipulating the 
size of the stimuli‘s pupils. Pupil size was found to influence the magnitude of the 
ascribed sadness, the strength of somatic and autonomic response (as measured by 
activation in the amygdala), and was mimicked by the participant while viewing the 
stimuli. This evidence demonstrates that differences in the magnitude of perceived harm 
are essentially tracked by differences in the evaluator‘s empathic response. This 
suggests a capacity to ascribe a magnitude to an outcome under consideration, which 
can thereafter be compared to another outcome (Saarela et al., 2007).  
In this section, we reviewed some evidence demonstrating how empathy, via the 
mental simulation of the patient‘s affective state, could undergird the capacities required 
by moral judgment which cannot be accounted for by rational and deliberative processes 
alone. The observation or imagination of another‘s experience elicits, through the 
activation of shared systems, a comparable emotional state in the evaluator. By 
understanding another‘s emotional states as neural instantiations of one‘s own 
comparable emotional states, this mechanism is capable of (i) yielding a non-cognitive 
moral attitude towards others‘ welfare, which (ii) correlates with the perceived 
magnitude or severity of the patient‘s projected state. In this way, the empathic response 
derived from simulation of the patient‘s experience enables the ascription of a valence 
and relative magnitude to different moral outcomes under consideration. 
2.5.2. Piecing it together 
The simulation theory of empathy explains how simulating the victim‘s or 
beneficiary‘s perspective might induce an empathic response which grants a valence 
and a relative magnitude to the outcome under consideration. Now we are in a position 
to evaluate how this affective mechanism complements Greene‘s neurocognitive 
account of the welfare calculus involved in utilitarian moral judgment. The relative 
magnitude of the outcome, along with a belief about the probability of the outcome, 
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together yield the outcome‘s expected value. The expected value of each behavioral 
option is compared, and a moral judgment is made by endorsing the behavioral option 
with the greater expected value for patient welfare. In what follows, I will articulate and 
address two obvious weaknesses of the proposed account of patient simulation. 
2.5.2.1. Psychological overdemandingness 
One might worry that this account of moral judgment is simply too contrived to 
reflect any aspect of the operation of folk moral judgment: the complexity of the mental 
operations stipulated by this account exceeds what might plausibly be attributed to 
ordinary moral cognition. Of course, in trolley-type moral dilemmas, where a very 
limited number of outcomes are stipulated by the context, the cognitive operations 
demanded by my proposed account might not overdemanding. In these circumstances, 
the agent‘s behavioral options (pushing a fat man off the footbridge vs. not) and the 
corresponding morally relevant outcomes (the death of the one vs. the death of the five) 
are severely restricted. By contrast, applying utilitarian moral decision-making in real-
life contexts (e.g., which career path to take, or which of a variety of products to buy) 
involves the choice between multiple behavioral options, and the morally relevant 
outcomes extend beyond the immediate consequences of the action. So for these 
contexts, we might question whether a mechanism that entails the consideration of all 
relevant outcomes is a plausible feature of ordinary moral cognition.  
Indeed it is rather unlikely that controlled moral judgment involves the 
consideration of all morally relevant outcomes in these more realistic contexts. But the 
account I have defended is not committed to such a claim. There is no reason to suppose 
that the exercise of controlled cognition requires the consideration of all morally 
relevant outcomes. Instead it is more appropriate to suppose that the range of morally 
relevant outcomes that figure into the aggregate welfare calculus may be influenced by 
situational and individual differences, such the evaluator‘s own cognitive style. Indeed, 
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as we saw before, reflective individuals tend to make more utilitarian moral judgments. 
On the account I am developing we can explain why this is: they are better able to, and 
more willing to, hold a greater number of morally relevant outcomes in mind, with their 
corresponding probabilities and magnitudes, and aggregate them to estimate the 
expected moral value of distinct behavioral options. This taxing mental exercise is one 
that reflective individuals are more likely to accomplish. In sum, controlled processing 
in moral judgment enables optimal utilitarian moral judgment, but it is important to see 
that it does not necessitate utilitarian moral judgment. This account can still explain the 
existing correlational data without being psychologically overdemanding.  
  
2.6. Conclusion 
The account I have put forth bears some resemblance to Greene‘s dual process 
theory. First of all, I grant Greene‘s efficacy view is closer to the truth than Haidt‘s 
futility view: controlled processing plays a role in favoring utilitarian moral judgment. 
However, Greene‘s account understates the necessity for an affective underpinning to 
utilitarian judgment. I.e., controlled cognition must be supplemented by a valuation 
mechanism, in order to yield an evaluative attitude. In this way, both System 1 and 
System 2 are ultimately grounded in affective processes. Controlled cognition has 
multiple roles to play in moral judgment: first of all, to suppress the System 1 response, 
and second, to perform the welfare-maximizing calculus. However, as I said, these are 
altogether insufficient to constitute a moral judgment without a mechanism of valuation, 
which in utilitarian judgment is facilitated by empathy for other‘s welfare, 
psychologically enacted via simulation.  
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Chapter 3. Mental simulation and the spontaneous evaluation of moral events 
 
3.1. Introduction 
While the influence of reason has been challenged, the role of affect in human 
moral competence has been vindicated by a wealth of empirical evidence. Dozens of 
studies highlight the pervasive role of affect in folk judgments about the moral 
permissibility of actions (Greene et al., 2001; Inbar, Pizarro & Bloom, 2009a; Schnall et 
al., 2008), and the moral character (Inbar, Pizarro & Cushman, 2012) and responsibility 
(Nichols & Knobe, 2007) of agents. In this chapter, I will highlight two unresolved 
questions concerning the formation of spontaneous moral judgments. Before moving 
forward, I will briefly unpack what is meant by spontaneous moral judgment throughout 
this chapter. I will be employing this term to refer to the average moral judgment made 
by psychotypical individuals, and which springs relatively quickly to mind in the wake 
of a morally evaluable event. 
The precise characterization of the role of affect in moral judgment has been 
subject to intense theoretical debate. In the first part of this chapter, I will take part in 
this debate by restating some of the different claims that have been made on this matter, 
and evaluating them in light of the diverse empirical studies that bear on this question. I 
will argue that the view according to which affect merely results from moral judgment-
making is untenable.  
Whereas the question about the psychological character of moral judgments has 
drawn great attention (i.e., Are moral judgments beliefs, intuitions, emotions?), very 
little progress has been made in characterizing the antecedent psychological processes 
which give rise to them, i.e., those processes taking place between the presentation of 
moral stimuli and the resulting moral evaluation. In the second half of this chapter, my 
aim will be to push forth in the characterization of these processes. I will claim, first, 
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that several popular accounts of moral judgment assume that moral judgment must 
derive from some process of categorizing actions on the basis of their properties. I 
challenge this assumption by examining a range of studies that, I argue, are better 
explained by appealing to processes of mental simulation. In passing, this defense of 
simulation-based processes over categorization-based processes in turn speaks to our 
debate about the character of moral judgment, advocating a strong causal role for 
affective processes. 
 Process  
Stimuli  Mental state 
Figure 3. The structure of moral evaluation. 
Therefore, my general strategy in this paper will be to work backwards in the 
causal chain (see Figure 3). First I will examine the psychological constitution of moral 
judgments (the mental state) in Section 2. Next, in Sections 3 and 4, I will look closer at 
the processes which yield this mental state (the process).  
 
3.2. Characterizing the relationship of affect to moral judgment 
In the last two decades, ample experimental evidence has been produced by 
empirical studies in moral psychology which demonstrate an involvement of affective 
processes in the formation of spontaneous moral judgment. Throughout this section, I 
will discuss much of that body of evidence in order to adjudicate between three popular 
and distinct claims about the relationship between affect and moral judgment. Before 
getting started, I will differentiate three such claims that vary in the strength of the 
relationship they posit between affect and moral judgment: 
1. Affect as constitutive. The activation (or induction) of a certain affective state 
causally produces moral judgment.  
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Stimuli  Affect 
Figure 4. Affect as constitutive. 
This is the strongest claim, and versions of it are endorsed by Prinz (2006), and 
Haidt (2001). According to this view, the processing of moral stimuli yields an affective 
response, positively or negatively valenced, which constitutes the moral judgment (see 
Figure 4). Therefore the induction of an affective state is capable of interfering with 
moral judgment-making processes (e.g., causing the misattribution of moral valence to a 
non-moral action). This sort of view is best paired with an emotivist or sentimentalist 
account of moral judgment. 
2. Affect as modulator. Moral affect influences moral judgment. Specifically, 
moral judgments are constituted of intuition, but the experience of moral affect 
during moral judgment-making process influences the severity of moral 
judgment. 
                                                        Affect 
                   
Stimuli                    Intuition 
Figure 5. Affect as modulator. 
According to this view, affect does not play a necessary causal role in moral 
judgment. It does however influence the moral decision-making process, acting as an 
―amplifier/dampener‖ of moral intuition (see Figure 5). This view predicts that the 
induction of moral affect cannot by itself yield a valenced moral judgment. But in 
conjunction with a moral intuition, affect can modulate the severity of ensuing moral 
judgment. So, this claim seems to speak in favor of a moral intuitionism, and has been 
upheld by a number of moral psychologists (Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Huebner 
et al., 2009; Nichols, 2002). 
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3. Affect as epiphenomenon. Moral affect does not influence moral judgment. 
Rather, moral affect results from processes of moral judgment-making.  
          Affect                  
         Stimuli              Intuition      
          Intuition 
Figure 6a. Affect as epiphenomenon I. 
Stimuli              Intuition         Affect  
Figure 6b. Affect as epiphenomenon II. 
Notice that there is a fundamental difference between the epiphenomenal view, 
and the constitutive and modulator views. The epiphenomenal view grants no causal 
role to affect in shaping moral judgment: on this view, affective responses merely 
follow from the process of moral judgment-making (as in Figure 6b), or from the 
presentation of moral stimuli in a manner independent of the moral judgment processes 
(as in Figure 6a). Epiphenomenal claims of this sort fit most naturally in support of 
moral intuitionism, and versions of them are found in the work of Mikhail (2011). 
Having differentiated three claims about the relationship between moral affect 
and judgment, in the remainder of this section I will examine the existing evidence in 
order to arbitrate between these views, and ultimately, to shed light on the question 
whether the core mental state in spontaneous moral judgment is an intuitive or an 
affective mental state. 
3.2.1. Correlational studies 
Early empirical studies show that distinct moral emotions, each with its 
corresponding facial expressions, are associated to different kinds of moral concerns 
(Rozin et al., 1999b). According to Rozin and colleagues‘ (1999b) CAD triad 
hypothesis, anger, contempt, and disgust are typically and cross-culturally elicited by 
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violations of autonomy (individual rights violations), community (violation of 
communal codes, including hierarchy), and divinity (violations of purity-sanctity) 
correspondingly.
6
  Participants in the United States and Japan were shown a series of 
descriptions of situations, such as a child saying dirty words to his parents (community), 
a man coming home drunk and beating his wife (autonomy), or touching a corpse 
(divinity). They were asked to pair each situation with the appropriate emotional 
response, by selecting either a facial expression or an emotion term corresponding to 
contempt, anger, or disgust. In a further experiment, participants read these situations 
and were asked to make appropriate facial expressions in response. Facial expressions 
were videotaped and coded according to movements that characterize each emotion 
(e.g., a one-sided smirk for contempt, a lowered brow for anger, or a wrinkled nose for 
disgust). Results on these studies provided clear support for the CAD triad hypothesis, 
indicating that unique emotions correspond to distinct moral domains.  
The association between trait disgust and violations of divinity (or purity) has 
been examined in greater depth in subsequent studies (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & 
Cohen, 2009; Inbar et al., 2009a). People vary in the strength of their reactions to 
disgusting situations, like seeing a human hand preserved in a jar during science class or 
drinking from a used but disinfected toilet bowl. Participants‘ sensitivity to disgust has 
been shown to predict judgments about purity-related issues, like incest, homosexual 
sex (Inbar et al., 2009a), such that participants who are more prone to feelings of disgust 
tend to condemn these behaviors more harshly. This relationship is also observed with 
participants‘ implicit judgments about male homosexuality, for example (Inbar, Pizarro, 
Knobe & Bloom, 2009b). Inbar and colleagues tested a sample of typically liberal 
college students to discover whether participants‘ implicit attitudes towards male 
homosexuality might be at odds with their explicit avowals. A long history of social 
                                                 
6
 Incidentally, this proposal is an important precursor of the moral foundations theory I 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
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psychological studies demonstrates that numerous biases and prejudices underlie 
participants‘ outwardly egalitarian commitments with respect to women, the elderly, 
racial minorities, and so on (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Indeed Inbar and colleagues 
found that, even among participants who overtly would express tolerance for male 
homosexuality, implicit measures of their attitudes revealed a negative bias. But, more 
importantly for our purposes, this bias was proportionate to participants‘ level of trait 
disgust, i.e., greater disgust sensitivity correlated with greater implicit prejudice and 
condemnation of homosexuality. 
Neuroscientific research further demonstrates the involvement of affective 
systems during the presentation of morally valenced stimuli (Moll, Eslinger, & de 
Oliveira-Souza, 2001, Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002a, Moll et al., 
2002b) and during the formation of moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). Moll 
and colleagues (2001, 2002a, 2002b) report heightened affect and activation in 
emotional networks in the brain during the contemplation of moral stimuli.
7
  
In a first study, subjects heard a set of moral and non-moral statements while in 
the fMRI scanner (Moll et al., 2001). Participants pondered the meaning of the sentence 
and judge whether they found each statement right or wrong. (The Portuguese terms 
―certo‖ and ―errado‖ are fully ambiguous between moral rightness/wrongness and 
truth/falsity.) Relative to non-moral claims, consideration of claims with moral content 
produced the most robust activity bilaterally in the frontal pole (BA 10/46) and the 
medial frontal gyrus (BA 9; see also Moll et al., 2002). A subsequent study by Moll and 
colleagues found similar neural responses to pictures with moral content, such as 
physical assaults, or poor abandoned children (Moll et al., 2002b), relative to control, 
                                                 
7
 These studies provide also convergent behavioral evidence of the correlation between 
affective processes and moral judgment: Participants judged moral statements, like 
―The boy stole his mother‘s savings‖, to be more emotionally charged than non-moral 
statements, like ―Desserts make you fat‖; and their moral judgments of the actions 
were predicted by their ratings of emotionality for both right and wrong actions. 
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non-moral images.  Across all three studies, activation of the medial frontal gyrus 
(BA9) – observed during attention to subjective emotional states (Lane et al., 1997) and, 
in particular, of unpleasant emotions (Lane et al., 1999; Damasio et al., 2000) – was 
preferentially engaged during consideration of moral stimuli.
 
 
Greene and colleagues‘ (2001, 2004) contrasting approach examined the brain 
activity of individuals while making moral judgments about a series of moral dilemmas. 
Some of the dilemmas were impersonal, where agents choose to save a greater number 
of people and sacrifice someone as a side-effect of so doing (as in the switch case). The 
other half were personal dilemmas, in which the agent actively harms a victim in order 
to save a greater number of people (as in the footbridge case). In line with prior data, 
they found increased participants condemn the personal trade-offs more severely than 
the impersonal trade-offs (Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993). Additionally, 
judgments of personal moral dilemmas elicited greater activation in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (BA 9/10), posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31/7), and bilateral superior 
temporal sulcus/inferior parietal lobe (BA 39), than did judgments of impersonal 
dilemmas. These brain regions are associated with affective processing, suggesting that 
affect is involved in the condemnation of intentional sacrifices in personal moral 
dilemmas.   
3.2.1.1.Non-cognitivist interpretation 
Greene‘s own non-cognitivist interpretation of these data is fairly 
straightforward:  The moral mind is such that the consideration of violent forms of harm 
and/or violations of sexual taboos, as seen in the incest case, elicit System 1 affective 
responses directly. These ‗hard-wired‘ affective responses constitute the moral 
judgments we make.
8
 This view therefore predicts that participants who experience 
                                                 
8
 As we saw, on Greene‘s account, the presence of heightened affect during moral 
judgment tasks is the result of evolutionary pressures that shaped our psychology to 
respond quickly and effectively to certain upclose moral violations. These affective 
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stronger affective responses will condemn the moral violations more heavily, while 
participants who experience weaker affective responses condemn them less. Differences 
in affect – whether indexed by neural, physiological, or self-report measures – are 
associated to differences in moral judgment since these affective responses themselves 
constitute the moral judgments.  
3.2.1.2. Intuitionist interpretation 
In response, universal moral grammar theorists, such as Mikhail (2007) and 
Huebner (2008) who defend a view of moral judgment as constituted by non-affective 
intuition, have been eager to remind us that the methodologies employed in these 
correlational experiments do not warrant a causal claim about the involvement of affect. 
Whether behavioral, physiological or neuroscientific in kind, this collection of studies 
―provides only correlational data, showing that emotions are associated with moral 
judgments. Such data (on their own) can never be used to infer causality‖ (Huebner et 
al., 2009, 3). In addition, the fMRI studies, ―because of the poor temporal resolution of 
neuroimaging, cannot be used to assess when emotions have a role or whether they are 
constitutive of moral concepts. In summary, the mere activity of neural circuits 
classically associated with emotion in processing moral scenarios fails to distinguish 
between the claim that (i) emotions are integral to moral computation and (ii) emotions 
result from these computations‖ (Huebner et al., 2009, 3-4). In sum, these studies do not 
arbitrate between the above views; they are compatible with a constitutive, modulator or 
epiphenomenal role for affect. 
Mikhail‘s explanation of Greene‘s neural data rests on the assumption of 
intuitive, and plausibly innate, concepts in the domains of morality and law. Mikhail 
points out that Greene and the scientific community at large have neglected to see that: 
                                                                                                                                               
responses played some adaptive role in dissuading the performance of these immoral 
behaviors. 
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…all of the actions described by these [trolley-type] vignettes are well-known 
crimes or torts. […]By contrast, only five of the 19 cases in Greene‘s 
―impersonal‖ condition are batteries, and only one of these batteries is 
purposeful. The basic cleavage he identified in the brain was not Kant versus 
Mill, but purposeful battery, rape, and murder, on the one hand, and a disorderly 
grab bag of theft crimes, regulatory crimes, torts against non-personal interests, 
and risk–risk tradeoffs, on the other. Moreover, his finding that the MPFC, PCC, 
STS, and amygdala are recruited for judgment tasks involving purposeful 
battery, rape, and murder does not undermine the traditional rationalist thesis 
that moral precepts are engraved in the mind. To the contrary, Greene‘s evidence 
largely supports that thesis. […] Naturally, violent crimes and torts are more 
emotionally engaging than insider trading or environmental risk analysis, but it 
does not follow that emotion ―constitutes‖ or ―drives‖ the judgment that the 
former acts are wrong. Rather, what drive these intuitions are the unconscious 
computations that characterize these acts as battery, rape, or murder in the first 
place (Mikhail, 2011, 294). 
So, for Mikhail, the personal/impersonal distinction differentiates grave crimes 
featuring murder or purposeful battery from an assortment of lesser crimes. An intuitive 
knowledge of moral and legal norms grants us the fundamental abilities to assign 
differential blame to these kinds of cases (just as our intuitive knowledge of linguistic 
norms, allows us to construct, understand and evaluate the grammaticality of sentences 
we have never heard). This innate knowledge contains concepts, such as ―intentional 
battery‖, ―murder‖ and so on, which are cemented in our legal and moral lexicon. 
Therefore, on this intuitionist account, the role of affect – discovered in the trolley 
problem studies, but also in judgments about simple harmful actions – is limited to that 
of epiphenomenon; affect merely results from this intuitive parsing of actions according 
to innate moral and legal principles. 
So, as it stands, these explanations are on equal footing: The aforementioned 
correlational evidence is compatible with either the constitutive and modulator views, 
latent in Greene and colleagues‘ (2001, 2007) interpretation of these studies, or the 
epiphenomenal view, championed by Mikhail‘s (2000, 2011) competing explanation. 
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3.2.2. Experimental studies 
Several studies in moral psychology have employed experimental designs to 
manipulate the reliance on affective processing. For instance, in the examination of 
harm violations, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) presented participants with a comedic 
video clip as an induction of positive affect. Participants viewed a funny Saturday Night 
Live clip (in the experimental group) or an affectively neutral video clip (in the control 
group) and then responded to versions of the switch and footbridge dilemmas. The 
researchers reasoned as follows: If (as Greene‘s view posits) people condemn the action 
of pushing the man in front of the trolley due to a negative affective response, then the 
dose of positive affect induced by watching a short comedic sketch should counteract 
the negative response that drives moral condemnation, thereby making people‘s 
judgments less condemnatory. By contrast, if negative affect is a mere epiphenomenon, 
as Mikhail argues in the passage above, this manipulation should drive no difference in 
moral judgment. In line with Greene‘s view, the researchers found that people who had 
watched the funny video tended to endorse pushing the man in front of the trolley more 
often than did participants who had watched the neutral video clip. Similar results have 
been achieved with neurochemical manipulations of affective state (Crockett et al., 
2010), where an increase in levels of serotonin – a neurotransmitter implicated in 
behavioral inhibition – was shown to lead to greater condemnation of welfare trade-offs 
in personal contexts.  
Similar effects have been demonstrated in the condemnation of purity domain 
issues. Schnall and colleagues‘ (2008) subjected their participants to a variety of 
manipulations aimed at enhancing the experience of disgust – e.g., sitting at a messy 
desk or smelling a noxious odor during the testing session – and found that participants 
made more severe moral judgments than did controls. Similarly, the induction of disgust 
through hypnosis influences moral judgment (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Participants 
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who were hypnotized to feel disgust in response to a neutral word like ―often‖ then 
judged moral transgressions as more wrong in vignettes containing the hypnotically 
targeted word. Across a range of stimuli, experimental inductions of affect are shown to 
influence subsequent moral judgment tasks, indicating a causal role for affect.  
3.2.2.1. Rejecting the epiphenomenal view 
Intuitionists have offered a couple of distinct replies to refute the causal 
inference that these data seemingly warrant, acknowledging the influence of affective 
processes on moral judgment while retaining the core tenet of intuitionism. For instance, 
Huebner and colleagues argue that:  
…emotion could modify the inputs into distinctively moral circuits rather than 
modulating the operation of these moral circuits themselves. Thus, although 
asking subjects to evaluate a moral question triggers the process of moral 
evaluation, the negative emotional state yields a more severe moral judgment 
because of an increased focus on the ‗antecedently‘ morally salient features of 
the scenario (2009, 3). 
This response basically amounts to an endorsement of the modulator view; i.e., 
affect is not the core component of spontaneous moral judgment, but it can (and does, as 
demonstrated in these studies) exert an influence on moral judgment, primarily by 
modulating its severity. A distinct response offered by intuitionists characterizes the 
induction of affect as instigating the formation of a competing judgment:  
…although emotion yields ‗practical‘ judgments, it is unclear that this warrants 
treating emotion as constitutive of ‗moral‘ judgments. Perhaps moral cognition 
can be interfered with by introducing distracting emotional stimuli. However, 
because disgust functions practically to help us avoid toxic, infectious or 
contaminating substances, it could generate interruptive judgments that could 
compete with moral cognition for attentional resources. Existent data fail to 
address the plausible hypothesis that the apparent modulation of moral 
judgments by emotion is an artifact of the redeployment of attentional resources 
(Huebner et al., 2009, 3, italics added). 
On this interpretation, disgust interferes with moral judgment processes by 
instigating the operation of a distinct class of judgments, according to Huebner and 
colleagues, ‗practical‘ judgments. That is to say, when heightened disgust is activated, 
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participants are engaged in the cognitive task of determining whether ―any toxic, 
infectious or contaminant substances‖ are present, which should be avoided. Although 
Huebner and colleagues do not make this clear, the potential disgust elicitors could be 
the prime – i.e., the fart spray, or the dirty desk – or the moral stimuli itself – i.e., the 
case of consensual incest, bestiality, and so on – or both. In either case, the 
manipulation prompts participants to form the practical judgment to avoid the disgust-
eliciting, potentially infectious or contaminant substance or practice. In sum, this 
account advocates a version of the modulator view as well, i.e., affective processes 
modulate moral judgment, but do not constitute an essential part of it. 
3.2.3. In search of intuition 
Whereas these experimental studies persuasively rule out the epiphenomenal 
view, they are compatible with both the constitutive view, defended by Greene (2007), 
and the modulator view, defended by Huebner and colleagues (2009). At this point, we 
may choose to accept a sort of stalemate between the constitutive and modulator views 
in terms of their explanatory power. And yet, if we bring considerations of theoretical 
parsimony to bear, it seems patently clear that the modulator view suffers an important 
disadvantage. While the ontology that is posited by a non-cognitivist account is 
tractable across numerous empirical studies, the intuitionist ontology requires the 
existence of some additional mental state, the intuition, for which no experimental 
evidence has been produced. . The above collection of studies, whether correlational or 
experimental, operationalize affective states via psychometric scale completion (e.g., 
disgust sensitivity), neural activation patterns (e.g. principally in the amygdala and 
VMPFC), or physiological signals (e.g., skin conductance response). So non-cognitivist 
explanations, like Greene and colleagues‘, can straightforwardly identify the indexed 
affective processes as the precise psychological states that constitute participants‘ moral 
judgments. Contrarily, intuitionists explain this evidence in every case by positing the 
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existence and operation of a distinct, non-affective intuition that is nowhere tractable in 
the experimental literature. In simple terms, we might ask rhetorically: Where is the 
evidence for the non-affective intuition? In this respect, the constitutive view holds the 
advantage of theoretical parsimony over the modulator view. 
 
3.3. Further back in the causal chain 
So far in this chapter we have focused on the relationship between affective 
processes and moral judgment, in order to determine the psychological character of 
moral judgment. In the remaining sections, I will take a step back in the causal chain 
and examine the nature of the psychological processes deployed in the interpretation of 
moral stimuli. In other words, what are the cognitive operations that take place between 
the presentation of moral stimuli and the resulting affective response? Whereas a vibrant 
discussion has centered on determining the precise psychological character of moral 
judgment, relatively less progress has been made in characterizing the antecedent, 
cognitive processes which yield our moral judgments. In addition, our present 
discussion will provide some purchase on the emotivism-intuitionism debate which has 
been the focus of this chapter thus far. This is because, in characterizing the cognitive 
processes that yield the pattern of spontaneous moral judgments evinced in the 
experimental literature, we will arbitrate between the constitutive and modulator views.  
3.3.1. Categorization/computation view 
Numerous intuitionist accounts presuppose that moral intuitions are derived 
through some process of computation over, or categorization on the basis of constituent 
properties of moral actions. This view is rather common in moral psychology, appearing 
in Nichols and Mallon (2006), Bartels (2008), and Mikhail (2007). Nichols and Mallon 
(2006) argue that the normative properties of actions – that is whether they violate any 
normative rules – in conjunction with an affective response (of disgust, or empathic 
   61 
concern) jointly determine the action‘s moral status. A related view, owing to Mikhail 
(2000), argues that moral judgment is the product of an operation over the causal and 
intentional properties of an action.  
The case for intuitive categorization or computation has rested heavily on a 
number of studies concerning the so-called means/side-effect distinction:  
M/SE: Harm as a means to an end is morally worse than equivalent harm 
resulting as a side effect of achieving an end. 
M/SE is observed routinely in folk moral judgments both in hypothetical 
dilemma contexts and in contemporary ethical debates. This principle might account, 
for instance, for the difference in people‘s intuitions concerning killing, in active 
euthanasia, versus letting die, in passive euthanasia (Foot, 1967). Similarly, in the 
experimental literature, we observe that actions involving harm as a means, e.g., the 
footbridge case, are judged to be forbidden, while actions that involve harm as a side-
effect, e.g., the switch case, are judged to be relatively more permissible. This pattern of 
intuitions arises rather universally and is normally deployed without the evaluator‘s own 
introspective knowledge of the principle itself (Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; 
Royzman & Baron, 2002). For these reasons, M/SE has stood as a clear exemplar of an 
unconscious moral principle that is intuitive, and plausibly has some innate basis.  
Categorization theorists have taken this principle as evidence that the moral 
status of an action is determined through a computation that depends on the action‘s 
intentional properties: namely, target moral actions are categorized as permissible if 
they involve un-intentional harm, and forbidden if they involve intentional harm, in line 
with the M/SE principle. Nichols and Mallon, for instance, refer to this capacity in 
terms of ―identifying rule violations‖: 
[We] suggest that judgments on the footbridge cases are guided by affect-backed 
rules: our all-in judgment to footbridge-style cases is a product of both rules and 
emotions. […] Typically, then, when a person judges an action as all-in 
62 
impermissible despite its having favorable outcomes this depends on both 
emotional activation and on thinking that a rule has been violated (2006, 540).  
On their view, moral violations therefore depend on an automatic categorization 
that depends on two components, one affective – whether harm ensues – and one 
intuitive – whether a rule has been violated (intentionally). The moral status of actions, 
on this view, depends in essence on a computation over these two properties of actions 
(i) whether they elicit an affective response, and (ii) whether they involve the intentional 
violation of a rule (see Table 2). Note that this view can account also for the moral-
conventional distinction: i.e., moral and conventional offenses alike involve the 
intentional violation of a rule, but moral offenses alone result in harm (Nichols, 2002). 
Both features are needed to produce a judgment of moral condemnation.  
Table 2. Two-component computation à la Nichols. 
 Rule violation: NO Rule violation: 
Victim distress: 
morally forbidden 
(e.g., footbridge dilemma, 
hitting a child) 
morally permissible 
(e.g., switch dilemma) 
NO Victim distress: 
morally permissible 




Similarly, Mikhail‘s universal grammar theory (2000, 2007) accounts for the 
deployment of the M/SE distinction in terms of a categorization process, akin to that of 
the grammatical parsing of sentences.  Consider, for example, the structural 
representations of the footbridge and switch dilemmas in Figure 7: 
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In each representation, we observe at the base the agent‘s original action. On the 
central branch we can see the agent‘s intentional behavior, while on diagonal branches 
we observe the side-effects of the agent‘s behavior. At the top of each central branch, 
we observe the agent‘s ultimate goal: i.e., to save the five workers on the tracks. Along 
each branch, we have a series of temporally distinct nodes that complete the description 
of the behavior.  On Mikhail‘s view, target actions are categorized and ascribed deontic 
properties (i.e., forbidden, permissible, obligatory) on the basis of this complex 
structural representation of their temporal, causal and intentional properties.  
In our present case, a difference in the representation of an action‘s intentional 
properties specifically gives rise to the M/SE distinction. In both cases, the agent 
commits battery and homicide against the proximal victim. However, the footbridge 
case involves battery as a means to saving the five lives, while in the switch case battery 
is a side-effect of saving the five lives (Mikhail, 2007). This is evinced in our 
descriptions of events using causal and intentional language: consider the linguistic 
expressions ―D caused the train to hit the man in order to save the five workers‖ and ―D 
saved the five workers by causing the train to hit the man‖. Notice that these statements 
are appropriate descriptions of the footbridge case, but fairly inappropriate descriptions 
of the switch case.   
                                                 
9
 Diagrams extracted from Mikhail (2007). 
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Mikhail‘s view therefore shares a fundamental perspective with Nichols & 
Mallon‘s. They both stress the unconscious computation over a few orthogonal factors. 
Some factors involve the detection of a harmful outcome, while other actors involve the 
detection of intention. In both accounts, the computation over these distinct components 
occurs quickly and unconsciously (even if the information may be consciously 
accessible ex post facto). Spontaneous moral judgment of the target action is dependent 
on the result of this computation.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue for an alternative to the 
categorization view. I will begin by presenting three sets of studies, concerning people‘s 
moral judgment patterns, that challenge the assumption that the central cognitive 
process in moral evaluation is one of intuitive categorization:  
1. Motor system: Moral judgments are sensitive also to motor features of the 
agent‘s action (Greene et al., 2009). 
2. Sensory systems: Moral judgment implicates sensory networks, including 
visual (Amit & Greene, 2012) and olfactory (Inbar, Pizarro & Bloom, 2012; 
Schnall et al., 2008) systems. 
3. Projection: Moral judgment involves projecting one‘s own values (Bartels, 
2008; Lieberman & Lobel, 2012) and non-moral preferences in third-party 
moral judgment. 
I will argue that these studies do not fit squarely with the categorization view, 
and throughout the following section, I will present a fundamentally distinct view of the 
cognitive processing of moral stimuli that better accounts for these data. 
3.3.2. The involvement of sensory and motor systems 
Evidence suggests that both sensory and motor systems are involved in the 
formation of spontaneous moral judgment. In particular, moral judgments about 
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personal moral dilemmas and purity violations are susceptible to manipulations that 
engage sensory and motor systems.  
3.3.2.1. Motor system 
In a 2009 paper, Greene and colleagues argued that the cognitive processes by 
which we normally condemn intentional harm, proscribe also the use of motor force in 
causing harm. This conclusion is based on the results of two experiments that explore 
the established difference in moral judgment between personal and impersonal moral 
dilemmas, in search of an added feature that drives condemnation of the personal cases. 
As I just discussed, one such feature is captured by the M/SE: the involvement of harm 
as a means versus as a side-effect of saving the five workers. However, the dissimilarity 
between the two cases is not exhausted by this distinction. It is also true, for example, 
that in the personal case the victim is closer to the agent than in the impersonal case, 
and that the agent comes into contact with the victim only in the personal case. So, it 
seems reasonable to ask: Which (if any) of these other differences is an active ingredient 
in the distinction between personal and impersonal harm? 
In order to test this, in a first experiment Greene and colleagues constructed 
several candidate personalness factors – spatial proximity, physical contact, and 
personal force – while holding the intention factor fixed across conditions (i.e., all 
conditions involved harm as a means to saving the five). In particular, the comparison 








Table 3. Personal-ness factors and vignettes in Greene et al. (2009). 
 Physical contact Personal force Spatial proximity 
Standard footbridge    
Footbridge pole    
Footbridge switch    
Remote footbridge    
 
Greene and colleagues found no significant difference between the Standard 
Footbridge and Footbridge Pole versions, indicating that physical contact did not drive a 
difference in moral judgment. Similarly, no difference was observed between 
Footbridge Switch and Remote Footbridge dilemmas, indicating that spatial proximity 
was not a morally relevant feature either, driving no difference in participants‘ moral 
judgments. By contrast, this study did reveal a difference between participants‘ moral 
judgments of dilemmas that featured personal force and dilemmas that did not. 
Therefore Greene and colleagues concluded that personal force, whether the agent‘s 
muscular force was involved in harming the victim, influenced participants‘ 
spontaneous moral judgments.  
In a follow-up experiment, Greene and colleagues manipulated both the personal 
force and intention (i.e., means vs. side-effect) factors in moral dilemmas. Half the 
participants viewed a means case, and the other half viewed a side-effect case. In each 
of those groups, half the participants viewed a case involving the application of personal 
force and the other half viewed a case without personal force. The results indicated that 
participants drew the M/SE distinction only when personal force was present, and not 
when it was absent; so that when the agent harmed the proximal victim as a means to 
saving the five and by using his/her personal force, moral condemnation was greatest.  
   67 
Together these results show that a personal force factor influences moral 
judgment (a result not predicted by the categorization theories), in conjunction with the 
intention factor, accounting for the differentiation between personal and impersonal 
harms. Greene and colleagues consider the significance of this interaction, drawing 
implications for the cognitive processing of moral stimuli:  
In a general sense, this suggests a mechanism of moral judgment that is a species 
of embodied cognition. One natural source of such embodied goal 
representations is a system of action planning that coordinates the application of 
personal force to objects to achieve goal-states for those speciﬁc objects. A 
putative sub-system of moral judgment, monitoring such action plans, might 
operate by rejecting any plan that entails harm as a goal-state to be achieved 
through the direct application of personal force. […] At a more general level, the 
present study strongly suggests that our sense of an action‘s moral wrongness is 
tethered to its more basic motor properties, and speciﬁcally that the intention 
factor is intimately bound up with our sensitivity to personal force (Greene et al., 
2009, 370). 
The suggestion here is that, rather than an intuitive categorization of the action, 
the relevant process by which spontaneous moral judgments are formed is a kind of 
‗embodied‘ cognition. On this view, bodily structures might be engaged in the cognitive 
processes subserving moral judgment. 
Of course it is straightforwardly possible to account for this finding from within 
a categorization-based account by merely adding one more factor to the computation 
process, i.e., one that is sensitive to whether the action involves personal force or not. 
And it is, in principle, not necessary for this to require ‗enactment‘ through bodily 
structures, as predicated by embodied cognition theorists. In sum, the evidence does not 
arbitrate between a mental representation and a motor system enactment of the action‘s 
motor properties (the second of which is Greene and colleagues‘ hasty interpretation). 
3.3.2.3. Sensory systems 
Spontaneous moral judgment seemingly involves also sensory neural systems, 
demonstrated by at least two sets of studies documenting the role of the visual (Amit & 
Greene, 2012) and olfactory (Inbar et al., 2012) systems in processes of spontaneous 
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moral judgment. Amit and Greene (2012) conducted three experiments to examine the 
role of visual versus verbal cognition on moral judgment. In a first experiment, their 
approach was to develop a measure of differences in visual versus verbal thinking style. 
The premise here is that some people are better at thinking visually, while others are 
better with language. The task required viewing a target item along with two probe 
items, and selecting the probe item that is most similar to the target item. For instance, a 
certain visual trial might require determining whether a checkered red circle or a plain 
blue star is more similar to a checkered blue star. The corresponding verbal trial would 
involve columns of words (i.e., ―checkered‖, ―red‖, and ―circle‖) instead of the depicted 
figures. Relative accuracy on the visual versus verbal portions of the matching tasks 
yielded an index of visual versus verbal thinking style. The researchers then contrasted 
this index of participants‘ thinking style with their moral judgment of trolley-type 
dilemmas. The results revealed that participants with a visual thinking style tended to 
condemn personal harm in trolley-type dilemmas more harshly than did participants 
with a verbal thinking style.  
In a second experiment, Amit and Greene (2012) examined the causal role of 
visual and verbal working memory. Participants were asked to complete a 2-back 
working memory task of either visual or verbal memory, interleaved with a moral 
judgment task. Participants viewed a series of shapes (in the visual condition) or shape 
names (in the verbal condition), and were required to indicate by means of a button 
press whether each item was identical to the item presented two items earlier. This time, 
the visual interference, relative to verbal interference and no interference, yielded 
reduced condemnation of personal moral dilemmas – plausibly because the visual 
system is implicated in processes of moral judgment. The authors argue that the target 
behavior is spontaneously visualized and this process gives rise to moral condemnation. 
So, when the visual system was occupied with a distracter task, resulting moral 
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judgments tended to be more lenient. Participants‘ self-report confirmed this hypothesis: 
in the personal condition, participants were more likely to report seeing the proximal 
victim in their ―mind‘s eye‖ than in the impersonal condition. These results therefore 
suggest a specific role for the visual system in the processing of moral stimuli.  
We find convergent evidence for the role of sensory systems in processes of 
moral evaluation in studies that examine participants‘ judgments about the domain of 
purity (Schnall et al., 2008; Inbar et al., 2012). Studies have demonstrated that the 
induction of a bad smell (through the application of fart spray in the testing room) 
influences attitudes towards sibling marriage and sibling incest (Schnall et al., 2008) 
and homosexual men (Inbar et al., 2012), making them more negative by comparison to 
the control group in a neutral-smelling testing room. 
Can a categorization view account for these different findings? As I suggested, 
the extant categorization views can account for the Greene and colleagues‘ (2009) 
finding without appealing to the involvement of motor systems –i.e., by merely adding a 
factor to the computation process, which is sensitive to whether the action involves 
personal force. However, the involvement of visual and olfactory systems (in Amit and 
Greene, 2012; Inbar et al., 2012; Schnall et al., 2008) seems more certain. This is 
because the corresponding studies directly engage visual and olfactory systems, through 
relatively specific manipulations of the content of these sensory systems. Therefore, the 
attempt to interpret these findings as evidence for categorization will fail.  
3.3.4. Projection in moral judgment 
It has frequently been noted that people exhibit the partly unconscious tendency 
to attribute one‘s own characteristics, goals and flaws to others (Freud, 1957; Holmes, 
1978). For instance, people tend to overestimate the extent to which people share their 
beliefs and worldview (see false consensus effect, in Ross et al., 1977). In one study, 
participants were given the hypothetical choice between writing a group paper at the 
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end of a class, or individual papers. Those who reported preferring to write a group 
paper estimated that more of their class would prefer the same than those who would 
prefer to write individual papers (and vice versa). Similar effects have been observed in 
the moral domain, on hot-button moral issues in United States policy, such as capital 
punishment and affirmative action (Ross et al., 1977). People who support affirmative 
action (/capital punishment) believe that support for affirmative action (/capital 
punishment) is more widespread than do people who oppose it, and the same is true 
mutatis mutandis for people who oppose these policies.  
Projection might explain numerous other patterns of spontaneous moral 
judgment, for instance, the condemnation of third-party violations of one‘s own 
protected values (Bartels, 2008). Protected values are those that we think of as absolute 
or unquantifiable, such that they cannot be traded for anything else (Ritov & Baron, 
1999). Whereas human life is more universally a protected value, other values such as 
the natural environment, animal life, religious symbols or works of art are much more 
culturally relative; i.e., they are clearly not seen as protected in all cultures or by all 
individuals.  
Bartels (2008) sought to examine the influence of protected status on moral 
decision-making. The experiment first evaluated whether participants grant protected 
status to a set of twenty values (e.g., birds, children, dolphins, the poor, trees). 
Participants then viewed moral dilemmas involving trade-offs with these values. For 
example:  
A ﬂash ﬂood has changed the water levels upstream from a dam on a nearby 
river. Scientists estimate that 20 species of ﬁsh upstream from the dam are 
threatened with extinction. David is considering opening the dam, which will 
save these species, but some species downstream will become extinct because of 
the changing water level. Because this ﬂood has rapidly changed water levels, a 
decision must be made quickly, and the government‘s options are severely 
constrained. David wants to save the ﬁsh species upstream. He ﬁrst calculates 
that opening the dam will kill 16 species downstream. Knowing that doing so 
will kill many ﬁsh, he chooses to open the dam. 
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Participants then made moral judgments about the agent‘s behavior. Results 
indicated that participants tended to judge trade-offs involving their own protected 
values as morally worse than did participants for whom those values were not protected.  
This finding may appear rather trivial. We can explain it rather straightforwardly 
by appealing to principled moralization: that is, people have certain moral principles by 
which they judge others‘ behavior (and their own). As a result of development, 
socialization or whatever, we adopt a series of moral principles, e.g. ―Harming fish is 
morally wrong‖. Personal values and preferences, such as the commitment to saving the 
fish, as well as third-party judgments are then derived from these general principles (see 
Figure 8).  
Cultural learning    General moral principles    First-person values 
Figure 8. The etiology of ‗principled moralization‘. 
But, alternately, development and socialization may shape our personal values 
and preferences directly (e.g., the aversion to cutting down trees, the commitment to the 
environment, and so on). Then, through projection, first-personal preferences and values 
shape our evaluations of others and our professed moral principles (see Figure 9). On 
this view, participants condemn David‘s trade-off as a consequence of having a personal 
interest (a preference) in the preservation of fish. Either account seems capable of 
explaining the consonance of third-party evaluations and first-person protected values 
observed in Bartels‘ (2008) study. 
Cultural learning  First person values  General moral principles 
Figure 9. The etiology of ‗projection‘. 
Some recent evidence provides support for the latter account (Lieberman & 
Lobel, 2012), showing that personal moral aversions concerning incest shape moral 
judgments of others‘ incestuous behavior. Earlier research had shown that the duration 
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of coresidence with siblings during childhood is one of the primary cues of relatedness 
(Lieberman, Tooby & Cosmides, 2007). So, Lieberman and Lobel (2012) set out to 
examine how coresidence duration might relate to one‘s personal aversion to incest and 
also to moral judgments about third-party incest. The researchers selected participants 
who had been raised in Israeli kibbutzim for two reasons: to confirm that this cue 
influences sexual aversions (1) towards peers who are not closely genetically related, 
and (2) even in the absence of social norms against sexual behavior towards co-reared 
peers. They found, as predicted, that duration of coresidence with an opposite sex peer 
predicted the strength of the aversion (i.e., disgust) toward sexual conduct with that 
same peer. It was also the case that participants‘ attitudes toward third-party sexual 
behavior between co-reared peers correlated with both total coresidence duration with 
opposite sex peers, and personal aversion towards sexual behavior with opposite sex 
peers. 
Yet for this phenomenon to count as social projection, third-party judgments 
must depend on personal aversions. To test this claim using correlational data, it is 
common to employ what is known as a mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In a 
mediation model, you start with a known relationship (correlation) between two 
variables, and a direction of causation from IV (independent variable) to DV (dependent 
variable). For instance, we know that age is positively correlated with the amount of 
savings in their bank account. We can assume that as people get older (IV), this causes 
a probabilistic increase in their savings (DV), not vice versa. Having established this 
much, we ask whether the increase in savings can be attributed to a third, mediating 
variable (MV), work years, which is itself influenced by changes in the IV, age. The 
purpose of mediation analysis is to test the ‗plausibility‘ of a causal model running from 
IV to MV to DV – and the extent to which MV mediates the relationship between IV 
and DV – by examining the patterns of shared variance between all three variables. 
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The researchers employed mediation to examine the causal relationships 
between coresidence duration, personal aversions to incest and third-party judgments. 
Since coresidence duration indexes a process taking place during childhood, one can 
assume that it precedes both the formation of sexual aversions and moral attitudes about 
third-party sexual behavior. Therefore, they posited coresidence duration as the 
independent variable in the model (i.e., the variable that causally influences other 
variables but is not causally influenced by them). This sets up the question about the 
relative order of own aversions and third-party moral attitudes in the causal chain. One 
possibility is that co-residence experience shapes own preferences and aversions, which 
in turn influence third party moral attitudes, as predicted by the projection view. 
Another possibility is that experience gives rise to the adoption of moral principles 
(indexed by third-party judgment), which then govern own aversions and preferences, 
as predicted by principled moralization. 
In line with the projection model, controlling for own sexual aversions, the 
relationship between co-residence duration and moral attitudes disappeared. That is, 
first-person sexual aversions fully mediated the relationship between co-residence 
duration and moral disapproval of third-party peer sex, as predicted by the projection 
view. Meanwhile, counter to the principled moralization view, controlling for moral 
attitudes, the relationship between co-residence duration and personal aversions 
remained strong, indicating that moral principles do not (in this case) mediate the 
relationship between co-residence duration and personal sexual aversions. Therefore, 
the results of the comparison between mediation models favored the projection account, 







     
Coresidence duration 
   
Third-party judgments 
Figure 10. Mediation model: support for the projection view. 
 
3.4. Simulation hypothesis: an alternative account? 
The previous section advanced two broad empirical claims about the nature of 
spontaneous moral judgment:  
(1) the spontaneous processing of moral stimuli involves sensory and motor 
systems, and  
(2) moral judgments exhibit the typical pattern of projection, i.e., third-party 
moral attitudes are causally dependent on personal aversions and preferences.  
Now we might ask: What sort of unconscious processes would recruit sensory 
and motor systems to visualize the action under evaluation, and cause third-party 
evaluations to be fashioned after own preferences and values? I suggest that processes 
of mental simulation are fit to accomplish just this. In the previous chapter, I introduced 
mental simulation as the imaginative ‗run-through‘ of another‘s behavior using shared 
neurocognitive systems. These shared systems are activated either endogenously or 
exogenously, such that consideration of others‘ intentional actions, emotions, or 
sensations activates internal replicas of, among other things, the motor plans and 
affective states that lie behind the behavior (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Gordon, 2004). 
I will refer to this account as the simulation hypothesis:  
Third-party moral judgments involve a (spontaneous) sensory and motor 
simulation, which elicits the evaluator‘s personal affective response. This 
affective response shapes the moral evaluation of the third-party behavior. 
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Consider again the example of the footbridge problem. According to the above 
hypothesis, the presentation of the footbridge vignette yields – via mental simulation –
an internal replica of the behavior, i.e., a first-person, imaginative run-through of the 
experience (in more or less detail). In turn, this process sets off an aversive, affective 
response which motivates the third-party judgment. This view would explain the 
involvement of motor systems, as suggested by Greene and colleagues‘ (2009) study, 
and of sensory systems as demonstrated by Amit and Greene (2011), and by Inbar and 
colleagues (2012).
10
 In addition, the simulation hypothesis is equipped to explain why 
we find projection in moral evaluation of others (Lieberman & Lobel, 2007): the 
question whether another‘s behavior is right or wrong is answered by simulating own 
performance of the behavior, and morally evaluating another‘s action on the basis of the 
affective response that stems from the simulation.  
Finally, I have argued that mental simulation may be the principal cognitive 
process in third-party moral judgment and that simulation (at least the simulation of 
emotionally-charged behavior) often results in an affective response. Therefore, a 
simulation-based account seems to favor a constitutive role of affect in moral judgment. 
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 It is worth also reviewing how this account would explain the correlational and 
experimental studies reviewed earlier in this chapter. First, consider studies that index 
a correlation between affect and third-party judgment. In the case of purity violations, 
for example, participants‘ own disgust sensitivity (arising through simulation) shapes 
condemnation of the third-party behavior. Similarly, the moral difference between 
doing a harmful action and allowing comparable harm to take place might arise from 
differences in the aversion to performing harmful actions versus performing harmful 
omissions (see ‗omission bias‘ in Baron & Ritov, 1990; Ritov & Baron, 1995). 
Finally, on this view, the manipulations of affective state through hypnosis (Wheatley 
& Haidt, 2005) and watching comical videos (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008) influence 
the evaluator‘s actual affective state, interfering with the shared system‘s normal 
representation of the third-party agent‘s affective state. That is, these studies render 
the simulation mechanism less accurate at reflecting how the evaluator would feel 
when performing these third-party moral violations, thereby influencing the severity 
of their moral judgments. 
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That is, (if the account is right) we ought to conclude that  moral judgments are 
constituted by affective responses to processes of third-party simulation. 
3.4.1. The role of VMPFC in moral judgment 
The proposed account faces a difficulty, prompted by the examination of moral 
judgment patterns in acquired sociopathy. Koenigs and colleagues (2007) tested the 
moral judgments of a group of patients with bilateral damage in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) against a group of matched controls. They found that, 
compared to psychotypical participants in the control group, patients with VMPFC 
damage made more permissive judgments about harmful action in personal moral 
dilemmas. By contrast, the VMPFC patients made normal judgments about impersonal 
and non-moral dilemmas (see also Ciaramelli et al., 2007). VMPFC patients are known 
to have profound affective deficits, despite retained general intelligence. Remember 
that, on Greene‘s view, moral condemnation depends on affect-laden processes and 
rational processes support more permissive moral judgments about these cases. 
Therefore, Greene‘s theory straightforwardly predicts the result that is obtained. 
Meanwhile, on the account I have developed both kinds of judgments recruit affective 
processes, so it is not obvious how my account can explain these data. 
A somatic marker view 
A distinct perspective on the role of VMPFC, based in the work of Damasio and 
colleagues, suggests an alternative explanation for their moral judgments. According to 
the somatic marker hypothesis, psychotypical individuals have the ability to bring to 
bear affective cues in complex decision-making contexts, through a repository of 
unconscious associations between behavioral options and the outcomes that are 
associated through experience to each option (Damasio, 1996).  
This perspective derives its strongest support from a series of experiments 
employing the Iowa Gambling Task. The IGT is a single player game where participants 
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select cards from a set of decks seeking to maximize pay-off. Each card has a different 
pay-off but some decks have better average pay-off rates than others. Within a few 
rounds of the game, participants learn to select from the advantageous deck, before 
being able to consciously report which deck yields the highest rewards. Moreover, 
physiological evidence indicates that this process relies on anticipatory aversions that 
deter the selection from low-yield decks (Bechara et al., 1997). The VMPFC appears to 
play a crucial role in this process: Participants with lesions to the VMPFC fail (a) to 
learn to select from advantageous decks, and (b) to exhibit these same signs of 
anticipatory aversion to a selection from low-yield decks (Bechara et al., 1994). More 
recently, neuroscientific evidence points toward heightened activation in the VMPFC 
during the IGT (Li, Lu, D‘Argembeau, Ng, & Bechara, 2010). Therefore, the VMPFC 
plausibly houses the somatic markers which unconsciously guide advantageous 
decision-making. 
An analogous somatic marker account could be told about moral decision-
making in trolley-type moral dilemmas. Somatic markers may also encode anticipatory 
aversions to immoral behavior, such as the violent action of pushing an innocent person. 
On this explanation, the personal (but not the impersonal) harmful action is associated 
through prior knowledge to ensuing victim harm, and therefore a fast and advantageous 
decision to condemn personal harm (but not impersonal harm) can be produced by 
psychotypical controls, owing to the influence of somatic markers.  
Empathy and quantitative trade-offs 
Still, it remains the case that VMPFC damage is associated with impaired affect, 
and moreover, impaired empathic abilities (Adolphs, 2002), and according to my 
proposal in Chapter 2 the endorsement of harm for the greater good recruits empathic 
abilities. So, why then would utilitarian judgment not also be impaired following 
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VMPFC damage (on my account)? Moreover, why would patients be more likely to 
endorse harmful actions for the greater good?  
My account does indeed predict that the utilitarian concern with others‘ welfare 
should be subdued as a result of VMPFC damage. Reduced empathic concern should 
result in less motivation to actively ―search‖ for moral outcomes and enact welfare-
maximizing courses of action. This does appear to be true of their real-life behavior, as 
documented by the tendency toward antisocial personality disorder accompanying 
damage (Grafman et al., 1996) or cortical thinning (Narayan et al., 2007) of the 
VMPFC. 
But then why does their reduced empathic concern go unnoticed in judgments 
about trolley-type dilemmas? Recall that in Chapter 2 we discussed the components of 
utilitarian judgment – probability and magnitude – and showed that it is determining the 
magnitude of moral outcomes which requires empathic abilities, but only (or primarily) 
when the relevant moral outcomes vary qualitatively. In addition, empathic concern 
may guide the prior ―search‖ for morally relevant outcomes to consider in the welfare 
calculus. Yet, in the classic one vs. five moral dilemmas in the experimental literature, 
these morally relevant outcomes are (i) provided by the scenario description, and (ii) of 
a single kind. Even severely limited empathic concern might suffice to prefer the 
utilitarian course of action in these quantitative trade-offs. To see why, consider the 
following example: 
I care deeply about my library. Therefore, if someone threatened to burn many 
of my books unless I shredded a single book from my library, I would adamantly 
comply. My CDs I don‘t like nearly as much; yet if someone posed the same dilemma, I 
reckon I would act the same (though not with the same drive, perhaps, with which I 
would try to save my library). I still prefer to save the larger number of my CDs, simply 
because I like CDs at all. This I think is roughly the case with VMPFC patients: they 
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care less about human lives than do psychotypical utilitarians, but they still (in these 
particular circumstances) prefer welfare-maximizing outcomes. Their empathic deficit 
just means they won‘t pursue them with equal zeal. 
 In sum, VMPFC regulates a range of affective processes, including the influence 
of somatic markers in behavior regulation and the ability to empathize with others. 
Consequently, both the condemnation of harm and the promotion of the greater good 
are impaired following VMPFC damage. Guided by an experimental literature that has 
emphasized quantitative (one-versus-five) trade-offs, for which only minimal empathic 
concern is required, we have devised an incomplete picture of the role of VMPFC in 
moral judgment. Yet it is clear, outside lab settings, that VMPFC patients are not 
utilitarian in any broader sense. To the contrary, their empathic deficit renders them less 
concerned with the greater good, and less motivated to defend it. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
A vast experimental literature demonstrates the involvement of affective 
processes in moral judgment. In this chapter, I differentiated three views about the 
psychological character of moral judgment, and argued that the empirical literature – 
and, in particular, the numerous studies employing experimental manipulations of affect 
– are incompatible with the epiphenomenal view, according to which affect merely 
results from the process of making moral judgments. Next, I addressed a related 
question concerning the cognitive processes that normally take place in the wake of 
third-party moral behavior, which yield this affective response. I characterized the 
prevailing account as one according to which the evaluator computes a moral intuition 
over different components of moral behavior such as intention, causation and so on. 
Instead, I argued that a growing body of literature points towards the involvement of a 
sensory and motor simulation of the behavior. A consequence of this is that we find a 
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tendency to project one‘s own moral values and aversions in third-party moral 
judgment, as seen in experimental studies examining the moralization of protected 
values and the moralization of third-party incest among Kibbutz members. Therefore, I 
defend a view of the processing of moral stimuli according to which the evaluator 
spontaneously simulates the behavior under evaluation, and this process triggers (in 
some cases) aversive reactions that guide judgment and decision-making. If this account 
is correct (awaiting empirical confirmation), moral affect is the core mental state 
constituting spontaneous moral judgment. 
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Chapter 4. Testing the hypothesis of simulated aversion 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I reviewed numerous studies demonstrating that moral 
judgments of purity and harm are widely influenced by affective processes. This is 
evident in the physiological and neural patterns accompanying moral judgment in 
psychologically typical populations (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2001, 2002a), in 
patients with blunted affect (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007), and through 
the effects of transient manipulations of emotional state (Crockett et al., 2010; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). I then argued that the data could 
be explained by appealing to processes of mental simulation, which shape our moral 
judgments about the behavior of others. However, direct empirical evidence for this 
phenomenon is limited. So, in this chapter, I aim to empirically test this suggestion, 
examining the precise content of this mental simulation.  
A simple exercise reveals the surprising extent of this gap in our understanding. 
Imagine that you see a mother slap her child for dropping his ice cream on her foot.  
You judge the mother‘s behavior to be immoral, and this depends in part on an affective 
response.  What is its origin and nature? We distinguish between two possibilities, 
which are not mutually exclusive. According to the first, you focus on the mother and 
recoil at the thought of performing the act of hitting a child. According to the second, 
you focus on the child and cringe at the thought of his pain and humiliation.  In other 
words, does your affective response arise from consideration of the act itself, or instead 
from consideration of its impact?  Despite a wealth of evidence for the role of affect in 
the moral condemnation of harmful action, we have remarkably little basis on which to 
distinguish the contributions and roles of these two putative affective responses.   
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4.1.1. Two kinds of aversive affect 
A dominant view, tracing back at least to Hume (1739), holds that the 
proscription of harmful behavior is rooted in a concern for the victim‘s distress 
(Hoffman, 1982, 2000; Pizarro, 2000) that emerges at an early age (Eisenberg-Berg, 
1979; Smetana, 1985). The inhibition of violence depends largely on empathic concern, 
an affective response that stems from the apprehension of a victim‘s emotional state, 
and which is congruent with what the victim is feeling or is expected to feel as a 
consequence of the harmful act (Batson et al., 1993; Batson, 1994). As I discussed in 
Chapter 2, neuroscientific findings support the existence of empathy by showing 
similarity in the activation patterns during actual experience and observation in others of 
a range of emotional states, including pain (Morrison, Lloyd, di Pellegrino & Roberts, 
2004). In laboratory investigations, these activations have been elicited by looking at 
facial (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi, 2003) and bodily expressions 
(Jackson, Meltzoff & Decety, 2005), as well as by the mere imagination of another‘s 
experience (Singer et al., 2004; Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff & Decety, 2006). Moreover, 
trait ratings of empathy are correlated with the strength of these activations (Lamm, 
Batson, & Decety, 2007; Singer et al., 2004). Critically, when this initial empathic 
response is activated, the agent‘s behavior can reflect increased concern for the victim‘s 
welfare. We call this the outcome aversion model: it posits an affective mechanism 
responsible for proscribing harmful behaviors based on the negative outcomes that they 
bring about, and is largely motivated by empathic concern for the victims (see also 
Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman, 2013). 
A conceptually distinct model, which we term the action aversion model, posits 
an affective mechanism that condemns actions intrinsically, rather than contingent upon 
the outcomes that they bring about.  The clearest evidence favoring this model comes 
from cases of victimless crime.  People condemn a host of actions, such as flag-burning 
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and consensual incest, that do not directly cause victim distress (Haidt, Bjorklund, & 
Murphy, 2000; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Consequently, the outcome aversion 
model is poorly suited to explain affective responses to violations of the purity domain. 
Instead, consideration of the action itself suffices to elicit the aversive affect that drives 
moralization.
11
 Of course it is important to emphasize that the action aversion model 
concerns the psychological mechanisms that give rise to a particular judgment, not their 
developmental, historical or adaptive origins.  It is surely the case, for instance, that 
sibling incest can lead to undesirable outcomes from a fitness perspective. Nevertheless, 
evidence suggests that our aversion to incest does not derive from the consideration of 
harmful outcomes at the level of psychological mechanism (Haidt et al., 2000; 
Lieberman & Lobel, 2012).  
Violations in the harm domain present a more ambiguous case. Clearly, 
violently harming a person leads to bad outcomes (at least for the person harmed). Still, 
it is possible that the aversion to harmful action does not require consideration of the 
harmful outcome.  Rather, it may depend in part on an intrinsic aversion to the action, 
including its sensory and motor properties; for instance, thrusting a knife at another 
person‘s belly.  
Recent evidence supports the existence of action aversion in the harm domain 
(Cushman, Gray, Gaffey & Mendes, 2012). Specifically, individuals exhibited 
physiological signs of aversion to performing simulated harmful actions even when 
experimental conditions insured that the actions could not possibly cause harm. For 
example, participants shot an unloaded gun at an experimenter, or smashed a baby doll 
                                                 
11
 In positing the distinction between the agent‘s action and the outcomes to patients, 
our present framework neglects the contribution of a further potential factor in moral 
evaluation, i.e., the consideration of outcomes to the agent, e.g. remorse, shame. 
Indeed recent evidence suggests that these considerations influence the condemnation 
of purity violations relatively more than harm violations (Dungan, Chakroff & Young, 
in prep). 
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against a desk. The aversion elicited by performance of these actions was greater than it 
was witnessing an experimenter perform these same actions or performing 
metabolically matched control actions (e.g., squirting a spray bottle, hammering a block 
of wood). These results indicate an aversion to the performance of harmful action that is 
triggered even under conditions where it is known that no bad outcome will ensue, and 
only when the participant engages in action (not in cases matched for the imagined 
outcome).  
Blair (1995, 2001, 2007) has developed a model of the neural and cognitive 
bases of psychopathy that provides a natural explanation for the action aversion 
hypothesis. According to Blair‘s violence inhibition mechanism, humans and other 
mammals possess an innate, unconditioned response to signs of victim distress that 
ceases ongoing behavior. Through a process of stimulus-reinforcement learning, actions 
that give rise to victim harm are associated with the negative reinforcement of the signs 
of victim distress. In this way, although outcome aversion may be the necessary 
developmental precursor of action aversion, consideration of the typically harmful 
action may independently suffice to elicit an aversion that deters harmful behavior.   
4.1.2. Aversive affect in third-party moral judgment 
Just as action- and outcome-aversion could operate as distinct affective bases for 
regulating one‘s own behavior, they may also contribute to processes of third-party 
moral judgment. For example, we may condemn someone else‘s choice to push the man 
off the footbridge on the basis of an aversion derived from considering the agent‘s 
action of pushing, or the victim‘s experience of being pushed off the footbridge. In this 
set of studies, we also address this question: To what extent do action and outcome 
aversion influence the moral evaluation of others’ behavior? Our approach assumes 
that, to the extent that personal aversions are recruited in third-party evaluation, the 
mechanism likely involves perspective-taking. On the agent focus model, evaluative 
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focus on the action, facilitated via simulation of the agent‘s perspective, triggers the 
basic affective response responsible for moral condemnation. In other words, agent 
focus uses one‘s own action aversion to inform third-party evaluation.  In contrast, on 
the victim focus model, it is an evaluative focus on the outcome of the action (e.g. 
victim suffering), facilitated by simulation of the victim‘s perspective, that triggers the 
aversive affect that supports moral condemnation. Thus, victim focus uses one‘s own 
outcome aversion to inform third-party evaluation (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Agent and victim foci models. 
 Agent focus Victim focus 
Predominant affect: Action aversion Outcome aversion 
Perspective-taking: Agent perspective-taking Victim perspective-taking 
 
4.2. Are agent and victim simulation tractable in moral judgment? 
We designed a questionnaire to assess individual differences in agent and victim 
foci during moral evaluation. The instrument is composed of two parts: the moral self-
regulation section and the third-party evaluation section. With the moral self-regulation 
section, we employed an 18-item scale to assess the influence of action and outcome 
aversion on participants‘ moral decision-making. The items were divided into two 
subscales, action focus and outcome focus.  
The action focus subscale contains nine items that stress the value of actions and 
decisions (―By and large, morality is about doing what feels right‖), and assert the 
relevance of the agent‘s feelings (―At the end of the day, good moral decisions are those 
decisions you can live with‖) and attitudes (―Dignity is a big part of my morality, so 
there are certain things I could never do‖) for the decision-making process. In other 
words, they capture an approach to moral judgment in which the consideration of an 
action gives rise to a feeling that that action is right or wrong. The other nine items 
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compose the outcome focus subscale, and stress the value of outcomes (―In order to be 
moral you have to pay close attention to the impact of your decisions‖), and the 
relevance of welfare considerations (―Morality is about helping others and not harming 
them‖), impartiality (―As far as morality goes my goal is to care about all people‖), and 
allocentrism (―If only people cared more about each other, they would make better 
moral decisions‖) for moral decision-making. In contrast to the action focus items, 
every one of the outcome focus items made reference to the impact of actions upon 
others‘ welfare.  In all the experiments that follow, the items were presented in an order 
randomized for each participant, and mixed across subscales, in order to preclude the 
impact of systematic order effects upon our analyses. 
A salient dimension of divergence between the subscales is the influence of own 
feelings on moral decision-making: Action focus items often referenced the agent‘s 
feelings (e.g. ―my own conscience‖, ―dignity‖), whereas outcome focus items did not.  
This reflects a basic distinction between action- and outcome-based approaches to moral 
judgment.  In an action-based system, the moral status of an action is derived from the 
feeling elicited intrinsically by the action itself.  By contrast, in an outcome-based 
system, the moral status of the action isderived from concern for the feelings and 
welfare of others (e.g., through empathy) and thus is contingent upon its consequences. 
In the third-party evaluation section, participants reported their reliance on agent 
and patient perspective-taking as approaches to third-party judgment through a variety 
of measures linked to two short paragraphs. First participants viewed these paragraphs 
(randomized for order between participants), which contained short descriptions of 
agent perspective-taking (Act) and patient perspective-taking (Impact), and selected the 
paragraph that best described their own approach to the moral evaluation of third-party 
behavior:  
Act: I know what is right and wrong by listening to my own conscience.  So, 
when judging another person‘s behavior, I put myself in their shoes and ask 
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myself what I would have done.  If I would have done the same, then what they 
did is morally right.  But if I could not have done the same according to my 
conscience, then the behavior was morally wrong for someone else to do. 
Impact: I judge moral decisions by putting myself in the shoes of the people 
who are affected by those decisions. If performing an action hurts others, then I 
consider it morally wrong. If performing an action benefits others, I consider it 
morally acceptable. The primary purpose of morality is to help other people and 
not hurt them. Therefore, making a moral judgment is all about adopting the 
perspective of anybody who will be affected. 
After endorsing one or the other paragraph, participants estimated the influence 
of agent perspective-taking (as defined by the Act paragraph), patient perspective-taking 
(as defined by the Impact paragraph) and any other approach they employ during third-
party moral evaluation on independent scales. Additionally, participants indicated the 
relative inﬂuence that each approach had on their moral judgments using an 11-point 
bipolar scale, ranging from 1: ‗‗100% Act /0% Impact,‘‘ to 6: ‗‗50% Act /50% Impact,‘‘ 
to 11: ‗‗0% Act /100% Impact.‘‘ So, while the moral self-regulation scale was primarily 
diagnostic of an action- versus outcome-focused outlook, the measures on the third-
party judgment page served to capture a participant‘s explicit use of agent and victim 
perspective-taking in making moral judgments of the behavior of others. 
Altogether, completion of the scale generated six indices for each participant. 
Two measures reflected action and outcome foci in moral self-regulation: (1) action 
focus, mean agreement with the nine action items on the scale, and (2) outcome focus, 
mean agreement with the nine outcome items on the scale. An additional four measures 
captured participants‘ preference for agent or patient perspective-taking in third-party 
moral evaluation: (3) agent vs. patient perspective-taking: endorsement, whether 
participants endorsed the Act or Impact paragraph, (4) agent perspective-taking: rating 
and (5) patient perspective-taking: rating, participants‘ ratings of the usefulness and 
importance of Act and Impact morality respectively, on a 7-point scale from 1: ―not at 
all‖ to 7: ―extremely‖, and (6) agent vs. patient perspective-taking: relative rating. 
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4.2.1. Methods 
Participants voluntarily logged on to the Moral Sense Test 
(moral.wjh.harvard.edu), a website hosted by the Psychology Department at Harvard 
University and maintained in collaboration with researchers at the Department of 
Cognitive, Linguistic & Psychological Sciences at Brown University, where visitors 
may take part in a range of experiments about moral psychology. The Moral Sense Test 
website has been used in previous studies of moral psychology (Cushman et al., 2006; 
Cushman, Knobe, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & 
Mikhail, 2007). After a brief introduction to the nature and purpose of the study, 
participants completed our measures of agent and victim foci. At the end of experiment, 
participants optionally provided demographic information. 493 participants (276 
females) completed the experiment. 
4.2.2. Results 
Action focus and outcome focus were moderately correlated, r = .387, p < .0001. 
An item analysis on action and outcome foci revealed that each subscale had 
satisfactory reliability, action focus α = .73, outcome focus α = .73. Every action item 
increased the reliability of the action focus subscale, and all but one outcome item (―If 
an action truly hurts nobody, then it probably isn‘t wrong.‖) increased the reliability of 
the outcome focus subscale.  
An exploratory factor analysis initially retained seven factors with positive 
eigenvalues, of which only two factors presented eigenvalues > 1. A visual inspection of 
the scree plot also supported the extraction of two factors. The rotated factor analysis 
confirmed the scale‘s constitution of two factors corresponding to our a priori 
subscales: every item loaded > .3 on its corresponding factor and ≤ .3 on the other 
factor, except one outcome focus item (see Table 5). This outcome focus item (O5) 
articulated a typically consequentialist ―no harm, no foul‖ view. We predicted that this 
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item should be associated with outcome focus, where the welfare of victims and 
beneficiaries is seen as the basis of moral consideration, and yet it was an outlier on 
both the item and factor analyses. Consequently, in further administrations of this 
assessment of evaluative focus, we plan to exclude this item. 
Table 5. Rotated factor analysis: Factor loadings and uniqueness values. 
 Item F1 F2 Uniq. 
A1 By and large morality is about doing what feels right. .532  .708 
A2 
When faced with a moral dilemma I usually listen to my own 
conscience.  
.406  .811 
A3 
In a way, morality is like art. When you see something, you 
know how you feel about it. 
.512  .719 
A4 
Dignity is a big part of my morality, so there are certain things I 
could never do. 
.365  .839 
A5 
If only people listened to their inner voice, they would make 
better moral choices. 
.487  .741 
A6 
At the end of the day, good moral decisions are those decisions 
you can live with. 
.582  .633 
A7 
Something that feels repugnant for me to do is probably wrong 
for someone else to do. 
.480  .754 
A8 
Certain ways of behaving are wrong no matter what the 
situation. 
.356  .869 
A9 
If a behavior is morally right, it shouldn‘t make me feel 
uncomfortable. 
.531  .714 
O1 
I‘m more than willing to make sacrifices for the better of others 
and the future. 
 .474 .765 
O2 Morality is about helping others and not harming them.  .563 .642 
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O3 As far as morality goes, my goal is to care about people equally.  .459 .760 
O4 The point of morality is to end suffering and promote happiness.  .535 .698 
O5 If an action truly hurts nobody, then it probably isn‘t wrong.   .954 
O6 
If only people cared more about each other, they would make 
better moral decisions. 
 .466 .755 
O7 
In order to live morally in your day-to-day, you have to 
constantly step out of your shoes. 
 .406 .834 
O8 
In order to be moral you have to pay close attention to the 
impact of your decisions. 
 .479 .768 
O9 
Considering the feelings of others is an important part of 
deciding what‘s right.  
 .535 .688 
Notes. F1: Factor 1 loadings; F2: Factor 2 loadings; Uniq.: uniqueness. Blanks represent 
factor loadings < .3. 
Views on moral self-regulation predicted approaches to third-party moral 
evaluation. A logistic regression model on endorsement of agent vs. patient perspective-
taking (1: agent; 0: patient) demonstrated unique effects of action focus, z = 8.02, p < 
.0001, and outcome focus, z = -11.01, p < .0001 (N = 1336, LR χ2 = 156.80, r2 = .089, p 
< .0001), indicating that action focus was associated with agent perspective-taking and 
outcome focus with patient perspective-taking. We confirmed these relations in multiple 
regression models on the independent ratings of agent and patient perspective-taking. 
There were unique effects of action focus, β = .366, p < .001, and outcome focus, β = -
.138, p < .001, in the predicted directions on ratings of agent perspective-taking. 
Similarly, there were independent effects of action focus, β = -.130, p < .001, and 
outcome focus, β = .488, p < .001, on ratings of patient perspective-taking. 
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4.2.3. Discussion 
In sum, responses to our measures of evaluative focus supported the dissociation 
between agent and patient foci. A rotated factor analysis revealed our two a priori 
factors in the moral self-regulation scale: one larger outcome focus factor on which all 
but one outcome item loaded and no action items loaded, and one smaller action focus 
factor on which all action items loaded, and no outcome items loaded. This finding 
indicates that participants‘ latent moral views contain these two distinct clusters of 
concerns. This distinction was further evinced by the relations between evaluative focus 
and perspective-taking in third-party evaluation: action focus was associated with 
adoption of the agent‘s perspective and outcome focus was associated with adoption of 
the patient‘s perspective. Together these analyses reveal (i) a distinction in participants‘ 
moral views between agent and patient foci, and (ii) individual differences in the 
reliance on each approach that are consistent across processes of self-regulation and 
third-party evaluation. 
According to proponents of dyadic completion, the attributions of bad intentions 
to an agent and of suffering to a victim are essentially inseparable. So whenever a 
person perceives an agent acting immorally, they infer a patient who suffers; 
conversely, whenever they perceive a patient who suffers, they infer an agent acting 
immorally (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012). This includes moral issues that do not have 
obvious agents, such as systemic injustice, and ones that don‘t have obvious victims, 
such as homosexual sex. This discounts a critical assumption of our experimental 
approach: i.e., that participants selectively simulation one or the other perspective. So, 
in order to rule out the possibility that individual differences on this dimension are an 
artifice of our stimuli, we asked a supplementary set of subjects (N=151) to report on 
the experience of completing our survey. An overwhelming majority (89%) of these 




 (66%), or not immediately obvious but apparent after taking 
some time to reflect
13
 (23%). This result suggests that the selective simulation of either 
agent or victim perspective is not an artifice of our stimuli. 
In the following four experiments, we employ this scale to examine the roles of 
agent and patient foci in moral judgments of harm and purity violations. Our studies are 
arranged in pairs that focus on purity domain and harm domain violations, respectively.  
For the purity domain studies we have a strong a priori basis to predict that action 
aversion plays a larger role than outcome aversion because the violations are typically 
victimless; correspondingly, we also predict that agent perspective-taking plays a large 
role, with no meaningful role of victim perspective-taking.  Consequently, within each 
pair of studies, the investigation of the purity domain serves partly as a method for 
validating the experimental paradigm used to assess action aversion and agent 
perspective-taking.  For the harm domain studies we consider it an open question 
whether, and to what extent, agent and victim focus play a substantial role in moral 
judgment. We therefore leverage the experimental paradigms that we validated against 
the purity domain in order to assess the affective basis of moral judgment in the harm 
domain. In Experiments 1 and 2, we develop an individual differences measure to assess 
the use of action-focused and outcome-focused processes of moral judgment as well as 
agent versus victim perspective-taking in third-party evaluation. In Experiments 3 and 
4, we manipulate agent versus victim perspective-taking to determine how these 
cognitive processes causally affect moral judgment.  
 
                                                 
12
 ―As soon as I read both paragraphs, I knew which of the two paragraphs describes me 
better. So I found that answering this question was straightforward.‖ 
13
 ―After reading both paragraphs, the answer was not immediately obvious. However, 
after thinking for a while, I realized that one paragraph describes me better than the 
other paragraph and I selected that one.‖ 
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4.3. Experiment 1: Does the condemnation of purity rely on simulated aversion? 
The first experiment assesses the role of agent and victim foci in moral 
judgments about violations of the purity domain, such as kissing a sibling in private, or 
eating one‘s dead pet dog (Haidt et al., 1993).  
There is a strong a priori basis to predict that participants exhibiting a 
predominant action focus will tend to proscribe purity violations, whereas participants 
exhibiting a predominant outcome focus would tend to condone them, simply because 
most violations of the purity domain do not, or need not, involve a victim. For similar 
reasons, we predicted that perspective-taking would be associated with moral judgment, 
such that participants who tended to make moral judgments by adopting the agent‘s 
perspective would judge these purity violations more harshly than would those who 
tended to adopt the victim‘s perspective. 
Our predictions add a twist to the well-established finding that condemnation of 
the purity domain is linked to the evaluator‘s disposition to experience disgust (Horberg 
et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2009a; Rozin et al., 1999b).  We propose that this relationship 
is due to individuals adopting an agent perspective, simulating performing the target 
behavior themselves, and using the elicited disgust response as a basis for moral 
judgment. Consequently, we predict that the established relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and condemnation of third-party purity violations will be moderated by 
perspective-taking; that is, disgust sensitivity should predict moral judgment 
significantly better among participants who tend to adopt the agent‘s perspective when 
making moral judgments.  
4.3.1. Methods 
Participants voluntarily logged on to the Moral Sense Test. After a brief 
introduction to the nature of the study, participants viewed a block of eight scenarios 
describing violations of the purity domain (see Appendix A), the measures of evaluative 
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focus, and the Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R; Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 1994, modified 
by Olatunji et al. 2007), a reliable and widely used instrument for assessing individual 
differences in sensitivity to disgust that correlates with real-life behavioral responding 
to disgust-eliciting stimuli (Rozin et al., 1999a).  The moral scenarios were presented in 
a pseudorandom order and briefly described a third-party agent performing actions that 
were designed to evoke core disgust (e.g., smearing feces on oneself), sexual disgust 
(e.g., French-kissing one‘s uncle at a family party), and animal-reminder disgust (e.g., 
getting plastic surgery that adds a two-inch tail to the end of one‘s spine). Participants 
rated the moral wrongness of these actions on a 7-point Likert scale from 1: ―Not 
morally wrong at all‖ to 7: ―Very morally wrong‖. The order of presentation of the 
scenario block and the measures of evaluative focus was counterbalanced, and 
participants always completed both sections before the DS-R scale. At the end of 
experiment, participants optionally provided demographic information.  
437 participants (210 female) completed the experiment. Data were discarded 
from 52 participants (i) who completed the experiment in under 6 minutes (deemed the 
minimum time required for attentive participation), (ii) whose responses to our 
measures (action focus, outcome focus, ratings of agent and victim perspective-taking) 
and mean moral judgment deviated by over three standard deviations from the group 
mean, and (iii) who did not respond appropriately to the two catch items on the DS-R 
scale (e.g., by indicating disagreement with ―I would rather eat a piece of fruit than a 
piece of paper.‖).14  
4.3.2. Results 
As hypothesized, action focus correlated with moral judgment, r(388) = .28, p < 
.0001, indicating that the more participants tended to moralize on the basis of actions 
                                                 
14
 All reaction time filters in this chapter were established by a collaborator on these 
studies. In order to establish a minimum time, he read through the each question at a 
fast pace and completed each question shortly after reading the prompt. 
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the more they condemned third-party violations of the purity domain. This correlation 
was not significantly influenced by the order of presentation of the two measures, p > 
.9, and in a one-way ANOVA (condition: EF before, EF after) on moral judgment, there 
were no effects of condition, p > .5. By contrast, no relationship was found between 
moral judgment and outcome focus, p > .5 (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11. Moral judgment by action (x; solid trend line) and outcome (o; dotted trend 
line) foci. 
We also found the predicted difference in moral judgment between participants 
who endorsed agent versus victim perspective-taking as approaches to third-party moral 
judgment. Participants who reported adoption of the agent‘s perspective made harsher 
moral judgments (M = 3.63, SD = 1.64) than did participants who reported adoption of 
the victim‘s perspective (M = 3.10, SD = 1.52), t(386) = 3.29, p < .002. Similarly we 
found a positive correlation between the rating of agent perspective-taking and moral 
judgment, r(388) = .16, p < .002. This correlation was, however, dependent on the order 
of presentation: EF after r(188) = .32, p < .0001; EF before r(200) = .01, p = .9.  A 






















perspective-taking and moral judgment: EF after r(188) = -.23, p < .001; EF before 
r(200) = -.09, p = .2. Ratings of victim perspective-taking did not correlate with moral 
judgment, p > .3.  
In accordance with previous studies, we found also that participants‘ disgust 
sensitivity correlated with their moral judgments, r(388) = .42, p < .0001. We 
hypothesized that this relationship is the result of participants simulating the agent‘s 
perspective. According to our description of agent perspective-taking in third-party 
evaluation, third-party behavior is condemned when simulation of the action in question 
elicits an aversive response (in this case presumably a disgust response). Critically, 
however, the disgust response should only serve as a basis for the condemnation of 
third-party behavior to the extent that participants adopt the agent‘s perspective—that is, 
to the extent that they take their own feeling of disgust as relevant to judging another‘s 
behavior.  In order to test this hypothesis, we examined the pairwise correlations 
between moral judgment and disgust sensitivity, comparing participants who reported 
adopting the agent‘s perspective to participants who reported adopting the victim‘s 
perspective. Indeed a Fisher‘s r-z test revealed that the correlation between disgust 
sensitivity and moral judgment was significantly stronger among agent perspective-
takers, than among victim perspective-takers, z = 2.71, p < .007 (agent r(165) = .54, p < 
.0001, victim r(223) = .31, p < .0001).
15
 This result supports our hypothesis: proneness 
to feeling disgust in response to aversive stimuli accounted for 29% of the variance in 
moral judgment among participants who reported adopting the agent‘s perspective but 
only 10% of the variance among participants who reported generally endorsing the 
victim‘s perspective. We confirmed this difference by entering disgust sensitivity, 
endorsement and their interaction into a multiple regression model predicting moral 
                                                 
15
 The difference in these correlations is evidently not affected by order: EF first – agent 
r(92) = .58, p < .0001; victim r(108) = .26, p < .007; EF after – agent r(73) = .51, p < 
.0001; victim r(115) = .33, p < .0005. 
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judgment, F(3,388) = 33.70, r
2
 = .208, p < .0001. We found main effects of disgust 
sensitivity, β = .40, p < .001, and endorsement (agent vs. victim perspective), β= .13, p 
< .003, and also critically the predicted interaction, β = .13, p < .004 (see Figure 12), 
indicating that the effect of disgust sensitivity on moral judgment was moderated by 
dispositional perspective-taking in third-party moral judgment. 
 
Figure 12. Disgust sensitivity and moral judgment by perspective-taking (agent: x, solid 
line; victim: o, dotted line). 
We replicated established relationships between political orientation, religiosity 
and moral judgment of purity violations: moral judgment correlated with religiosity, 
r(388) = .48, p < .0001, and political orientation, r(374) = .39, p < .0001, indicating that 
conservative and religious participants tended to condemn purity violations relatively 
more than did liberal and non-religious participants. In addition, we discovered 
relationships between religiosity and political orientation and evaluative foci, on both 
measures of self-regulation and third-party judgment. Action focus correlated with 
political orientation, r(374) = .23, p < .0001, and religiosity, r(388) = .22, p < .0001, 






















focus. Outcome focus did not correlate with religiosity, p > .7, or political orientation, 
r(373) = -.07, p = .15, though there was a small trend towards greater outcome focus 
among liberals. 
We found corresponding relationships also for perspective-taking in third-party 
moral judgment. Participants who endorsed victim perspective-taking were significantly 
more politically liberal and less religious (pol. M = 3.22, SD = 1.45; rel. M = 2.96, SD = 
2.03) than participants who endorsed agent perspective-taking (pol. M = 3.76, SD = 
1.59; rel. M = 3.55, SD = 2.02), pol. t(372) = 3.40, p < .0007, rel. t(386) = 2.81, p < 
.005. These relationships were reflected also on the relative ratings of agent vs. victim 
perspective-taking, pol. r(374) = -.21, p < .0001; rel. r(388) = -.13, p < .01. Similarly, 
ratings of agent perspective-taking correlated with political orientation, r(374) = .17, p < 
.0007, and religiosity, r(388) = .20, p < .0001, such that conservative and religious 
participants rated agent perspective-taking more favorably than did liberal and non-
religious participants. In addition, victim perspective-taking was associated with a 
liberal political orientation, r(374) = -.13, p < .01.  
4.4. Experiment 2: Does the condemnation of harm rely on simulated aversion? 
In this experiment we employed our measures of evaluative focus in order to 
explore the relationship of agent and victim focus to moral judgments of hypothetical 
dilemmas that involve a tradeoff among lives, such as the trolley problem (Foot, 1967; 
Thomson, 1985). Our dilemmas described a person (the ―agent‖) who brought about 
direct harm to one person (the ―proximal victim‖) in order to save a greater number of 
other people (the ―distal victims‖). We contrasted two types of scenarios that have been 
extensively investigated in past research (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001 
2009; Mikhail, 2000; Petrinovich et al., 1993): personal cases, in which the agent 
brought about the harm as a means to saving the five and by applying forceful contact 
(e.g., pushing someone off the footbridge in order to stop the train, thereby saving the 
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five), and impersonal cases, in which the harm brought about by the agent involved 
neither forceful contact nor was a means to saving the five (e.g., turning a train onto a 
sidetrack, where the victim is standing and dies as a side-effect of saving the five). As I 
discussed earlier, people typically judge that killing the proximal victim is morally 
wrong in the personal cases, but morally permissible in the impersonal cases.  
Experiment 2 asks whether, in the personal cases, moral condemnation is 
associated to agent or victim focus. On the victim focus view, the critical difference 
between personal and impersonal cases is in empathic concern towards the proximal 
victim, and this difference is supported by a simulation of the victim‘s perspective. 
Several considerations support this view. First, the proximal victim seems relatively 
more ‗prominent‘ in the personal cases: when we contemplate the footbridge case, we 
imagine the victim being forcefully harmed ―up-close‖, and this may elicit greater 
empathic concern. Second, when we perceive intention in the perpetrator‘s attack, the 
attack seems more painful than if it had been inflicted accidentally (Gray & Wegner, 
2008). This effect would result in the perception of greater pain, and likely more 
empathic concern for the victim in the personal cases, where the agent is described as 
harming the victim in order to save the five, than in the impersonal cases, where the 
victim is harmed only as a side effect of saving the five. Third, populations known to 
have deficits in empathic concern, as indexed by blunted physiological (Blair, Jones, 
Clark, & Smith, 1997; Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1990) and neural (Deeley et al., 
2006) reactions to the perception of sad and fearful faces, demonstrate abnormally high 
rates of endorsement of personal harm (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2007, 
2012). Thus, prior work suggests that outcome focus, facilitated by victim perspective-
taking, may contribute to the enhanced condemnation of personal harm. 
On the agent focus view, an evaluation focused on the agent‘s action gives rise 
to the difference in moral judgment between these types of dilemmas. Specifically, 
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moral condemnation depends on greater aversion towards performing the agent‘s action 
in the personal version than the impersonal version, and this process is supported by a 
simulation of the agent‘s perspective. A recent experiment examining the features that 
drive the condemnation of personal harm supports this view (Greene et al., 2009).  
Specifically, condemnation of the welfare trade-off is triggered not by spatial proximity 
or physical contact between the agent and the victim, but by the application of the 
agent‘s muscular force to the victim. Moreover, this effect is heightened when the agent 
acted intentionally, such that participants condemned the welfare trade-off most when 
the agent applied muscular force to bring about harm as a means to saving the five. 
These findings point towards ―a system of moral judgment that operates over an 
integrated representation of goals and personal force—representations such as ‗goal-
within-the-reach-of-muscle-force.‘‖ (Greene et al., 2009, p. 370), suggesting that moral 
judgment is influenced by an evaluation of the agent’s motor behavior and goal, rather 
than the victim‘s perceived suffering. Furthermore, evidence that people show an 
aversion to performing simulated harmful actions even when they give rise to no actual 
harm (Cushman et al., 2012) indicates a potential basis for the action-focused affective 
processes engaged in the moral judgment of dilemmas involving harm.    
In sum, when we contemplate the trolley problem and judge that it is wrong to 
push the man but ok to flip the switch, are we feeling greater compassion for the man on 
the bridge than we feel for the victim on the sidetrack, or are we feeling greater aversion 
to the thought of pushing a person than we feel towards pulling a switch? In this 
experiment, we take a first step in answering this question by examining whether 
individual differences in agent or victim focus are selectively associated with 
differences in the condemnation of personal harm. 
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4.4.1. Methods 
Participants voluntarily logged on to the Moral Sense Test website. In a 2 
(Personal vs. Impersonal moral dilemmas) x 2 (EF Before vs. After) between-subjects 
design, participants viewed six moral dilemmas (see Appendix B) and completed the 
indices of evaluative focus. Moral dilemmas described an agent who brought about 
harm to a proximal victim and saved a greater number of people. Participants then rated 
the moral wrongness of the agent‘s behavior on a 7-point Likert scale from 1: ―Not 
morally wrong at all‖ to 7: ―Very morally wrong‖. Dilemmas were presented in a 
pseudorandom order and the order of presentation of the dilemmas block and the 
measures of evaluative focus was counterbalanced. Finally, participants optionally 
provided basic demographic information.  
4.4.2. Results 
425 participants (223 female) completed the experiment. Data were discarded 
from 38 participants who (i) completed the experiment in under 4 minutes (deemed the 
minimum completion time), and (ii) whose responses to our measures (action focus, 
outcome focus, ratings of agent and victim perspective-taking) and mean moral 
judgment deviated by over three standard deviations from the group mean. 
In a two-way 2 (condition: Personal, Impersonal) × 2 (order: EF before, EF 
after) ANOVA on moral judgment, there was a main effect of condition, F(1,391) = 
125.1, p < .0001, and no effect of order of presentation or interaction with condition, ps 
> .3. The main effect of condition indicated that participants rated the welfare trade-off 
as morally worse in the personal condition (n = 204, M = 4.10, SD = 1.18) than in the 
impersonal condition (n = 187, M = 2.80, SD = 1.05), t(389) = -11.45, p < .0001.  
Turning then to the main analysis of interest, we found that action focus 
correlated with deontological moral judgment in the personal condition, r(204) = .25, p 
< .0004, whereas outcome focus did not, r(204) = .08, p = .3. On impersonal dilemmas, 
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the correlation between action focus and moral judgment approached significance, 
r(187) = .12, p = . 10, and there was no relationship between moral judgment and 
outcome focus, r(187) = .06, p = .4 (see Fig. 3).  A multiple regression model predicting 
moral judgment by dilemma type, action focus, and the dilemma type x action focus 
interaction revealed main effects of action focus, β = .17, p < .001 and dilemma type, β 
= .48, p < .001, but the interaction term did not reach significance, β = .07, p = .12. In 
addition, the correlation between action focus and moral judgment was stronger when 
participants completed the scale prior to the moral dilemmas: EF first r(92) = .34, p < 
.001; EF after r(112) = .17, p < .07.  
  
Figure 13. Moral judgment by action (x, solid trend line) and outcome foci (o, dotted 
trend line): Personal moral dilemmas (left), impersonal moral dilemmas (right). 
Our presumption that action focus in third-party moral judgment should be 
accomplished by agent perspective-taking was supported by evidence of a correlation 
between these two measures. Consequently, we predicted that agent perspective-taking 
should be associated with deontological moral judgment on personal harm dilemmas. 
However, we found no correlation between moral judgment and either endorsement or 
ratings of agent and victim perspective-taking, all ps > .7.  
Taken together, these results provide partial support for the action model in the 
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condemn harmful action in personal dilemma contexts, but not impersonal dilemma 
contexts. A related prediction concerning self-reported perspective-taking in third-party 
moral judgment was not supported.  
We replicated relationships between religiosity and political orientation and 
responses to the assessment of evaluative focus found in Experiment 1. Political 
orientation correlated negatively with outcome focus, r(369) = -.22, p < .0001, and 
positively with action focus selectively in the EF first condition, r(177) = .22, p < .004. 
Similarly, political orientation correlated negatively with ratings of victim perspective-
taking, r(369) = -.17, p < .001, and positively with ratings of agent perspective-taking, 
r(369) = .18, p < .0005. Religiosity correlated with action focus, r(390) = .29, p < .0001, 
and agent perspective-taking, r(390) = .25, p < .0001, but did not correlate with 
outcome focus or victim perspective-taking, ps > .8. Lastly, on our measure of 
endorsement of agent vs. victim perspective-taking in third-party moral judgment we 
found the same relationship: participants who endorsed victim perspective-taking were 
significantly more liberal (n = 199, M = 3.01, SD = 1.46) than were participants who 
endorsed agent perspective-taking (n = 170, M = 3.75, SD = 1.69), t(367) = 4.56, p < 
.0001. The corresponding difference in religiosity trended in the same direction, but 
non-significantly, t(388) = 1.53, p < .13. In sum, we found consistent patterns of 
relationship on both measures of self-regulation and third-party judgment; namely, 
conservatives and religious participants tended to be agent-focused while liberals tended 
to be victim-focused. 
 
4.5. Discussion 
Two experiments provide preliminary support for the role of agent focus in the 
proscription of purity violations and of personal harm in moral dilemma contexts. We 
found that a tendency to focus on actions, but not outcomes, in moral self-regulation 
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correlated with moral judgment of third-party purity violations and personal moral 
dilemmas, such as the footbridge dilemma. Participants who exhibited a greater focus 
on actions tended to judge these violations more severely than did participants who 
exhibited lesser action focus. 
We found also that action and outcome foci in moral self-regulation covaried 
with adoption of the agent‘s and victim‘s perspective respectively in third-party moral 
judgment. Therefore, we predicted that self-reported agent perspective-taking in third-
party evaluation would be associated with moral judgment. However, we found limited 
support for this hypothesis. Participants who endorsed agent perspective-taking as an 
approach to third-party judgment condemned violations of purity more than did 
participants who endorsed victim perspective-taking, but only when the perspective-
taking questions followed the judgment task. We also found that agent perspective-
taking moderated the effect of disgust sensitivity on condemnation of purity violations. 
A relationship between self-reported perspective-taking and moral judgment was not 
observed, however, in the harm domain.  
In Chapter 3 I differentiated between the categorization view and the simulation 
view. Notice that either explanation can account for our pattern of results: i.e., that 
moral judgment was associated with our measure of action focus, but not with our 
measure of agent perspective-taking. On the categorization/computation view, certain 
actions ―feel‖ categorically wrong, whether carried out by the self or others. Certain 
moral principles determine that personal harm is wrong, and then these principles cause 
our preferences and affective responses. Consequently, action focus would predict 
moral judgments of personal harm, but without employing processes of simulation or 
perspective-taking. By contrast, on the simulation view, certain actions feel wrong to 
the evaluator and, through a mental simulation of the agent‘s perspective, are evaluated 
as wrong for others. 
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So the simulation view would have predicted a relationship between our 
measures of perspective-taking and moral judgment. However, as prior research has 
shown, it is often the case in social cognition that cognitive processes are unconscious, 
and inaccessible by introspection (Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser et al., 2007; Inbar et al., 
2009b). In our present case, if perspective-taking in third-party moral judgment is 
relatively unconscious, this would explain the failure of our self-reported measure of 
perspective-taking. So in Experiments 3 and 4 we pursue a further test of these distinct 
hypotheses. 
We found no relationship between moral judgment and the tendency to focus on 
outcomes or to adopt the victim‘s perspective in third-party moral evaluation. One 
explanation for this might be the presence of outcome considerations motivating both 
attitudes of condemnation and of exculpation. That is, one could in principle focus on 
the proximal victim and heavily condemn the welfare trade-off, or instead empathize 
with the distant five and endorse it. Consequently, across trials and individuals, we 
might have found no correlation between moral judgment and outcome focus, even 
though outcome focus and victim perspective-taking may promote both judgments. So 
in Experiment 2b we take a different approach and examine the effect of proximal 
victim perspective-taking, rather than of general, dispositional outcome focus and 
victim perspective-taking. 
Although not an a priori concern of our study, we found consistent relationships 
between both political orientation and religiosity, and agent versus victim foci in moral 
judgment. Namely, religiosity and political conservatism correlated with a tendency to 
focus on actions and to simulate the agent‘s perspective while liberalism was associated 
with a focus on outcome considerations and with simulating the victim‘s perspective 
during moral evaluation. This finding dovetails with evidence that liberals principally 
moralize domains that directly implicate harm to others – i.e., the harm and fairness 
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domains – whereas conservatives tend to regulate a wider range of behaviors, many of 
which do not obviously bring about harmful outcomes (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009). This result will be the focus of the following Chapter 5. 
 
4.6. Perspective induction via narration 
In Experiments 3 and 4 we target the role of perspective-taking in third-party 
moral evaluation. We did not find strong evidence for this relationship in our previous 
experiments, and the results produced can be explained by either categorization or 
simulation views. I argued though that this may be due to the limitations of a self-report 
paradigm, since mental simulation in moral judgment could be unconscious. 
Consequently, we adopt a direct manipulation of perspective-taking in the following 
experiments.  
Our methodological approach in Experiments 3 and 4 depends on the use of 
narrative focus to manipulate participants‘ perspective on moral stimuli. Theorists in the 
psychology of narrative have argued that, in order to process narrated events, readers 
assume the perspective of a character (Black, Turner, & Bower, 1979; Özyürek & 
Trabasso, 1997; Rall & Harris, 2000) and mentally represent the emotional states 
(Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992), beliefs and goals (Wegner & Giuliano, 
1983) and motor plans (Mar, 2004) of that character. In this way, the reader may 
experience affect congruent with the character‘s situation and comparable to the 
emotional experiences encountered in the real-world (László & Cupchik, 1995; Oatley, 
1999). Neuroscientific evidence of shared systems provides support for these claims. 
Observation of third-party action activates neural systems that subserve the observer‘s 
performance of that action (Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004), and it recently been demonstrated that reading can activate shared 
systems also (Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti & Iacoboni, 2006). Importantly, shared 
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systems have been shown to activate during both observation of motor behavior 
(Cochin, Barthélémy, Roux & Martineau, 1999; Rizzolatti et al., 1996) and the 
recognition of affective states (Carr et al., 2003; Wicker et al., 2003).  
 
4.7. Experiment 3: Does perspective-taking influence condemnation of purity 
violations? 
In Experiment 3, we employed a perspective manipulation in order to examine 
whether violations of the purity domain are judged differently when narrated from the 
agent‘s point of view versus the point of view of a passive bystander, while matching 
descriptions of the action plan for length and detail. This manipulation should affect the 
extent to which participants simulate the agent‘s behavior and consequently the salience 
of the resulting action aversion. Therefore, if a mental simulation of the agent‘s action 
drives condemnation of violations of the purity domain, the behavior should be 
perceived as morally worse from the agent‘s perspective than from a bystander‘s 
perspective.  
4.7.1. Methods 
Participants voluntarily logged on to the Moral Sense Test website, were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions (Agent or Bystander) and viewed a random 
selection of four scenarios drawn from a set of eight total scenarios (see Appendix C). 
The vignettes described violations of the purity domain, beginning with an introduction 
that served to establish the participants‘ tacit identification either as the agent or a 
bystander in the scenario. Consider, for example, the following scenario involving the 
artists Julie (agent) and Meg (bystander; italicized content varies by condition):  
Julie/Meg is an artist who lives in the heart of Boston with her husband and two 
children. One spring morning, Julie/Meg wakes up early to meet a friend and 
fellow artist at a nearby café for breakfast. Julie/Meg decides to buy a cup of 
coffee and a blueberry muffin before she sits down with her friend. They discuss 
collaborating on a new project and a proposed budget for the project. On the 
way to the art studio, Julie/Meg’s friend notices city staff putting up decorations 
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to celebrate the upcoming religious holiday. When they arrive at the art studio, 
Julie’s friend/Meg begins to brew a pot of tea.  
After the perspective-inducing introduction, the action plan was presented: 
As her friend/she is making the tea, Julie/Meg’s friend prepares her workstation 
and says she wants to draw a portrait of the religious icon she saw on the way to 
the studio. However, she would depict him nude and make the portrait rather 
comical with the religious leader‘s genitalia appearing grossly enlarged. 
How morally wrong would it be for Julie/Meg’s friend to make this portrait? 
Participants then made moral judgments by selecting their response on a 7-point 
Likert scale from 1: ―Not morally wrong at all‖, to 4: ―Somewhat morally wrong‖, to 7: 
―Very morally wrong‖. After the block of purity violations, participants completed the 
assessment of evaluative focus and provided optional demographic information. 
4.7.2. Results 
660 participants (303 female) completed the experiment. Data were discarded 
from 24 participants who (i) completed the experiment in under 4 minutes (deemed the 
minimum completion time), and (ii) whose responses to our measures deviated by over 
three standard deviations from the group mean. After applying this filter, 321 
participants remained in the Agent condition, and 315 in the Bystander condition. 
Because of the design of Experiments 3 and 4, we conducted all our analysis 
replacing random effects tests with multilevel tests, where we entered scenario context 
and subject as dummy variables. A multilevel mixed-effects linear regression on moral 
judgment with condition (1: Agent, 0: Bystander) as independent variable, and scenario 
context as dummy variable revealed a significant effect of condition, z = 2.16, p = .031, 
indicating that participants tended to condemn purity violations more in the Agent 
condition than in the Bystander condition (see Figure 14). Looking at individual 
scenarios, we found the predicted difference in moral judgment on seven of the eight 
scenarios (see Table 6). 
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Smearing feces on self 157 3.78 2.45 146 3.19 2.34 
Drawing a naked portrait of religious 
leader 
152 3.73 2.13 146 3.36 2.18 
Having sex with a chicken carcass 147 4.27 2.40 154 4.51 2.50 
French-kissing a family member 159 4.89 2.11 159 4.64 2.25 
Signing a note to sell her soul 158 3.56 2.42 158 3.42 2.43 
Urinating on someone at their request 156 3.26 2.26 156 2.97 2.24 
Eating a sandwich containing own pubic 
hair 
161 3.47 2.43 159 3.32 2.46 
Adding a two-inch tail to one‘s spine 154 3.12 2.26 159 3.08 2.26 
 
Collapsing across conditions, we replicated the relationships observed in 
Experiment 1 between evaluative focus and moral judgment. First, action focus was 
associated with greater condemnation, z = 10.31, p < .001, whereas outcome focus was 
not, p > .8. We observed the corresponding relationships also with perspective-taking: 
participants who endorsed agent perspective-taking made harsher moral judgments than 
did participants who endorsed victim perspective-taking, z = 4.82, p < .001. Moreover, 
the higher participants rated agent perspective-taking, the harsher their moral judgments 
tended to be, agent z = 9.04, p < .001, relative agent vs. victim z = -5.79, p < .001. We 
uncovered a relationship in the opposite direction with victim perspective-taking: the 
more participants tended to adopt the victim‘s perspective, the less they condemned 
purity violations, z = -2.05, p < .04.  
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We replicated also the relationships between political orientation, religiosity and 
evaluative foci measures found in Experiments 1 and 2: Participants who endorsed 
victim perspective-taking were significantly more politically liberal and less religious (n 
= 404; pol. M = 3.04, SD = 1.43; rel. M = 2.81, SD = 1.94) than participants who 
endorsed agent perspective-taking (n = 232; pol. M = 3.51, SD = 1.50; rel. M = 3.27, SD 
= 2.06), pol. t(603) = 3.77, p < .0002, rel. t(631) = 2.85, p < .005 (see Table 7 for 
correlations). 
Table 7. Political orientation, religiosity and evaluative focus: correlations. 
 
Focus Perspective-taking 
Action Outcome Agent Victim Relative 
Political 
conservatism 
.21 *** -.16 *** .11 * -.11 ** -.13 ** 
Religiosity .28 *** .04 .20 *** -.04 -.13 ** 
*: p < .05; **: p < .005; ***: p < .0005 
 
4.8. Experiment 4: Does perspective-taking influence condemnation of harm? 
Experiment 3 yielded support for the role of agent perspective-taking in the 
condemnation of violations of the purity domain. In this experiment, we employ the 
same perspective manipulation to examine the effect of perspective-taking on moral 
judgments of personal harm dilemmas. If agent perspective-taking drives the 
condemnation of personal harm, we should expect moral judgments to be more 
deontological from the agent‘s perspective than from a bystander‘s perspective.  
The design of Experiment 4 allows us to address an additional important issue 
not resolved by Experiment 2.  In Experiment 2, we found no relationship between 
moral judgment and the tendency to adopt the victim‘s perspective in third-party moral 
evaluation. We proposed that this may have been due to the presence of multiple 
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potential victims in a typical moral dilemma. So, in this experiment we isolate the 
effects of proximal victim perspective-taking in order to ask whether, and to what 
extent, empathizing with the proximal victim influences condemnation of the welfare 
trade-off in personal dilemma contexts. If considerations of victim pain and suffering 
drive condemnation of personal harm, then participants who read a scenario narrated 
from the proximal victim‘s point of view should condemn harm directed toward that 
victim particularly strongly. 
In summary, Experiment 5 assesses the roles of agent and victim perspective-
taking in the condemnation of personal harm. In simple terms, when we ponder the 
footbridge dilemma, what is the basis of our condemnation? Are we imagining what it 





Participants voluntarily logged on to the Moral Sense Test website and were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Agent, Victim or Bystander. In an 
incomplete repeated-measures design, participants viewed four personal moral 
dilemmas drawn from a total set of six (see Appendix D). In each condition, the 
vignettes were furnished with extended introductions that served to induce the 
perspective of the agent, victim, or bystander. After the perspective-manipulation, the 
dilemma was presented and participants were asked to make moral judgments (e.g., 
―For Brooke to throw the old man overboard would be…‖) by selecting a response on a 
7-point Likert scale from 1: ―Not morally wrong at all‖, to 4: ―Somewhat morally 
wrong‖, to 7: ―Very morally wrong‖. After the moral dilemmas section, participants 
completed an adapted version of the ―Linguistic Implications Form‖, a pronoun 
                                                 
16
 This experiment included a pronoun completion task (Wegner & Giuliano, 1980) in 
order to measure self-focused attention. Participants completed this task immediately 
following the moral judgment task. However, this task did not generate noteworthy 
results, so it is excluded from further discussion. 
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completion task developed by Wegner and Giuliano (1980) measuring self-focused 
attention. Lastly, participants completed the assessment of evaluative focus and 
provided optional demographic information. 
4.8.2. Results 
1002 participants (467 female) completed the experiment. Data were discarded 
from 24 participants who (i) completed the experiment in under 6 minutes (deemed the 
minimum completion time), and (ii) whose responses deviated by over three standard 
deviations from the group mean. After applying this filter, we had 326 participants in 
the Agent condition, 317 in the Victim condition, and 335 in the Bystander condition, 
roughly matching the sample sizes employed in Experiment 3. 
A multilevel mixed-effects linear regression on moral judgment with Agent 
condition (1: Agent, 0: Victim, Bystander) and Victim condition (1: Victim, 0: Agent, 
Bystander) as the independent variables (and scenario context and subject as random-
effects) revealed a significant effect of Agent condition, z = 2.98, p = .003, but no effect 
of Victim condition, z = 1.20, p = .23. This result indicates that participants in the Agent 
condition condemned personal harm more harshly than did participants in the Bystander 
condition, whereas the difference between the Victim and Bystander conditions was not 
statistically significant. This is reflected by looking at means across scenarios: of the six 
total scenarios, moral condemnation was greater on five scenarios in the Agent 
condition, but greater only on three scenarios in the Victim condition, as compared to 
the Bystander condition (see Table 8). Moreover, the difference between the Agent and 
Victim conditions was marginally significant, z = 1.72, p = .086, indicating that 
participants in the Agent condition condemned personal harm more than did participants 
in the Victim condition.  
 
 
   113 
Table 8. Moral judgment by condition and scenario.  
Scenarios 
Agent Victim Bystander 
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Military submarine 183 4.17 2.04 178 4.02 1.95 183 3.62 1.98 
Lab scientist 182 5.47 1.93 189 5.57 1.74 201 5.49 1.88 
Jungle research 187 4.83 1.99 164 5.13 1.78 190 4.23 2.00 
Lifeboat 191 5.18 1.78 173 4.68 1.89 203 5.10 1.99 
Climbing group 190 5.82 1.61 185 5.74 1.67 188 5.76 1.57 
Enemy doctor 184 4.47 2.07 186 3.92 2.02 190 4.21 2.19 
 
As in Experiment 2, the effects of our perspective manipulation were small. In 
order to contextualize these results, it is helpful to visualize them in comparison to other 
effects known in the literature. In Figure 14, we display the regression equation 
coefficients of our perspective manipulations (employing the dummy coding scheme, 1: 
Agent/Victim, 0: Bystander) as well as those of the relevant z-scored demographic 
variables (i.e., political orientation and religiosity). This reveals that the effect of agent 
perspective-taking on judgments in the purity domain is about half the size of a standard 
deviation shift in political orientation or religiosity.  And, the effect of agent 
perspective-taking on the judgment of moral dilemmas is roughly equivalent to its effect 
in the purity domain. 
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Figure 14. Effect sizes on moral judgment: politics, religiosity and perspective 
manipulation. 
Collapsing across conditions, we replicated the correlation between action focus 
and moral judgment, z = 11.90, p < .001.  In addition we found a statistically significant 
but smaller relationship between outcome focus and moral judgment, z = 5.43, p < .001, 
indicating that participants who tended to make deontological judgments exhibited 
greater outcome focus. However, entering both action and outcome foci into the 
regression model on moral judgment, the effect of outcome focus did not hold, action z 
= 10.64, p = .001; outcome z = 1.41, p = .16. With a larger sample size than Experiment 
2 we also observed a modest relationship between deontological moral judgment and 
ratings of agent perspective-taking, z = 5.44, p < .001, but not victim perspective-taking, 
z = .71, p = .48. 
Finally, Experiment 4 replicated the finding that conservatives and religious 
participants were more agent-focused while liberals were more victim-focused. 
Participants who adopted the agent‘s perspective were more conservative (n = 382, M = 
3.62, SD = 1.52) than participants who adopted the victim‘s perspective (n = 522, M = 
3.01, SD = 1.48), t(928) = 6.17, p < .0001. Correlations with ratings of agent and victim 
perspective-taking and action and outcome foci were replicated (see Table 9). 
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Table 9. Political orientation, religiosity and evaluative focus: correlations.  
 
Focus Perspective-taking 
Action Outcome Agent Victim Relative 
Political 
conservatism 
.21 *** -.08 ** .20 *** -.13 *** -.18 *** 
Religiosity .26 *** .14 *** .11 *** .02 -.03 
*: p < .05; **: p < .005; ***: p < .0005 
 
4.9. Discussion 
Our perspective manipulation yielded effects on the condemnation of moral 
violations consistent with the agent focus model. When actions were narrated from the 
perspective of the agent, participants made harsher moral judgments than when they 
were narrated from a bystander‘s perspective, suggesting a role for perspective-taking 
and simulation in moral judgment. This difference held for both harmful actions – like 
pushing someone to their death in order to save five people – and impure behaviors – 
like eating one‘s dead dog.  In conjunction with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, 
these results derive support for the role of unconscious processes of mental simulation 
in the condemnation of third-party moral violations. If moral judgment were 
accomplished by categorizing actions according to their causal, intentional and 
normative properties, but without a role for perspective-taking, we should not have 
observed a difference between conditions since the action description was matched 
across conditions. By contrast, the simulation view (as articulated in Chapter 3) can 
explain the observed difference: the narrative manipulation promoted the adoption of 
the protagonist‘s perspective in interpreting the narrated events. Specifically the agent‘s 
perspective rendered the evaluator‘s own aversion to performing harmful actions 
salient, and this action aversion influenced moral condemnation. 
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Lastly, Experiment 5 did not draw support for the victim focus model: we found 
no significant difference between the Victim and Bystander conditions, although there 
was a trend towards greater condemnation of harm from the victim‘s perspective.  This 
result suggests that increased empathic concern for the proximal victim drives the 
condemnation of personal harms weakly at best, and likely contributes less than the 
alternative mechanism based on action aversion.  
 
4.10. General Discussion 
The present study illustrates two related influences on moral judgment: the 
affective valuation of actions, and the simulation of an agent perspective. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, individual differences in action focus (but not outcome focus) 
were correlated with moral judgment, such that greater focus on actions was associated 
with deontological moral judgment on personal moral dilemmas and greater 
condemnation of purity violations. Participants who reported making moral judgments 
by focusing on the action were likely to focus on the aversive character of the actions 
involved in purity and personal harm violations, and condemn these actions even in the 
face of consequentialist reasons to condone them.  Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated 
the causal role of agent perspective-taking in the condemnation of purity and harm 
violations. When induced to adopt the agent‘s perspective in our vignettes, participants 
condemned moral violations significantly more than when induced to adopt a passive 
bystander‘s perspective, matching level of detail across conditions.  
These findings help to resolve the precise role of affect in the judgment of moral 
dilemmas that involve a trade-off among lives. The affective response to the footbridge 
version of the trolley problem, for instance, appears to arise principally not from 
empathy for the victim being pushed, but rather from an aversion to performing harmful 
actions, like pushing, that typically bring about harm. As we saw in Chapter 3, moral 
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judgment is sensitive to motor features of the evaluated action, such as whether the 
agent directly applies muscular force to the victim (Greene et al., 2009). The results 
reported here suggest that this may be because we unconsciously adopt the agent‘s 
perspective and mentally simulate their behavior when judging third parties. This 
simulation in turn elicits an aversive affective response congruent with own 
performance of the action, which promotes moral condemnation. This might be termed 
―evaluative simulation‖, an act of perspective-taking that functions not to describe, 
predict or explain another‘s behavior (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006; 
Gordon, 1986), but rather to judge it (Miller & Cushman, 2013; Miller et al., 2013). 
Prior evidence of the role of own disgust sensitivity in the condemnation of third-party 
purity violations, along with our present finding that agent perspective-taking 
moderated this relationship, suggests that processes of evaluative simulation are 
responsible for condemnation in the domain of purity too. Lastly, further evidence of 
the interference of visual (Amit & Greene, 2012; Schnall et al., 2008) and olfactory 
(Inbar et al., 2012) systems with processes of moral judgment bolsters the case for a 
mechanism of moral evaluation that makes use of sensorimotor representations in 
condemning the behavior of others.  
The mechanism of action-aversion, and its extension to the task of third-party 
moral judgment, help to explain some familiar yet puzzling aspects of our moral 
psychology as it is deployed in everyday contexts. Actions that some people find 
personally aversive yet do not cause obvious direct harm – such as swearing, nudism 
and homosexual intercourse – may become a target of condemnation. Conversely, 
actions that are not typically associated with harm and thus fail to elicit a learned action 
aversion – for instance, using powerful fertilizers for home lawn care, or purchasing 
sweatshop-manufactured clothing – may be condoned regardless of the harmful 
outcomes that they ultimately bring about.  
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An important area for further investigation is the relationship between the 
evaluative focus on actions versus outcomes and the dyadic theory of moral judgment 
(Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012).  According to the dyadic theory, all moral evaluation 
involves the perception of a harm-doing agent and a suffering patient, a phenomenon 
that is termed dyadic completion.  There is an evident connection between these agent 
and patient roles and the emphasis on action versus outcome that we have discussed 
here.  For our present purposes we remain agnostic on whether all moral evaluation 
necessarily involves the perception of both dyadic roles; however, our research does 
suggest that there may be individual differences in the extent to which an agent‘s action, 
versus its outcomes to patients, are the primary target of focus during moral evaluation. 
One limitation of the present study is the small-to-medium effect sizes reported 
throughout. Even in the examination of purity violations, where the conceptual case for 
the role of agent focus is strong, we did not observe large effects on moral judgment.  
This weakness may owe to our methodological approach. For example, we sought to 
measure individual differences in action and outcome foci, processes arguably at a 
cognitive-attentional level, by employing a psychometric scale perhaps better suited to 
capture higher-level attitudinal and personality differences. That is, the items on the 
self-regulation scale express beliefs and attitudes about morality that may signal an 
underlying action or outcome focus, but they do not directly target the lower-level 
processes of interest. This methodological ―distance‖ from the target psychological 
variables may have reduced the validity and accuracy of our indices of action and 
outcome foci and (if the theoretical framework is correct) could be responsible for the 
modest effect sizes we observed. Our perspective manipulation similarly did not yield 
large effects. One reason for this may be the lack of time pressure during exposure to 
the vignettes, giving participants the opportunity to counteract the manipulation by 
mentally ―shifting out‖ of the induced perspective. 
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 Additionally, in contrast to the significant effect of manipulating perspective-
taking through narrative focus, perspective-taking via self report did not consistently 
predict moral judgment. We have suggested that the relevant processes of agent and 
victim foci may operate automatically and unconsciously (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Hauser et al., 2007), but this hypothesis awaits systematic investigation.  
Still, the present study offers some promising first steps in establishing the 
source of aversive affect in moral judgment.  Proponents of the affective revolution in 
moral psychology have largely taken empathy to be the basis of moral judgment, at least 
in the harm domain. These studies highlight an alternative account: Moral 
condemnation largely depends upon an intrinsic aversion to performing harmful actions 
extended to third parties through an automatic process of evaluative simulation. 
Outcome-focused affect such as empathy may play a key role in the developmental 
acquisition of action aversion (Blair, 1995; Blair et al., 1997), but apparently plays a 
relatively weaker role in generating the widespread condemnation of welfare sacrifices 
in personal dilemmas. At the level of psychological processing, the analogy to the purity 
domain seems fruitful: our attitudes concerning the categorical immorality of eating pet 
dogs and pushing people off bridges depend to a surprising extent on imagining how 




Chapter 5. The influence of evaluative focus on moral and political attitudes 
 
5.1. Introduction 
It is patently clear that political liberals and conservatives disagree vehemently 
on issues related to morality, as evinced both on questions of public policy and in 
laboratory investigations (Graham et al., in press; Inbar et al., 2009a; Piazza & Sousa, 
2013). It is a core ambition of research in political psychology to understand those 
disagreements in terms of broader cognitive structures.  
The previous chapter demonstrated replicable differences in agent and victim 
foci across the political spectrum. Specifically, conservatives tended to demonstrate an 
evaluative focus on the intrinsic value of actions, while liberals tended to focus on the 
action‘s expected outcomes. So, in this chapter I ask whether the aforementioned 
difference in evaluative focus might help to explain the patent moral disagreement 
between conservatives and liberals. However, first I shall briefly review past 
achievements in our theoretical grasp of the psychological basis of ideological 
differences. 
One successful approach, Moral Foundations Theory, highlights differences in 
the content of liberal and conservative moral codes (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; 
Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Building on earlier attempts to 
aggregate diverse moral norms into a superordinate structure of basic concerns 
(Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), Haidt and Graham 
(2007) proposed a taxonomy of five foundations that together form the basis of morality 
across cultures. The foundations of harm and fairness encompass norms that proscribe 
harm to others and unjust behavior, and are suggested to relate to the evolution of the 
mammalian attachment system, empathy and mind-reading, and the development of 
reciprocal altruism. Together these domains are referred to as the ―individualizing‖ 
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foundations since they function primarily to protect the individual‘s wellbeing. The 
loyalty and authority foundations are comprised of norms that establish societal order 
and maintain intra-group relations e.g., norms about loyalty to superiors, patriotic 
duties, respect for elders, as well as govern attitudes towards the outgroup. These 
foundations are proposed to be closely linked to the evolution of small-scale, hunter-
gatherer and tribal communities and their hierarchical structures. Finally, the purity 
foundation contains a wide range of norms concerning food, hygiene, proper use of the 
body, including sexual behavior, and religious mandates about transcending carnal and 
animal impulses, and cultivating a spiritual sense. These norms evolved originally to 
deter the ingestion of contaminant substances, but now serve a broader purpose of 
establishing standards of decency and propriety. The loyalty, authority, and purity 
domains are sometimes referred to as the ―binding‖ foundations, suggesting that their 
proximate social function is to bind groups together rather than to directly protect the 
individual. It is argued that these five moral foundations are innate and can be found in 
every moral code across cultures, instantiated by different sets of substantive norms in 
each social context (Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  
In a large-scale study, Graham and colleagues (2009) found that across different 
cultures and nationalities people who identify with the political left place slightly 
greater importance on the values of care and fairness, while people who identify with 
the political right place substantially greater value on the virtues of loyalty toward one‘s 
ingroup, respect for authority, and upholding sanctity and bodily purity. An attractive 
feature of this result is that it can easily explain what is perhaps the most obvious aspect 
of the left-right political spectrum: disagreement on matters of policy. Questions of the 
proper scope of military power, immigration, and the role of religion in public life, for 
instance, clearly can be linked to a theory of divergent moral foundations. 
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However, while it explains a great deal about political disagreements over 
morality, this content-based schema neglects a class of disagreements that arise in the 
face of welfare trade-offs. Some experimental evidence indicates that conservatives 
express greater opposition to directly harming one person in order to save five others in 
trolley-type dilemmas (Graham et al., in prep.; Piazza & Sousa, 2013), and we replicate 
this finding in Analysis 1.  In addition, a wealth of evidence – discussed in greater detail 
in previous chapters – indicates that these condemnatory responses to moral dilemmas 
are motivated by an aversion to harmful action (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Greene et al., 
2001, 2004, 2009; Koenigs et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2013).  
These differences travel beyond the trolley tracks, and are illustrated in salient 
policy disputes. For instance, the issue of voluntary euthanasia, i.e., whether it is right 
for a physician to assist a terminally-ill patient in fulfilling their desire to die, has fueled 
a thorny debate in bioethics and philosophy (Foot, 1977; Kass, 1989; Rachels, 1986; 
Singer, 1995) and consistently drives a wedge between secular liberals and religious 
conservatives on major opinion polls, with liberals favoring more permissive policies 
while conservatives favor more restrictive policies (Procon.Org, 2011). Here again, the 
conservative position seems motivated by a greater, not lesser, moral concern with 
harmful action. 
The trouble, of course, is that – according to the theory of moral foundations – 
conservatives are supposed to care slightly less about harm than liberals, or certainly no 
more (Graham et al., 2009). Why, then, should they show increased condemnation of 
harm in the context of abortion and euthanasia, and also for trolley-type cases? A closer 
look at the structure of these dilemmas reveals a potential explanation. In each case, a 
disturbing action is balanced against welfare interests: the welfare of the mother; the 
suffering of the terminally ill; the five workers on the track. This introduces the 
possibility that the corresponding liberal and conservative moral views on these issues 
   123 
can be understood in terms of their divergent evaluative foci on the intrinsic moral 
status of actions viewed in isolation (conservative) versus the expected value of 
outcomes aggregately (liberal). 
Three existing lines of evidence support this structural hypothesis. First, the 
structural hypothesis dovetails with a recent finding that increased religiosity – which is, 
of course, strongly correlated with social conservatism (Olson & Green, 2006) – leads 
to a preference for ―rule-based‖ (i.e. deontological) versus outcome-based moral 
judgment (Piazza, 2012). Second, a structural approach might help to explain 
conservatives‘ and liberals‘ contrasting approaches to harmless taboos, such as kissing a 
sibling, peeing in public or eating one‘s dead pet (Inbar et al., 2009a). As we saw in 
Chapter 4, the extent which participants focused on actions (but not outcomes) predicted 
their condemnation of purity domain violations. Moreover, through an induction of the 
agent‘s perspective led to increased condemnation (relative to the bystander‘s 
perspective), and this difference was attributable presumably to the increased salience of 
the disgusting action via simulation. Third, the evaluative focus perspective is linked 
with prior differences in the thinking styles of liberals and conservatives, a point which 
merits more detailed attention below. 
5.1.1. Cognitive style and politics 
To identify moral disagreements between liberals and conservatives is only a 
first step towards the ultimate goal of explaining how underlying cognitive differences 
shape these moral disagreements. On this question, meager progress has been made. 
One exception is Janoff-Bulman and colleagues‘ (2008) linkage of observed differences 
in approach versus avoidance motivation among liberals and conservatives to their 
concern with proscriptive (―thou shalt not‖) versus prescriptive (―thou shalt‖) norms.  
The complementary focus of this chapter is to establish a link between cognitive 
style on the one hand, and the moral foundations identified by Haidt, Graham, and 
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colleagues on the other. Past studies show that conservatives exhibit a greater need for 
cognitive closure (Chirumbolo, 2002; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994), and are more intolerant of ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948) and 
avoidant of uncertainty (Wilson, 1973) than are liberals. Moreover, recent studies have 
demonstrated the longitudinal effects of an intuitive cognitive profile on conservative 
ideology (Hodson & Busseri, 2012) and on the related construct of right-wing 
authoritarianism (Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2011). Finally, even the short-term 
induction of an intuitive thinking style yields a boost in self-reported conservatism and 
conservative views (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012). In three 
experiments, Eidelman and colleagues observed that political conservatism increased 
with blood-alcohol content, and that participants displayed more conservative attitudes 
under cognitive load, and greater endorsement of conservative terms and rejection of 
liberal terms under time pressure (see also Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012).  
Collectively, these studies indicate that a conservative political orientation is associated 
with – and moreover, causally dependent on – a preference for simpler, definitive, and 
intuitive styles of thinking. How might these thinking styles explain different moral 
attitudes? In other words, why might the conservative preference for intuition and 
epistemic certainty lead to stricter sexual norms or stronger favoritism towards the 
ingroup, for instance, while a preference for reflection leads to a selective concern with 
harm and fairness?  
Through the lens of a content-based schema, it is not obvious why this should 
be. Adopting a structural approach, however, these connections are more readily 
explained. In the previous chapter, I presented evidence that people vary in the degree to 
which they engage two different approaches to moral judgment. One approach, which 
we referred to as victim focus, involves an assessment of whether the expected 
outcomes of a behavior are positive or negative. Attention is directed at the moral 
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patients and the outcomes likely to befall them. An alternative approach to making 
moral judgments, which we labeled agent focus, involves a focus not on the outcomes 
of the action, but rather on the intrinsic moral status of the action.  
We considered the example of a teacher slapping a child in the previous chapter. 
Through an evaluative focus on actions, one‘s categorical aversion to slapping children 
may give rise to the simple judgment that the teacher‘s action is inherently wrong. This 
approach likely depends on the acquisition of a valenced attitude toward the action 
itself, and a spontaneous simulation of the affective experience of performing the action, 
which gives rise to a moral evaluation.
17
  
By contrast, an evaluative focus on outcomes implicates more demanding 
cognitive processes, insofar as the teacher‘s action may have a multitude of potential 
outcomes. Beyond the child‘s immediate pain and humiliation, it may also discourage 
the child‘s undesirable behavior, decrease his self-esteem, deteriorate his relationship 
with the teacher, and may also indirectly affect others—for instance, it may influence 
the child to behave violently towards his peers. Moreover, there is uncertainty 
associated with each of these outcomes: they may or may not happen. 
So, evaluating actions based upon the intrinsic value representations that they 
immediately invoke—does this feel right, or wrong?—provides a heuristic approach to 
moral judgment that can potentially yield quick and definitive answers (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Whereas a person (in the position of a moral 
agent) may readily feel that it is wrong to cheat, steal or lie and experience relative 
certainty in this judgment, in many circumstances identifying and assessing the precise 
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 There are numerous ways these action-based affective responses might arise: some 
may be largely innate (see Greene et al., 2009; Lieberman & Lobel, 2012), others 
acquired through cultural learning of taboos and symbolic behavior (Baron & 
Spranca, 1997), and so on. In addition, Blair‘s (1995; see also Blair et al., 1997) 
model of the violence inhibition mechanism offers a specific account of the 
acquisition of many action-based aversions in the harm domain. This issue is treated 
more thoroughly in Chapter 6. 
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outcomes of these actions (to the victims and beneficiaries) involves a more exhaustive 
analysis of multiple subsequent events, each of which is uncertain. Therefore, the 
simplicity afforded by the action-based approach may be favored, and moreover in most 
circumstances it will lead to the same judgment as the outcome-based approach, like 
many heuristics (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).
18
 
This observation suggests a potential role for cognitive style in moral 
psychology. Individuals who enjoy thinking and engage deep reflection in order to form 
beliefs should be more likely to make moral evaluations through the cognitively taxing 
exercise of patient focus. By contrast, people who dislike thinking deeply and prefer to 
form beliefs in the wake of minimally sufficient evidence may accordingly prefer the 
strategy of agent focus. This suggests, since liberals and conservatives differ on this 
psychological dimension, that conservatives should tend to exhibit greater agent focus 
than liberals, while liberals should tend to exhibit greater patient focus than 
conservatives (as observed in Chapter 4).  
Motivated by these several lines of evidence, the present study aims to illustrate 
the value of characterizing the basis of moral disagreements between liberals and 
conservatives not only in terms of moral foundations, but also in terms of the structural 
division between action-based and outcome-based value representation. Specifically, we 
predict that agent focus gives rise to a typically conservative moral profile, while patient 
focus gives rise to a typically liberal moral profile. In addition, this exercise will help to 
bridge the gap between two areas of past research, asking how fundamental differences 
in cognitive style between liberals and conservatives yield the corresponding differences 
in moral values described by moral foundations theory. In other words, what is the 
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 Indeed, experimental evidence demonstrates that the categorical condemnation of 
actions, including lying (Greene & Paxton, 2009) and cheating (Rand, Greene & 
Nowak, 2012), is relatively automatic and cognitively undemanding, while an 
outcome-sensitive evaluation requires greater cognitive resources (Bartels, 2008; 
Greene et al., 2008; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2011). 
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nature of the psychological processes of moral evaluation that give rise to typically 
conservative and liberal moral profiles? 
5.1.2. Outline  
In Analysis 1, we replicate a finding that conservatives tend to condemn 
personal harm for the greater good more than do liberals. This finding cannot be 
straightforwardly captured by content-based schemas, like the extant Moral Foundations 
Theory. We propose that this result may owe to differences in the structural approaches 
of liberals and conservatives. So in Analysis 2 we examine the relationship between 
evaluative foci and demographics, paying special attention to religiosity and political 
orientation. Next, in Analysis 3, we examine whether agent and patient foci are related 
to the established differences in cognitive style between liberals and conservatives. 
Finally, in Analyses 4 and 5, we examine whether the differences in evaluative foci are 
at the root of distinct systems of moral foundations, and derivatively, may account for 
the disagreement about the relevance of binding foundations. 
5.1.3. General methods 
 In this study, we report data that were collected using two online platforms. 
Participants from both platforms were directed to an online survey where, after a brief 
introduction detailing the purpose and nature of the study, they completed the 
Act/Impact Morality Scale (see Experiment 1 in Chapter 4). In each experiment, 
participants completed one or more additional measures. At the end of the testing 
session, all participants provided optional demographic information.  
Demographics 
Participants indicated their age on a 10-year interval U.S Census scale (Under 
15 years: 2.6%; 15 to 24 years: 54.8%; 25 to 34 years: 21.2%; 35 to 44 years: 11.7%; 45 
to 54 years: 8.0%; 55 to 64 years: 3.2%; 65 years and over: 1.1%), gender (53.0% 
females, 47.0% males), educational attainment (Less than high school: 11.6%; High 
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school/GED: 19.7%; Some college: 23.9%; 2-year college degree: 8.0%; 4-year college 
degree: 21.0%; Master‘s degree: 12.2%; Doctoral Degree: 2.0%; Professional degree, 
e.g. JD, MD: 1.7%), religiosity (―How religious are you?‖; 1 Not at all: 33.7%; 2: 
13.1%; 3: 6.7%; 4 Somewhat: 17.0%; 5: 11.5%;  6: 9.7%; 7 Very: 8.4%), and several 
measures related to political orientation. Participants reported their political orientation 
on social issues (―When it comes to social issues, how liberal or conservative are 
you?‖), fiscal issues (―When it comes to economic issues, how liberal or conservative 
are you?‖) and the political orientation that prevailed throughout their development, 
which we term familial political orientation (―How would you describe the political 
environment that you grew up in, including your family, friends and community?‖; see 
Table 10). Finally, participants indicated the amount of formal education they had 
received in the subjects of philosophy (Very little or none: 53.5%; Some (e.g. one or 
two courses): 37.1%; A lot (e.g. three or more courses): 9.4%) and psychology (Very 
little or none: 44.4%; Some (e.g. one or two courses): 40.6%; A lot (e.g. three or more 
courses): 15.1%). 
Table 10. Political orientation: distribution. 
 VL   M   VC 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Social issues 















































Notes. VL: Very liberal; M: Moderate; VC: Very conservative. 
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5.2. Analysis 1: Focus- versus content-based accounts of moral disagreement. 
 Recent reports indicate that political conservatives tend to judge five-versus-one 
welfare trade-offs more harshly in trolley-type contexts (Graham et al., in prep.; Piazza 
& Sousa, 2013), and we replicate this finding in Analysis 1.  We also examined 
participants‘ concern for each of the five moral foundations, of harm, fairness, ingroup 
loyalty, authority and purity.  
 The most straightforward application of a content-based approach to moral 
judgment would predict that the condemnation of harmful action in trolley-type 
dilemmas will correlate strongly with ratings of the harm foundation, but weakly with 
the remaining foundations, if at all. 
 A structural approach to moral judgment, in contrast, predicts a strong 
correlation between the judgment of trolley-type dilemmas and the purity foundation. 
The moral condemnation of purity-related issues depends not on a consideration of the 
action‘s outcomes (Haidt et al., 2000), but rather on an aversion to the action 
(Lieberman & Lobel, 2013; see also Chapter 4). Similarly, ample evidence indicates 
that the moral condemnation of personal harm in trolley-type dilemmas rests upon an 
affective prohibition of actions that directly harm another (Greene et al., 2001 2004; 
Koenigs et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2013). 
5.2.1. Methods 
 144 participants (81 females) voluntarily logged on to the Moral Sense Test 
(MST). All research was conducted under the guidelines of the institutional review 
boards at Harvard University and Brown University. This study was specifically 
approved by the named institutional review boards, and written consent was obtained 
from all research participants. 
 Participants read a brief introduction to the study and then viewed three high-
conflict personal moral dilemmas in a random order (Trolley, Crying Baby, and 
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Lifeboat adapted from Greene et al., 2001; see Appendix E). These hypothetical 
dilemmas describe a person who faces the choice whether to kill one person in order to 
save a greater number, or instead to do nothing and allow the greater number of people 
to die. In each context, the person chose to sacrifice the one in order to save the greater 
number, and participants made moral judgments of their behavior on a 7-point Likert 
scale from 1: ―Not morally wrong at all‖ to 7: ―Very morally wrong‖. These particular 
scenarios were classified as ―high-conflict‖ in Koenigs et al., 2007, based on long 
reaction times and high disagreement about the moral permissibility of the behavior. As 
such, the mean response across our three dilemmas should serve as a reliable index of 
moral attitudes towards welfare trade-offs involving human death.  
Participants also completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; 
Graham et al., 2009), a 30-item scale that indexes participants‘ level of concern with 
each of the five moral foundations. In the first part, participants rate how relevant 
various concerns are to them when thinking about moral issues, e.g., ―Whether or not 
someone acted unfairly‖ (Fairness) and ―Whether or not an action caused chaos or 
disorder‖ (Authority). In the second part, participants express their agreement or 
disagreement with a set of items that reflect the relevance of a particular moral 
foundation, e.g., ―One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless 
animal‖ (Harm), ―It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself‖ 
(Loyalty), and ―Chastity is an important and valuable virtue‖ (Purity). A score for each 
foundation is derived by averaging across the three corresponding items in the first part 
and the three corresponding items in the second part. Harm and fairness scores can be 
averaged into a single metric of concern for the individualizing foundations; and 
similarly loyalty, authority and purity scores are sometimes averaged into a single 
metric of relevance of the binding foundations. The MFQ contains two catch items, and 
participants who demonstrated inattentiveness on these two items were excluded from 
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the analyses (above 2 on ―Whether or not someone was good at math‖, and below 5 on 
―It is better to do good than to do bad‖, both on a 6-point scale).  
The order of presentation of the moral dilemmas block and the MFQ was 
counterbalanced across participants. At the end of the study, participants optionally 
provided some demographic information. The MFQ contains two catch items, and 21 
participants who demonstrated inattentiveness on these items were excluded from the 
following analyses.  
5.2.2. Results 
  We found that moral judgments of trolley-type dilemmas correlated with 
political orientation on social issues, r = .280, p < .002, and fiscal issues, r = .233, p < 
.01, and marginally with familial political orientation, r = .171, p = .06, indicating that 
conservatives tended to condemn personal harm in welfare trade-offs more than did 
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 We replicated the finding, presented in Chapter 4,that condemnation of personal harm 
correlated with action focus, r = .261, p = .004, but not outcome focus, r = -.02, p > .8, 
indicating that the more participants tended to focus on the character of actions, the 














































Figure 15. Moral judgment by political orientation. (Very lib.: Very liberal; Very cons.: 
Very conservative.) 
Next, we turned to the relationship between condemnation of personal harm and 
relevance of each of the moral foundations. As predicted by the content-based approach, 
condemnation of personal harm correlated with relevance of the harm foundation, r = 
.365, p < .0001. However, as predicted by evaluative focus alone, we found correlations 
between condemnation of personal harm and all three binding foundations; loyalty r = 
.290, p < .002, authority r = .336, p < .0001, purity r = .434, p < .0001, indicating that 
the more participants condemned the welfare trade-off in trolley-type dilemmas, the 
more they cared about loyalty, authority and particularly about purity. 
5.2.3. Discussion 
Analysis 1 demonstrated that that social conservatives judged welfare trade-offs 
implicating personal harm more harshly than did liberals. This difference, not captured 
by moral foundations theory, is easily explained by appealing to evaluative foci. From 
an evaluative focus perspective, the presence of both action and outcome sources of 
affect in harm violations introduces the possibility of moral conflict and disagreement. 
By focusing on the moral agent, conservatives tend to condemn the welfare trade-off on 
the basis of an affective response to the agent‘s harmful action (e.g., pushing, shooting a 
gun, smothering one‘s child; see also Miller et al., 2013). Liberals, on the other hand, 
focus on the moral patients and judge the welfare trade-off relatively more permissible 
on the basis of a concern for the welfare of the patients in the moral interaction.  
This philosophical thought experiment provides some purchase on contemporary 
political divisions. Consider, for instance, euthanasia or abortion. When we simulate 
these behaviors from the agent‘s perspective, and focus on the performance of a harmful 
action, action aversion promotes the categorical condemnation of the behavior (Miller et 
al., 2013). By contrast, when we jointly consider the expected outcomes of the action, 
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i.e., the victim‘s immediate pain but also a broader range of probabilistic, ―distal‖ 
outcomes associated to the welfare of other patients, these concerns may outweigh the 
aversion to performing harm to a proximal victim and guide approval of associated 
policies.  
In the second part of this study, we found that increased reliance on the harm 
foundation predicted deontological moral judgment of dilemmas, consistent with either 
content-based or structure-based schemas. However, increased sensitivity to purity 
concerns also predicted deontological moral judgment of dilemmas and, if anything, this 
latter correlation appeared to be the stronger of the two. This result seemingly favors the 
structural hypothesis. Still, we must ask whether these results can be understood in 
terms of a content-based approach alone. It is possible, for instance, that these moral 
dilemmas are construed as purity-related issues: e.g., ―Human life is sacred, and not to 
be defiled by its profane sacrifice for greater welfare‖. Such language is often invoked 
in opposition to abortion and euthanasia, although we may detect a whiff of post hoc 
rationalization about it.  
Therefore, though moral foundations theory captures the disagreements between 
liberals and conservatives that surround transgressions of the binding foundations, the 
theory neglects another category of issues, concerning the permissibility of welfare 
trade-offs, that generate divisive moral disagreements. Analysis 2 employs a more direct 
measure of evaluative focus in moral judgment across the political spectrum. 
  
5.3. Analysis 2: Demographic predictors of evaluative focus. 
 In Experiment 2 we ask participants whether they adopt a structural approach to 
moral judgment that places greater emphasis on the feelings associated with actions 
intrinsically, or instead on the outcomes that those actions are likely to cause. Our 
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prediction is that conservatives will emphasize the former set of concerns, while liberals 
will emphasize the latter. 
5.3.1. Method 
 493 participants (276 females) logged on to the MST, where they first read a 
brief introduction to the study and provided their written consent. Participants then 
completed our measures of evaluative focus (see Chapter 4), and then voluntarily 
provided demographic information. 
5.3.2. Results 
As predicted, social conservatives demonstrated greater action focus, r = .212, p 
< .0001, and lesser outcome focus, r = -.141, p < .003, than did social liberals. In a 
multiple regression model, these were unique effects on social political orientation, AF 
β = .267, p < .001, OF β = -.211, p < .001. With our measures of third-party evaluation, 
we obtained the corresponding pattern of results. Evaluative simulation (via focus on 
the moral agent) was associated with a conservative stance on social issues, r = .158, p 
< .001, while outcome assessment (via focus on the moral patients) was associated with 
liberal views on social issues, r = -.193, p < .0001, and these were independent effects 
in a multiple regression model, ES β = .127, p < .01, OA β = -.170, p < .001. Finally, we 
observed that participants who endorsed evaluative simulation were more socially, 
t(463) = 4.02, p < .0001, and fiscally, t(465) = 2.40, p < .02, conservative than 
participants who endorsed outcome assessment. With views on fiscal policy, we 
observed correlations with our measures of action focus, r = .132, p < .005, and 
evaluative simulation, r = .120, p < .01, only. Similarly, religiosity correlated only with 
action focus, r = .175, p < .003.  
In both self-regulation and perspective-taking during third-party evaluation, we 
found differences along the political spectrum, which were larger for social, than for 
fiscal, political orientation. (Figure 16 displays mean values on measures of evaluative 
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focus across the political spectrum.) Other demographic measures, including academic 
instruction in philosophy and psychology, gender, religiosity, and education, correlated 
also with evaluative foci in diverse ways, though these effects were smaller and less 
stable across our related measures than the effects on political orientation. See 
Supplementary Analysis 1 for correlations with other demographic variables. 
  
Figure 16. Action and outcome focus (left) and ratings of agent and patient perspective-
taking (right) by social political orientation. (Very lib.: Very liberal; Very cons.: Very 
conservative.) 
5.3.3. Discussion 
 Social conservatives demonstrated an evaluative focus on actions and tended to 
endorse evaluative simulation, while social liberals demonstrated greater evaluative 
focus on outcomes and tended to favor outcome assessment. Political orientation on 
fiscal issues did not yield as clear systematic effects on evaluative focus and, 
surprisingly, neither did religiosity (but see Piazza, 2012). With familial conservatism, 
we found no relationships in the first place; this result provides suggestive evidence that 
evaluative focus is not the result of a liberal or conservative upbringing, but rather 




































These demographic variables correlated with our measure of action focus, but the 
overall size of the effects was stronger with social political orientation. 
 
5.4. Analysis 3: The influence of cognitive style on moral evaluation. 
In Analysis 3, we employ two differentiated dimensions of cognitive style, need 
for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984) and need for closure (Webster & 
Kruglanksi, 1994), in order to determine the relationship between participants‘ 
structural approach to moral judgment and their cognitive style (intuitive versus 
deliberative).  This is motivated by a straightforward observation: To make moral 
judgments by assessing how an action ―feels‖ plausibly depends on System 1 
processing (akin to the affect heuristic in Slovic et al., 2002), while to make moral 
judgments by assessing the likely outcomes of an action requires a System 2-based 
search over probabilistic causal models.  These two approaches to decision-making have 
been formalized in computational terms (Sutton & Barto 1999; Dayan & Niv, 2008; 
Daw & Shohamy, 2008) and signatures of both approaches are evident behaviorally 
(Otto, Gershman, Markman & Daw, 2013; Gershman, Markman & Otto, 2012) and 
neurally (Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, & O'Doherty, 2010).  Altogether, these studies 
indicate that ―action-based‖ evaluation operates in a more automatic fashion, whereas 
―outcome-based‖ evaluation depends more upon mechanisms of cognitive control 
(Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013). We therefore predict that participants with an 
intuitive cognitive style will exhibit an evaluative focus on actions, while participants 
with a reflective cognitive style will exhibit an evaluative focus on outcomes. 
5.4.1. Methods 
 236 participants (128 females) were recruited via Amazon‘s Mechanical Turk 
(www.mturk.com), an online labor market where short incentivized tasks are completed 
by workers worldwide. Several studies demonstrate that Mechanical Turk provides a 
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diverse sample for affordable and high-quality data collection in Web-based behavioral 
paradigms (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011).  
 Participants provided their written consent and then completed two widely-used 
measures of cognitive style – the 18-item Need for Cognition Short Form (Cacioppo et 
al., 1984), and the 42-item Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) – 
along with our measures of evaluative focus, in a randomized order to avoid the 
influence of systematic order effects upon our data.  
The 18-item Need for Cognition – Short Form is a widely-used and reliable 
measure of need for cognition, or ―an individual‘s tendency to engage in and enjoy 
effortful cognitive endeavors‖ (Cacioppo et al., 1984, p. 306). People who display a 
high need for cognition find thinking enjoyable and engage in reflection frequently, 
whereas people who display low need for cognition find thinking tedious and 
unappealing and engage thinking only when it is properly incentivized. Example items 
are ―I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems‖ and 
―I only think as hard as I have to‖ (reverse-scored). The sum score of all 18-items, 
ranging from 18 to 90, was computed as a participant‘s need for cognition index. 
The 42-item Need for Closure Scale, designed to assess individual differences in 
the desire to possess knowledge (on a given topic), rather than enduring ambiguity or 
indecision (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). People 
who are high in need for closure tend to seek definitive knowledge and form conclusive 
beliefs with minimally sufficient evidence. This trait is known to give rise to a 
preference for order and routine and an intolerance of ambiguity and unpredictability. 
By contrast, people who are low in need for closure are more likely to endure ambiguity 
and uncertainty, and hold higher standards for the formation of beliefs. The need for 
closure construct is composed of five subscales: order (e.g. ―I hate to change my plans 
at the last minute‖), predictability (e.g. ―I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new 
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situation without knowing what might happen,‖ reverse-scored), decisiveness (e.g. 
―When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly‖), 
ambiguity (e.g. ―I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear 
to me‖), and closed-mindedness (e.g. ―When considering most conflict situations, I can 
usually see how both sides could be right,‖ reverse-scored). The sum score of all the 
items, ranging from 42 to 252, was computed as a participant‘s need for closure index. 
At the end of the testing session, participants optionally provided basic demographic 
information. 
5.4.2. Results 
We replicated previous findings demonstrating a relationship between cognitive 
style and political orientation (Jost et al., 1999): specifically, high need for closure and 
low need for cognition were associated with social conservatism, closure r = .193, p < 
.008, cognition r = -.223, p = .002, but bore no relationship to fiscal conservatism, ps > 
.5. Need for cognition and need for closure were also negatively correlated with each 
other, r = -.290, p < .0001.   
As predicted, action focus correlated positively with need for closure, r = .330, p 
< .0001, and negatively with need for cognition, r = -.224, p < .002, confirming that 
action focus was associated with an intuitive cognitive style. By contrast, outcome focus 
did not correlate with either need for cognition or need for closure, ps > .5 (see Figure 
17). Controlling for political orientation in separate multiple regression models, the 
effects of action focus on the indices of cognitive style remained significant, cognition β 
= -.223, p < .002, closure β = .316, p < .001. 
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Figure 17. Need for cognition (left) and need for cognitive closure (right) foundations 
by action and outcome focus. 
There were no effects of need for cognition or need for closure on the 
endorsement measure or  relative rating of agent vs. patient perspective-taking, all ps > 
.15, suggesting that perspective-taking in third-party evaluation is not associated to 
cognitive style. Examining the relationships of cognitive style to the independent ratings 
of agent and patient perspective-taking, once again we found little evidence for 
systematic relationships: Agent perspective-taking correlated with neither need for 
closure nor need for cognition, ps > .3, while patient perspective-taking correlated with 
need for cognition, r = .187, p = .008, but not need for closure, p > .3. 
5.4.3. Discussion 
We found a pattern of results consistent with the view that an intuitive cognitive 
style supports an agent focus while a reflective cognitive style supports a patient focus 
in moral judgment. However, the precise set of results was rather more nuanced: We 
found that intuitive cognitive style (indexed by a low need for cognition and a high need 
for closure) predicted social political orientation and, in a multiple regression model, 





















has some intuitive plausibility. Cognitive style shapes political orientation in a variety 
of ways, many of which do not have a moral dimension. For instance, the preference for 
conformity and tradition, appreciating simple and intuitively appealing arguments, or 
being suspicious of science and higher education are elements of intuitive thinking that 
may promote conservatism in ways that evaluative focus could not explain. The results 
of the multiple regression analysis are consistent with this interpretation: cognitive style 
influences politics via numerous routes, only some of which implicate evaluative focus, 
and thus remains the stronger predictor of political orientation.  
By contrast, with third-party evaluation, we found minimal relationships 
between cognitive style and either agent or patient perspective-taking, suggesting that 
differences in perspective-taking along the political spectrum are not principally due to 
differences in cognitive style. One explanation for this might be that whether we take 
our aversions to particular actions into account when deciding what is right for us to do 
is largely due to a general reliance on intuition. But, given those feelings, whether we 
employ them to judge others through evaluative simulation is not influenced by 
cognitive style, but rather a sui generis approach to third-party moral judgment. 
The results of Analysis 3 demonstrate a relation between cognitive style and 
social political orientation, but no relation with fiscal political orientation. Together 
with the results of Analysis 2 (where differences in evaluative foci where stronger with 
social than fiscal political orientation too), this suggests that the phenomenon of interest, 
i.e., how cognitive style gives rise to distinct approaches to morality among liberals vs. 
conservatives, primarily implicates the social dimension of political ideology. Thus, in 
further analyses, we focus on the relations that obtain with social political orientation. 
 Finally, we found that cognitive style was strongly related to our measures of 
action focus, but weakly if at all related to our measures of outcome focus.  (In contrast, 
outcome-focus items did correlate with political orientation in Analysis 2).  We did not 
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anticipate this result, which deserves further investigation.  Possibly, our outcome items 
index the endorsement of outcome-based concerns in the abstract, which is not 
cognitively demanding or ambiguous (see Ditto & Liu, 2012).  Rather, cognitive 
demands and ambiguity may arise principally from the process of actually imposing 
outcome-based moral judgments in practice, especially in cases such as trolley-type 
dilemmas and victimless crimes where they conflict with action-based moral judgments. 
 At a broad level, the results of Analysis 3 suggest a potential link between two 
well-studied aspects of political psychology that have previously been treated 
independently.  On the one hand, political conservatives show a preference for intuitive 
cognitive styles (Jost et al., 1999). On the other hand, conservatives exhibit heightened 
concern for the binding moral foundations (Graham et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2009a). We 
have already demonstrated a connection between an intuitive cognitive style and the 
preference for action-based moral evaluation.  In Analysis 4, we complete the linkage 
by demonstrating that a preference for action-based moral evaluation is linked to the 
adoption of conservative moral values. 
 
5.5. Analysis 4: Evaluative foci predict patterns of moral foundations. 
Analysis 4 seeks to examine the relationship between evaluative foci and 
systems of moral foundations, using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; 
Graham et al., 2009). It is already known that political liberals primarily rely upon two 
psychological foundations, the foundations of harm and fairness, whereas political 
conservatives rely more evenly upon all five psychological foundations. The structural 
hypothesis provides a possible explanation for these observed differences: Actions that 
violate the individualizing foundations, such as sticking a pin into the palm of a child or 
cheating in a game of cards, involve an agent harming one or more patients. By contrast, 
actions that violate the binding foundations, such as burning one‘s national flag or 
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cooking and eating one‘s dead pet dog, feature agents performing reprehensible acts that 
in many instances do not entail harmful outcomes to patients. They of course may do so: 
insulting a family member, or cursing one‘s nation on the radio, for instance, likely 
bring about some victim distress in each case. But critically, an action need not entail a 
harmful outcome in order to constitute a violation of the loyalty, authority or purity 
foundations.  
Consequently, we predict a strong relationship between outcome focus and 
concern with the harm and fairness foundations, sometimes referred to as 
individualizing foundations.  We also predicted a strong relationship between action 
focus and the harm and fairness foundations, insofar as one might be motivated by an 
aversion to harmful or unfair actions just as much as by the outcomes they produce 
(Cushman et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2013). For the purity, authority and loyalty 
foundations—sometimes referred to as binding foundations—we predicted a strong 
relationship with action items alone. Thus, the individuals who exhibit agent focus 
should demonstrate greater concern for the binding foundations than patient-focused 
individuals demonstrate. 
5.5.1. Methods 
 571 participants (323 females) voluntarily logged on to the Moral Sense Test, 
read a brief introduction to the study and provided their written consent.  Next, 
participants completed the assessment of evaluative focus developed in Chapter 4 along 
with the MFQ. 93 participants who demonstrated inattentiveness through the catch 
items in the MFQ were excluded from subsequent analyses. At the end of experiment, 
participants optionally provided demographic information. 
5.5.2. Results 
 As predicted, the extent to which participants exhibited an evaluative focus on 
actions correlated with their concern for all five foundations, whereas the extent to 
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which they emphasized outcomes correlated only with their concern for individualizing 
foundations (see Figure 18, and statistical tests presented in Table 11). Next we 
examined the measures of third-party evaluation and found the corresponding pattern of 
relations: ratings of evaluative simulation correlated with moralization across all five 
foundations, whereas ratings of outcome assessment correlated only with moralization 
of the individualizing foundations (see Table 11). 
  
Figure 18. Relevance of the individualizing (left) and binding (right) foundations by 
action and outcome focus. 
Table 11. Evaluative foci and moral foundations: correlations. 
 Harm Fairness Loyalty Authority Purity 
Action focus .288*** .224*** .278*** .376*** .451*** 
Outcome focus .431*** .420*** .075 -.014 .018 
Agent perspective-taking .132** .102* .139** .198*** .230*** 
Patient perspective-taking .312*** .322*** -.025 -.053 -.071 
Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
Looking at the dichotomous endorsement measure, we found that participants 




















individualizing foundations as less relevant, and the binding foundations as more 
relevant, to them than did participants who reported adopting the patient‘s perspective, 
individualizing t(477) = -3.76, p < .0005, binding t(477) = 2.23, p = .026. This 
relationship was confirmed on the bipolar relative rating of agent vs. patient 
perspective-taking: as participants rated agent perspective-taking more favorably than 
patient perspective-taking, they tended to judge the individualizing foundations as less 
relevant, r = .153, p < .001, and the binding foundations as more relevant to their moral 
judgment, r = -.150, p < .001. 
 We then entered our measures of evaluative focus along with social political 
orientation into separate multiple regressions predicting each of the moral foundations 
(see Supplementary Analysis 2).  Still, we observed significant effects of action focus 
on all five foundations, .185 < βs < .371, ps < .001, and of outcome focus on the 
individualizing foundations, .333 < βs < .369, ps < .001, after controlling for the effects 
of political orientation. Similarly, we entered our measures of third-party evaluation 
along with social political orientation into separate multiple regressions predicting each 
of the moral foundations (see also Supplementary Analysis 3).  Here too we observed 
independent effects of evaluative simulation on the individualizing foundations, .162 < 
βs < .181, ps < .001, and outcome assessment, .291 < βs < .336, ps < .001, after 
controlling for political orientation. The effects of evaluative simulation on each of the 
binding foundations after controlling for political orientation were significant .098 < βs 
< .163, ps < .05, though their overall sizes were small. In sum, the effects of 
participants‘ evaluative foci on their pattern of moral foundations held even after 
controlling for political orientation. 
In a follow-up study, we confirmed the above findings employing a 
complementary measure, the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (MFSS; Graham et 
al., 2009). On the MFSS, participants are requested to imagine performing a series of 
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actions. The actions listed on MFSS are moral violations corresponding to each of the 
five foundations, .e.g. ―Kick a dog in the head hard‖ (Harm), ―Renounce your 
citizenship and become a citizen of another country‖ (Loyalty), or ―Get a blood 
transfusion of 1 pint of disease-free, compatible blood from a convicted child molester‖ 
(Purity). Participants select the appropriate point on an 8-point logarithmic scale, 
indicating ―how much money someone would have to pay [them] (anonymously and 
secretly) to be willing to do each thing‖ (1:  $0 I‘d do it for free, 2: $10, 3: $100, 4: 
$1000, 5: $10,000, 6: $100,000, 7: $1,000,000, 8: Never for any amount of money). As 
such, the MFSS provides a visceral counterpart to the more abstract MFQ. A measure of 
unwillingness to violate (or sacredness of) a given foundation is derived by averaging 
across the four items corresponding to each foundation. Since the MFSS measures the 
sacredness of each foundation in the participant‘s own behavior, in these analyses we 
were primarily interested in the relationships with measures of moral self-regulation. 
We found that both action and outcome foci correlated with moralization across all five 
foundations, all ps < .01. So, we entered action and outcome foci into separate multiple 
regression models for each foundation: action focus and outcome focus each explained 
unique variance in the sacredness of the harm and fairness foundations (all ps < .01), 
whereas only action focus explained unique variance in the loyalty, authority and purity 
foundations (action focus ps < .001; outcome focus ps > .1). 
5.5.3. Discussion  
As predicted, participants‘ evaluative focus on actions versus outcomes 
predicted the moral views of liberals and conservatives across different stimuli 
pertaining to the moral foundations. We found that an emphasis on actions was 
associated with a five foundation morality (the conservative moral profile) whereas an 
emphasis on outcomes was associated with a harm-based, two foundation morality (the 
liberal moral profile).  
146 
 
5.6. Analysis 5: Building a model of politics, moral foundations and evaluative foci. 
We have thus far demonstrated that evaluative foci are related to political 
orientation and to distinct patterns of moralization of individualizing and binding 
concerns. In this section, the aim is to determine the causal ordering among these 
variables. We first review past evidence suggesting that the moral attitudes in fact shape 
political orientation, and then employ statistical modeling techniques in order to 
determine the position of evaluative focus within this causal relationship. 
A number of findings indicate that the induction of binding concerns causes 
participants to identify with the political right. In one recent study, it was found that 
brief exposure to the national flag promotes identification with the conservative party 
(Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011). In a similar vein, attendance to Independence Day 
parades in the United States throughout childhood predicts conservatism during 
adulthood (Madestam & Yanagizawa-Scott, 2012). These studies can be understood as 
demonstrating that political conservatism is promoted by the induction of loyalty and 
authority concerns. Similarly, reminders of purity have been shown to sway participants 
towards the conservative end of the spectrum (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011). As a prime of 
purity concerns, participants completed the experiment next to a hand sanitizer as 
opposed to across the hall from the hand sanitizer in the control group. In two studies, 
participants who were exposed to the manipulation reported more politically 
conservative attitudes than did participants in the control group. Might the causal link 
also run in the opposite direction? That is, does affiliation with the conservative party 
shape concern for the binding foundations? Although we do not rule out this relation, at 
least some evidence from our own data suggests otherwise. Specifically participants‘ 
familial political orientation did not predict their own attitudes toward the moral 
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foundations, despite the fact that it did predict their own present political orientation.
20
 
In this section, we perform Sobel-Goodman mediation analyses on the data in Analysis 
4 to arbitrate between three models that are consistent with a causal link from 
moralization of the binding foundations to political conservatism. We then employ path 
analysis on these data in order to develop a prototypical causal model of evaluative foci, 
moral foundations and political orientation.  
5.6.1. Results  
We compare three mediation models with action focus, concern for the binding 
foundations and political orientation that are compatible with a causal link from concern 
for the binding foundations to political conservatism. We posit concern for the binding 
foundations as causally prior to political orientation, and place agent focus – indexed by 
action focus and agent perspective-taking – as either (M1) independent variable, (M2) 
mediator variable, or (M3) dependent variable as demonstrated in Table 12. The 
structural hypothesis predicts that an emphasis on actions causes moralization of the 
binding foundations and so we predict that M1 will yield the strongest mediation model. 
Table 12. Candidate mediation models for comparison. 
 IV  MV  DV 
M1: Agent focus  Binding concerns  Social conservatism 
M2: Binding concerns  Agent focus  Social conservatism 
M3: Binding concerns  Social conservatism  Agent focus 
 
                                                 
20
 Harm r = -.050, p = .3; fairness r = -.054, p = .3; loyalty r = .078, p > .10; authority r 
= .101, p < .04; purity r = .144, p < .005. In multiple regression models, the significant 
effects of familial political orientation on authority and purity foundations were non-
significant, p > .2, after controlling for the effects of own political orientation on 
social issues, p < .001. As noted, familial political orientation did predict own political 
views: social r = .380, p < .0001; fiscal r = .400, p < .0001. 
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In our preferred model, M1, agent focus causes concern for the binding 
foundations, which in turn promotes social conservatism. A mediation analysis revealed 
that concern for the binding foundations mediated the relationship between action focus 
and social conservatism, z = 7.46, p = 8.42 x 10
-14
, prop. effect mediated = 1.02. By 
contrast, the alternative models, with agent focus as mediator (M2) and as dependent 
variable (M3) were only marginally significant, M2: z = -1.77, p = .077, prop. effect 
mediated = -.067, M3: z = -1.77, p = .076, prop. effect mediated = -.090. 
We confirmed this relationship with our measure of evaluative simulation. 
Consistent with M1, concern for binding foundations fully mediated the effect of agent 
perspective-taking on social conservatism, z = 4.77, p = 1.81 x 10
-6
, prop. effect 
mediated = .854, whereas the alternative mediation models did not reach significance, z 
= .320, p = .7, prop. effect mediated = .008, M3: z = .373, p = .6, prop. effect mediated = 
.054. Altogether, these analyses favored our hypothesized mediation model, M1. 
Given the ordering of the causal chain supported by the previous comparison, in 
the following step we present a path analysis with action and outcome foci as exogenous 
variables (Level 1), concern for the individualizing and binding moral foundations as 
intermediate variables (Level 2), and social political orientation as the dependent 
variable (Level 3). We seek to compare the variance explained by the full model 
retaining every path from a lower-level to a higher- level variable to the variance 
explained by a reduced model, where we drop the path from outcome focus to 
moralization of binding concerns, as well as the direct paths from evaluative foci to 
political orientation (see Figure 19). So, we computed the variance accounted for by 
each model using the following equation,    RR
iPM
22 1-1 , where R
iP
2 is the R
2  from 
each regression in the model. The total R
2 of the full model equaled .397, while the total 
R
2 of the reduced model equaled .391, indicating a relative fit of the reduced model to 
the full model of .990. Model-fit difference was calculated using 
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    7204  R1R1log 2reduced2fulle . -  - dNW  , where N is the sample size and d is 
the number of dropped paths. We then obtained the 
2 critcritW , where ddf  . For 
this analysis,   815.705.,32  pdf . Since WW crit , we conclude that (i) the 
deleted paths did not contribute to the model and (ii) the reduced model fits the data as 
well as the full model.  
 
Figure 19. Reduced model showing β values as path coefficients. 
5.6.2. Discussion 
According to the above analyses, we propose the following account: Differences 
in agent and patient foci (associated partly with differences in cognitive style) give rise 
to distinct moral views about the individualizing and binding foundations. In particular, 
patient focus supports exclusively the moralization of harm and fairness foundations, 
whereas agent focus supports primarily the moralization of the binding foundations 
(and, to a lesser extent, the moralization of the individualizing foundations as well). In 
turn, moralization of the individualizing and binding foundations influences political 
affiliation: Specifically, individualizing concerns promote affiliation with the political 
left while binding concerns promote affiliation with the political right. 
 
5.7. General discussion 
Moral disagreements along the political spectrum appear to derive not only from 
a concern for divergent moral domains, but also from different structural foci during 
 
 





















moral evaluation. Consistent with other recent findings (Graham et al., in prep; Piazza 
& Sousa, 2013), we show that conservatives are more likely than liberals to condemn 
direct harmful action when it is motivated by welfare-maximizing concerns, an effect 
not easily captured by moral foundations theory alone. A conservative preference for 
action-based moral evaluation is also evident in their agreement with abstracted 
statements (e.g., ―By and large, morality is about doing what feels right‖), and is 
associated with an approach to moral judgment that we call ―evaluative simulation‖: If 
it feels aversive to me, it‘s morally wrong for you.  
Additionally, we show that these evaluative foci in moral judgment are related to 
differences in thinking styles. In particular, the tendency to employ action-based affect 
in self-regulation may derive partially from having an intuitive cognitive style and lesser 
tolerance for uncertainty. This was true even after controlling for differences in political 
orientation.  
Finally, we show that these structural differences between conservative and 
liberal approaches to moral judgment correspond with previously reported differences in 
the content of their moral values (Graham et al., 2009). Across different stimuli, we 
found that an agent focus was associated with moralization of the individualizing and 
binding moral foundations alike, whereas patient focus was associated exclusively with 
a concern for individualizing moral foundations. A focus on the intrinsic wrongness of 
actions is associated with valuing the binding foundations (ingroup loyalty, authority, 
and purity), while a focus on outcomes is associated with valuing the individualizing 
foundations (harm and fairness), and these relationships held even when controlling for 
political orientation.  
At a broad level, these considerations highlight the importance of characterizing 
individual differences in moral judgment not just in terms of domain content, as in 
moral foundations theory, but also in terms of evaluative focus. Of course these two 
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approaches are not mutually-exclusive.  Rather, they complement each other insofar as 
certain contents are closely aligned with an emphasis on negative outcomes (particularly 
harm) and others are difficult to understand except in terms of an emphasis on aversive 
actions (most obviously purity).  
The present study contributes to an extensive research program uncovering basic 
psychological differences between liberals and conservatives, e.g., in cognitive style 
(Kruglanski, 2005; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) or in personality traits like threat 
anxiety, openness to experience, ambiguity tolerance (see Jost et al., 2001), and their 
longitudinal influence on the development of a political identity (Eidelman et al., 2012; 
Heaven et al., 2011; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Matthews et al., 2009; Perry & Sibley, 
2012). Building on prior evidence, we proposed the following causal picture: Reflective 
individuals tend to make moral evaluations by focusing on the expected outcomes of the 
agent‘s action on others, i.e., by evaluating the way that an agent‘s behavior affects the 
welfare of victims or beneficiaries. This approach to moral evaluation in turn gives rise 
to moral views, such as greater approval of welfare trade-offs and the moralization of 
individualizing but not binding concerns, that are sensitive to whether the behavior 
enhances or hinders patients‘ welfare. The development of this cluster of moral attitudes 
in turn promotes the individual‘s placement on the liberal end of the political spectrum. 
By contrast, individuals with a preference for intuitive and simpler thinking styles are 
more likely to make moral evaluations by focusing on the agent‘s action, i.e., by 
condemning the agent‘s behavior if its mental simulation elicits an aversive response. 
This approach to moral evaluation in turn gives rise to moral values that depend on 
whether performance of the agent‘s action would be aversive to the evaluator, such as 
the condemnation of welfare trade-offs and the moralization of binding concerns. The 
adoption of these moral attitudes then promotes the individual‘s identification as a 
social conservative. 
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Together these results might be considered to paint an unflattering portrait of the 
conservative moral sense. In place of a consideration of how people‘s actions harm or 
help those affected, conservative judgments about what is right and wrong for others 
depend on projecting personal, automatic aversions associated to others‘ behaviors: if it 
feels bad to me, it‘s wrong for you. At the same time, there are several potential benefits 
to an action focus in moral decision-making. First, ascribing intrinsic moral value to 
types of actions likely enables the adoption of bright-line standards of conduct, which 
are in turn associated with a greater ease of willful behavioral control (Baumeister & 
Tierney, 2011; Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010). By contrast, evaluating the expected 
outcomes of an action introduces uncertainty and, potentially, a greater scope for 
processes of motivated reasoning to rationalize self-interested behavior. Second, 
evaluating others‘ actions by comparing them against the standard of one‘s own 
conscience would, at least in theory, reduce moral hypocrisy. Along similar lines, it 
might be expected to foster the development of morally and ideologically defined 
communities, a consequence that is compatible with the theory of conservative ideology 
as binding moral groups (Haidt & Graham, 2009). 
We must also note several limitations of the studies presented here. First, the 
causal claims that we defend, while congruent with prior evidence and with the 
statistical models we tested, depend on correlational methods. Future work should 
therefore aim to test the proposed causal claims in an experimental design. Second, 
there are interesting public policy cases of moral disagreement where the structural 
approach makes the opposite (wrong) prediction. For instance, a paradigmatic emphasis 
on outcomes perhaps would yield the view that in certain circumstances the death 
penalty is morally preferable to life imprisonment, or that intrusions on privacy for the 
greater good of society (such as the practice of wire-tapping in the effort to prevent 
terrorism) are morally permissible. Yet the typically liberal position on these issues is in 
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fact ordinarily the opposite. These examples illustrate that not all typically liberal moral 
views are congruent with those that a predominant outcome focus would promote. 
Finally, we must note that the effect sizes reported for content-based theories of 
conservative moral values tend to be larger than the effect sizes we report here based on 
structure.  Of course, as we have emphasized throughout, these approaches are not at all 
exclusive of each other, and indeed they appear to be mutually-reinforcing. 
Still, this study offers a promising advance in our understanding of the 
psychological basis of moral attitudes along the political spectrum. Liberals‘ and 
conservatives‘ seemingly irreconcilable views about matters of right and wrong are 
partly the product of individual differences in the tendency to approach the evaluation 
of moral issues with an emphasis on simulating the agent‘s action versus on assessing 
its expected outcomes. This difference in their approaches to moral judgment dovetails 
with other well-known correlates of political orientation, and helps to explain 
disagreements on heated public policy debates, hypothetical dilemmas, and abstract 
moral standards.  
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Chapter 6. The theory of evaluative focus in perspective. 
 
6.1. Introduction  
Throughout the previous chapters, I defended – through both argumentation and 
empirical evidence – that moral judgments involve affective responses to processes of 
mental simulation. The experimental findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5 
demonstrate the utility of drawing a distinction between two particular kinds of mental 
simulation, differentiated by their content. Specifically, moral judgments may derive 
from a simulation focused on the agent‘s action or on the outcomes to patients.  
To recapitulate, the studies in Chapter 4 showed that the condemnation of 
canonically disgusting and harmful behavior depends principally on the evaluative 
simulation of the agent‘s action. Then, in Chapter 5 we saw that differences in the 
evaluative focus on actions versus outcomes affects the moral (and even political) 
attitudes one adopts in fundamental ways. In particular, we saw that reason yields a 
preference for outcome-based assessments over action-based assessments, and therefore 
the endorsement of characteristically consequentialist and welfarist views, including the 
demoralization of loyalty, authority, and purity-related issues. As such, the theory of 
evaluative foci brings together two fruitful bodies of experimental research concerning, 
on the one hand, the interplay of automatic and controlled cognition in judgments about 
harm violations (Cushman et al., 2006, 2011; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Paxton et al., 
2012) and, on the other, the moral differences between liberals and conservatives 
(Graham et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2009a). I will argue that this set of results is best 
construed as supporting a dual-process theory of moral judgment, implicating a System 
1 responsible for the evaluative simulation of actions and a System 2 performing an 
assessment of its expected outcomes to victims and beneficiaries. On the proposed 
theory, the differences in moral attitudes observed in Chapters 4 and 5 are the result of 
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differences in the reliance on and interplay between these neurocognitive systems (see 
Greene, 2007).  
In order to do so, in this final chapter, I will integrate these findings in the 
context of a broader literature, ranging from cognitive neuroscience, through the 
literature on learning algorithms, and evolutionary theory. Through this effort, my aim 
will be to put forth a novel account of the psychological faculty for making moral 
judgments, and examine its plausibility and consistency in light of scientific theorizing 
about social cognition and decision-making across numerous, related disciplines.  
6.1.1. Action and outcome as dual processes 
As noted above, the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 provide empirical support for a 
fundamental distinction between two kinds of moral judgment. In particular, the 
observed differences in evaluative focus (which were associated with specific moral and 
political profiles) can be understood as reflecting underlying differences in the 
engagement and interplay between two neurocognitive systems.  
The bulk of this dissertation has focused on deriving, and subsequently testing 
behavioral-psychological predictions about the human moral faculty. Yet, in Chapter 2, 
I outlined some of the broader postulates of dual process theories. A dual process 
interpretation of our findings makes certain assumptions also about the neural, 
evolutionary, and computational characteristics of each cognitive system. Therefore, the 
objective of this final chapter is to ask whether the proposed dual process theory is 
consistent evidence across this broader range of disciplines. For instance, do we observe 
dissociable and interpretable neural networks corresponding to the proposed cognitive 
systems for moral judgment? If so, does our characterization of System 1 as engaging 
an evaluative simulation of the agent‘s action have a plausible evolutionary 
explanation? In this final chapter, I will examine a wealth of evidence from bordering 
disciplines – including neuroscientific data, computational models of learning and 
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evolutionary considerations – to evaluate the broader tractability of this theory, and its 
consistency with findings concerning human cognition more broadly.  
As part of this theoretical development, a central aim in this final chapter will be 
to explain an intriguing, and widely replicated, feature of the empirical data concerning 
moral judgment. As we saw earlier, in both original data I presented and numerous past 
studies, reason apparently privileges welfarist (and often specifically consequentialist) 
moral views. Participants who engaged critical thinking tended to discard concerns 
about loyalty, authority and purity (Paxton et al., 2012), and moralize concerns about 
harm and fairness only. Similarly, previous studies show that a tendency to engage 
rational thought is associated with permissive responding on trolley-type moral 
dilemmas (Feltz & Cokely, 2008; Moore et al., 2008). It appears therefore to be an 
empirical fact that rational individuals, as well as conditions that favor rational thought, 
converge towards consequentialist moral thinking.  
The division between evaluative focus on actions and outcomes provides an 
explanation for this finding. Consider first the influence of reasoning on the adoption of 
moral foundations. We observed that more reflective participants tended to demoralize 
questions concerning loyalty, authority and purity, but not issues of harm and fairness, 
by comparison to intuitive participants.
21
 According to the theory of evaluative focus, 
making moral judgments on the basis of an assessment of outcomes is favored by 
rational individuals for at least two related reasons. The first is that outcome assessment 
is more cognitively demanding, because for any single action there are numerous, 
foreseeable outcomes, each with their associated probability. The second is that actions 
                                                 
21
 Although we did not report the pairwise correlations between measures of cognitive 
style and moral foundations, we observe the expected pattern of correlations: Need for 
cognition correlated with demoralization of fairness, authority and loyalty, all rs > .3, 
all ps < .001. Meanwhile, need for closure correlated with moralization of fairness, 
authority and loyalty, all rs > .2, all ps < .01. Neither measure was related to 
participants‘ judgments about harm and fairness. 
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are temporally prior to outcomes, and some outcomes may be much delayed and even 
spatially distant. Therefore, participants who are likely to require minimal evidence in 
order to derive their judgment will use the first, available evidence while more reflective 
participants may be willing to await further information about outcomes. If we assess 
the morality of binding foundation issues – like flag desecration or homosexual sex – 
from an outcome perspective, we may not find any objectionable outcomes on which to 
condemn the behaviors. If instead we assess them by consulting our aversions to the 
performance of the evaluated actions, we are likely to find them more morally 
reprehensible. Therefore the tendency to engage in reasoning favors welfarist views, by 
supporting an evaluative focus on outcomes rather than on actions.  
A recent study examining implicit attitudes toward homosexuality illustrates this 
account. Inbar and colleagues (2009b) found that people generally exhibit an implicit 
aversion towards homosexuality. (This was true even in individuals who profess 
tolerance on this matter, and of individuals who report a homosexual orientation.) When 
it comes to making explicit moral judgments, the typically conservative opposition to 
homosexuality is consistent with this System 1 aversion, and the theory of evaluative 
focus provides a plausible explanation for this result: A spontaneous, evaluative 
simulation of the action is responsible for the unconscious aversion to homosexuality, 
and conservative moral views are widely informed by this cognitive process. By 
contrast, in liberal individuals, the explicit acceptance of homosexuality is inconsistent 
with their implicit aversion, suggesting that some exercise of cognitive control is 
involved in professing a permissive attitude toward homosexuality. 
In a similar fashion, the theory of evaluative focus explains why controlled 
cognition tends to promote utilitarian responding to moral dilemmas. In an outcome-
based assessment, the outcome of five lives being saved (with certainty) is weighed 
against the outcome of one life being lost (with certainty), yielding the characteristically 
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utilitarian judgment. By contrast, in an action simulation, the aversion associated to the 
harmful action of forcefully harming a person yields the characteristically deontological 
judgment (Miller et al., 2013).  
So, reason privileges welfarist, characteristically utilitarian moral views, because 
reasoning and reflection yield the tendency to make moral judgments through outcome 
assessment. A central objective of this chapter will be to understand this empirical fact 
in greater depth: Why is reason associated with an assessment of outcomes rather than 
the simulation of actions? In the following sections, I will aim to answer this question 
by looking at several scientific findings about moral judgment from different domains.  
 
6.2. Neuropsychology 
As we saw in Chapter 2, one of the key premises of dual process theories is the 
existence and functioning of two neurocognitive systems in parallel (i.e., parallel 
processing). A few neuroimaging studies point towards the double dissociation of neural 
networks consistent with the theory of evaluative foci.  
On the one hand, a neural network of regions generally engaged during System 1 
processes is involved in making action-based moral evaluations (see Figure 20). For 
example, the left insula is activated during the experience of disgust (Carr, Iacoboni, 
Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003). In addition, the amygdala exhibits increased 
activation during the condemnation of purity-related issues (Schaich-Borg, Lieberman, 
& Kiehl, 2008). Similarly, the mPFC is activated during the condemnation of personal 
harm (Greene et al., 2001, 2004) and lesions in the mPFC decrease condemnation of 
personal harm (Koenigs et al., 2007). In addition, since conservatives demonstrate 
greater action focus, the theory of evaluative focus predicts that conservatives will 
exhibit a more robust System 1 network. This is indeed what a recent neuroscientific 
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study finds (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011), with conservatives exhibiting more 
grey matter in amygdala and left insula than liberals. 
On the other, a neural network of regions implicated in System 2 processes 
seems to be involved in making outcome-based assessments. This System 2 network is 
recruited in condoning utilitarian trade-offs in personal dilemma contexts (Greene et al., 
2004; Shenhav & Greene, 2010). In addition, as predicted, liberals (who typically 
demonstrate greater outcome focus) exhibit also more gray matter volume (Kanai et al., 
2011), as well greater connectivity (Amodio et al., 2007) in the anterior cingulate cortex 
than do conservatives. 
So, altogether, the model of evaluative focus appears to be consistent with the 
relevant neuroscientific studies, integrating the evidence on neural activity during moral 
judgment tasks with functional and structural differences in the brains of liberals and 
conservatives.  
6.2.1. Neuroscience of psychopathy 
The study of the behavioral and neural correlates of psychopathy provides 
another valuable opportunity to test the model of evaluative foci. It is known that 
psychopathy is associated with greater endorsement of utilitarian trade-offs relative to 
non-psychopaths, particularly in personal trolley-type dilemmas (Bartels & Pizarro, 
2011). We should therefore expect psychopaths to exhibit corresponding neural 
differences.  
One possibility is that psychopaths are hyper-reasoning; i.e., they exhibit 
unusually heightened activity in the System 2 neural network that produces outcome-
based assessments. Meanwhile, another possibility is that psychopaths have an intuition 
deficit: i.e., a structural dysfunction or decreased functional activity in the System 1, 
responsible for orchestrating action-based moral judgments.  
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The neuroscience of psychopathy draws support for the intuition deficit 
hypothesis (reviewed in Blair, 2008). In one study, psychopathic patients demonstrated 
reduced grey matter in regions of the prefrontal cortex, including the ventromedial areas 
of interest (Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000). Meanwhile, other studies 
have confirmed amygdala dysfunction also in the pathology of psychopathy. In one 
study, high indices of psychopathy among violent offenders were associated with 
reduced amygdala size (Yang et al., 2009; see also Tiihonen et al., 2000). Functional 
deficiencies have also been documented: Psychopaths showed impaired amygdala 
activation during aversive conditioning (Veit et al., 2002) and emotional memory tasks 
(Kiehl et al., 2001). So, deficits in the System 1 network, which supports action-based 
moral judgments, are plausibly responsible for the tendency for psychopaths to condone 
personal harm in trolley-type contexts.  
Together the variety of neuroscientific studies concerning moral judgment, 
political orientation and psychopathy indicate that the tendency toward utilitarian 
responding can derive from either a deficit in System 1 processes – as expressed by 
psychopaths (by comparison to psychotypical individuals) – or in increased System 2 
activity – as expressed by political liberals (by comparison to political conservatives), 
echoing armchair accounts of the phenomenology of utilitarian thinking (Baron, 2011; 
Singer, 1981). At a broader level, these studies demonstrate the operation of two 
dissociable neural systems in moral judgment, compatible with the theory of evaluative 
focus.  
 
6.3. Developmental acquisition of aversions to actions 
The above findings document a deficit in System 1 processing in psychopathy, 
and suggest that the phenomenon of psychopathy may imply an impairment in action 
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aversion, i.e., the absence of an aversion to harming others. A leading account of 
psychopathy, positing a violence inhibition mechanism (VIM), argues just this.  
As I mentioned earlier, Blair and colleagues (1995) provide an explanation for 
how aversions to harmful actions are normally acquired throughout development. First 
of all, it is well known that psychotypical children react aversively to the presence of 
cues of submission or distress from an early age. I referred to this response as empathic 
concern (a kind of outcome aversion) in previous chapters. Throughout development, 
the psychotypical child may engage in aggressive actions which result in another‘s 
display of distress cues. These distress signals negatively reinforce the child‘s behavior, 
we might say, as unconditioned stimuli. But, through associative learning, the 
aggressive action may become negatively reinforced, as conditioned stimulus. So, 
consideration of the harmful action triggers an aversive, withdrawal response, which 
inhibits the action and decreases the likelihood of performing that harmful action in the 
future (Blair, 1995; see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20. Schematic of the VIM demonstrating outcome aversion (i.e., empathic 
concern) and action aversion pathways.  
This account suggests that deficits in the System 1 network should be expressed 
in impairments on aversive conditioning and instrumental learning tasks. Indeed, it 
appears that the effects of amygdala dysfunction include impairment in aversive 
conditioning and instrumental learning (LeDoux, 1998). Similarly, damage to regions of 
the prefrontal cortex results in difficulties learning associations (Bechara et al., 1994; 
A's harmful action 
P's distress cues 
(e.g., sadness, fear) 
A's aversive reaction 
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see also Blair, 2004). So the amygdala and prefrontal cortex putatively constitute the 
neural basis of the human system for associative learning (Blair, 2004; Damasio, 1999). 
On this account, the moral judgment patterns of psychopaths (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) 
and patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex (Koenigs et al., 2007) are attributable 
to developmental difficulties in acquiring and storing the negative value associated to 
harmful actions. 
This kind of explanation might account for the acquisition of aversions to 
commonplace violent behaviors, such as punching or kicking. Yet, there are at least two 
reasons why this mechanism cannot explain the acquisition of all aversions to actions. 
First of all, it appears that individuals have numerous moral aversions to actions that 
they have never performed themselves, such as shooting a gun (see Cushman et al., 
2012). We might be able to save this explanation by appealing to visual representations 
and mental simulation. That is, we might acquire aversions, not only through own 
performance, but also through visual exposure to action-outcome pairings. For example, 
the repeated association of gun-firing to pain and death on television might plausibly, 
through aversive conditioning, result in the acquisition of an intrinsic aversion to 
shooting guns.  
6.3.1. Beyond harm: aversions to victimless transgressions 
Though this model seems well equipped to explain the acquisition of aversions 
to transgressions in the harm and fairness domains, there is reason to doubt its 
explanatory power with respect to aversions to victimless violations – for instance, to 
consensual incest, or to eating a pubic hair sandwich. Consider, for instance, the 
condemnation of flag desecration, or eating one‘s dead pet dog. For these sorts of food- 
and sex-related transgressions there is no unconditioned distress response to the 
transgression (because there is no victim), and therefore no basis on which an aversion 
to the action itself may be conditioned. 
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Following prior theorists in the literature, in the following section (6.4) I will 
argue that some aversions to actions arise principally as a result of evolutionary 
pressures, rather than learned through conditioning. Transgressions in the purity 
domain, involving sex or eating, provide a particularly plausible case since the 
inhibition of these behaviors should confer some adaptive advantage to the agent 
him/herself.  
At a broader level, in this chapter I will make the case that no single framework 
accounts for the acquisition of all moral aversions. Instead, moral aversions may derive 
from different concerns (some other-oriented, some self-oriented; see Dungan, Chakroff 
& Young, in prep.), and originate in different ways (principally through social learning, 
or principally through innate predisposition). This echoes a broader criticism of Elliot 
Turiel‘s (1983) work and of other developmental psychology perspectives. 
Crosscultural and evolutionary perspectives contravene Turiel showing that, at its root, 
morality is not comprised only of concerns about others‘ welfare (Haidt, Graham & 
Nosek, 2009; Kelly, 2013). One way of understanding the existence of moral concerns 
not derived ultimately from concerns about others‘ welfare, is to posit that some moral 
rules uphold self-oriented concerns (Dungan et al., in prep.). For instance, as 
evolutionary psychologists point out, one‘s goal of avoiding contamination might 
undergird numerous purity-related concerns. In addition, other self-oriented values such 
as the avoidance of punishment and the maintenance of a positive reputation in the 
moral community may undergird some of our moral norms as well. This might be 
particularly true about loyalty- and authority-related concerns, since violations of these 
domains have been shown to elicit others‘ contempt (Rozin et al., 1999b). So, just as 
victim distress plays an important role in the development of aversions to harmful 
actions, societal contempt may play a comparable causal role in the acquisition of 
aversions to loyalty and authority violations (such as, e.g., flag desecration).  
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Therefore, in order to retain the conceptual framework put forth by Blair to 
explain the development of action-based aversions across multiple domains, I suggest 
that there are numerous primitive (i.e., unconditioned) moral values from which action 
associations (or moral rules) are derived. The relevant unconditioned moral values 
include not only others‘ welfare but also self-oriented values such as the maintenance of 
a positive reputation. Furthermore, some moral aversions may not be the result of 
associative learning at all. Instead, some moral aversions may have an evolutionary 
basis, manifesting as the predisposition to acquire certain action-based aversions in the 
absence of sufficient social learning by association.  
 
6.4. Innate predisposition: the case of incest 
Several leading psychologists, anthropologists, and primatologists have held 
versions of this so-called adaptationist view in evolutionary approaches to morality (de 
Waal, 1996; Katz, 2000; Sober & Wilson, 1999). On this view, selection pressures 
which were present in evolutionarily ancient environments have likely predisposed us to 
acquire aversions that inhibit putatively maladaptive action-types. This perspective is 
not without its detractors (Prinz, 2007), but in what follows I will try to draw out its 
plausibility, if limited to certain purity-related issues (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 
2008). To do this, I will examine the moralization of incest as a case study; although I 
think one can extrapolate this account to several other food and sex-related taboos. 
Three features of the moralization of incest point toward an innate predisposition: (1) 
the norm independence and (2) adaptive advantage of incest avoidance, as well as (3) 
the psychophysiology of disgust. 
Incestuous behavior is widely condemned, and in many cases also legally 
sanctioned, in human societies worldwide (Wolf & Durham, 2004). Of course the near-
universality of the incest taboo does not entail that it is innately predisposed. More 
   165 
compelling evidence derives from the apparent norm independence of incest avoidance. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, even in sociocultural environments such as the Israeli 
kibbutzim, where no explicit norm governs incestuous behavior, it is strikingly rare 
(Shepher, 1983). Not only do kibbutz-raised children experience sexual revulsion 
towards their siblings, but also towards other non-siblings with whom they were 
communally raised. This finding provides support for the hypothesis, first proposed by 
Westermarck (1891), according to which incest avoidance relies on a mechanism for 
sibling detection that gauges genetic relatedness as a function of the duration of 
coresidence during childhood. Additionally, this mechanism might explain the 
unusually high divorce rates among Taiwanese minor marriages, which are 
characterized by an extended period of premarital cohabitation between the future bride 
and groom (Wolf, 1995). In sum, incest avoidance appears to arise in the absence of a 
social norm, driven by a sibling detection mechanism.  
The adaptive advantage of incest avoidance and condemnation also suggests an 
innate basis for this behavioral tendency. Inbred offspring exhibit reduced genetic 
variance, and thereby are more likely to suffer reduced fertility, loss of immune system 
function, increased infant mortality, and lower general fitness. We observe this clearly 
in enclosed habitats, such as islands, where animal communities are forced to inbreed. 
As this process goes on over generations, populations tend to decrease dramatically and 
interbreeding between remaining individuals becomes harder to avoid, leading to a 
relatively inevitable extinction (Frankham, 1998). Therefore, from an evolutionary 
perspective, an automatic and perhaps over-inclusive mechanism of incest avoidance 
confers an adaptive advantage. In line with this, several mammal species avoid 
inbreeding, particularly when non-related partners are available (Wolf & Durham, 
2004).  
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Adaptations in behavior are often marked by an automatic, psychophysiological 
reaction that initiates the appropriate behavioral response, e.g., of approach or of 
avoidance in relation to the elicitor. This is evidently the case with the avoidance of cliff 
edges (Dahl et al., 2013), spiders, or snakes (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008; Ohman & 
Mineka, 2001). These adaptations are marked by facial and cardiorespiratory routines 
that initiate the appropriate states of alertness and avoidance in response to threats that 
would have been present in ancient environments. Similarly, incest (as an example of a 
purity-related transgression) has an associated psychophysiological response, which we 
know as disgust, and observe clearly in laboratory settings (Haidt et al., 2000; Rozin et 
al., 1999b). The disgust response can be traced to its psychophysiological precursor, 
distaste, which serves principally against oral contamination and is widely observed in 
other species (Rozin et al., 2008). Disgust arises automatically in response to 
contaminant stimuli and also maladaptive practices – incest, zoophilia – and features a 
particular facial expression, as well as some behavioral responses (including vomiting), 
which serve to reduce chances of contagion. By the very nature of contagion, if a 
community member is contaminated it may not be long before I am contaminated too. 
Therefore, it does not much matter whether it is I or some community member who is 
contaminated and so the disgust response is triggered comparably by others‘ 
transgressions as it is by one‘s own. This feature renders disgust a patently social 
emotion.  
Altogether, considerations of the norm independence, adaptive advantage, and 
psychophysiological profile of incest avoidance suggest that the mechanism is the result 
of selection pressures. This favors an adaptationist explanation, over a social learning, 
explanation of the acquisition of an action aversion towards incestuous behavior. A 
similar case could perhaps be made about other food- and sex-related taboos that share 
the above characteristics. Moreover, the adaptationist explanation may even hold some 
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ground outside the purity domain (de Waal, 1996). For instance, Trivers (1971) 
famously argued that ―tit for tat‖ policies provide an adaptive advantage, and so related 
views of fairness may have an evolutionary basis. Similarly, Greene (2007) has argued 
that the inhibition of intentional and forceful harm may have an innate basis. I remain 
agnostic about the strength of adaptationist perspectives outside the purity domain; my 
goal in this section was merely to demonstrate that at least some moral attitudes are 
predicated on action aversions that we are innately predisposed to acquire. 
 
6.5. Aversions in practice: Behavioral choice and reinforcement learning models 
Throughout previous sections, I have argued that aversions to actions are 
acquired in a variety of ways. Following Blair‘s violence inhibition mechanism, some 
aversions – particularly those belonging to the harm domain – are conditioned from the 
basic empathic concern for distress in conspecifics. Other aversions to action-types are 
conditioned from self-oriented concerns, such as the avoidance of societal contempt and 
the maintenance of a community reputation. And, others yet, most obviously in the 
purity domain, may be the product of evolutionary pressures. These aversions are 
acquired through numerous distinct pathways and result in the grab bag of action 
aversions typically expressed by normal adults. 
The literature on machine learning has identified two broad approaches to 
behavioral choice, known as model-free and model-based algorithms (Sutton & Barto, 
1999; see also Sutton, 1988). In this section, I will argue that these reinforcement 
learning algorithms provide a plausible framework to understand the engagement of 
action and outcome aversions in moral judgment across different domains. This broader 
framework enables us to understand how action and outcome aversions across domains 
might be brought online during behavioral choice (see also Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 
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2013). Specifically, model-free and model-based algorithms engage action and outcome 
aversions correspondingly. 
One class of algorithms, known as model-based, employs probabilistic models 
of the causal relations in the world to select behavioral choices (or sequences of 
behavioral choices in some cases) that lead to desired rewards (and away from 
punishment). Model-based algorithms for behavioral choice produce instructions with 
the following structure:  
Perform action A because a sequence of actions beginning with action A will 
lead over time to the maximal set of rewards, ∑   
 
   ,  
followed by a specification of the full temporal sequence of actions and their 
corresponding rewards and/or punishments: ―Pushing the man will yield negative value 
and also cause the man to fall on the tracks, which will cause the train to stop, which 
will cause the five workers to be saved and yield larger positive value. Not pushing the 
man will cause the man not to fall on the tracks, which will allow the train to proceed, 
which will cause the five workers to die and yield large negative value. So, push the 
man off the footbridge.‖  
 This is essentially the kind of decision process that we have described as 
outcome-based evaluation in the moral domain. In moral judgment, outcome-based 
evaluation select actions based on the expected value of their corresponding outcomes, 
where these outcomes primarily concern the welfare of victims and beneficiaries (but 
perhaps other self-oriented moral values too, including one‘s own community reputation 
and welfare). 
The alternative algorithm for behavioral choice, known as model-free, builds 
sparse representations of the value of each behavioral option available in a particular 
state. The basic structure of model-free algorithms is the following:  
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In context C, among the actions available, perform action A because A is 
associated with the highest reward, RA.  
In any state, the choice among available actions depends solely on the 
representations tied directly to those specific actions in that particular state—without 
consulting the outcomes of the actions: ―Pushing the man will yield a negative value. 
Not pushing the man has no associated value. So, don‘t push the man off the 
footbridge.‖ 
Rather than performing searches over the enormous space of possible future 
actions, model-free algorithms simply query the values of each of the behavioral options 
that are immediately available, much like the account of action-based evaluation I put 
forth throughout prior chapters. In moral judgment, action-based evaluation select 
actions based on the value associated intrinsically to the action itself, as a product of 
innate predispositions, or associative pairing from signs of victim distress or of societal 
contempt. This account therefore extends Blair‘s model of associative learning in the 
harm domain to explain the acquisition, whether through ontogeny or phylogeny, and 
engagement of action and outcome aversions across numerous moral domains. 
6.5.1. Devaluation procedure 
The operation of these two algorithms is neatly demonstrated by the devaluation 
procedure, an experimental paradigm that has been conducted with rats, monkeys and 
humans (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). In a simple version of the devaluation 
procedure, Dickinson and colleagues (1995) trained a group of rats to press a lever in 
order to receive food. Half of the rats received basic training (consisting of 120 trials), 
while the other half received extensive training (consisting of 360 trials). Extensive 
training serves to strengthen the representation of the value of lever-pressing. This is 
because the more trials a rat undergoes, the more the rat will associate a reward (i.e., the 
food) to the action of pressing the lever and come to value lever-pressing in itself.  
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In each group, prior to the experiment, half of the rats were fed while the other 
half were not fed. The rats that were fed constitute the group for which the outcome was 
devalued, since the reward is no longer as valuable as it is for the unfed rats in the 
valued group. Researchers measured the number of times per minute that the rats in 
each group pressed the lever, as an index of the value assigned to the option of pressing 
the lever. To the extent that model-free algorithms determine behavioral choice we 
should expect that rats press the lever even if the reward has been devalued. Meanwhile, 
to the extent that model-based algorithms determine behavioral choice, we should 
expect the rats to press the value as a function of whether the reward is valued or not.  
The researchers observed that the rats who had received basic training, and had 
relatively weaker value representation of lever-pressing, pressed the lever as a function 
of whether they valued the outcome, i.e., more frequently when they were hungry than 
when they were full. By contrast, the rats who had received extensive training and 
therefore had built up a strong value representation associated to lever-pressing 
intrinsically, tended to press the lever equally regardless of whether they had recently 
been fed. This suggests that, as intrinsic value representations of the action were 
strengthened, model-free algorithms began to drive behavioral choice. 
6.5.2. Model-free versus model-based moral evaluation 
As we saw exemplified by the devaluation procedure, model-based algorithms 
equipped with a detailed model of the causal world and unlimited processing capacity 
can make what we might call rational choices. This owes to at least three features of 
model-based algorithms; they are (i) far-sighted, (ii) goal-oriented, and (iii) flexible. 
They are far-sighted choices because they can specify a decision path that may require a 
long sequence of actions to reach the desired goal. They are also goal-oriented, in the 
sense that decision paths are fully determined by the values associated to end states (i.e., 
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by the goals) held by the agent. Finally, they are flexible, in the sense that decision paths 
can be updated easily as new punishments and rewards are introduced to the model.  
At the same time, there is a high computational cost associated with constructing 
and operating a causal model of a complex world. As the number of relevant states and 
actions increases, so does the space of possible decision paths over which a model-
based algorithm must search. This renders a model-based solution to numerous real-life 
decisions practically untenable. In these contexts, model-free algorithms, with their light 
computational load, tend to dominate behavioral choice.  
However, by merely storing value associations related to each behavioral option, 
model-free decisions can often lead to sub-optimal outcomes. We saw this in the 
devaluation procedure, when the actual reward did not match the stored value 
associations. So how are these sparse value representations updated to yield beneficial 
choices in a changing environment? This is a serious challenge for model-free 
algorithms and computational models demonstrate two techniques that update model-
free value representations in order to minimize error. Prediction error learning and 
temporal difference learning enable model-free algorithms to more efficiently represent 
the value of a behavioral choice, without representing what specific rewards make it so.  
Prediction error learning (PEL) allows an agent to update a representation of the 
value of an action based on recent trials of that action-type. So, for example, suppose an 
agent has a stored value representation for a certain action of 10, and a new token of that 
action-type yields an actual reward of 4. PEL allows the agent to update the 
representation of the value of that action-type by some fraction of the error, e.g., to 8 
(see Schultz et al., 1998).   
The process of moralization, whereby moral attitudes towards an action-type 
shift dramatically and relatively quickly, reflects the operation of prediction error 
learning in moral judgment. Consider, for example, the morally motivated transition to a 
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vegetarian diet. During this transition, vegetarians are likely to develop a disgust 
reaction to meat-eating, and this disgust response helps to conform to the vegetarian diet 
(Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997). The development of a categorical disgust response 
towards meat-eating can be understood as the result of PEL. As individuals acquire 
vegetarian moral values, they effectively introduce a new ―punishment‖ for eating meat 
into their models of the world. When this punishment is newly introduced, the stored 
model-free representation of the value of meat-eating is likely greater than the value of 
its actual (i.e., newly devalued) outcome. So initially the avoidance of meat-based foods 
depends on a model-based computation of the harmful outcomes for animal welfare (or, 
in simple terms, on the active reminder of its consequences for animal suffering). But, 
through PEL, the vegetarian will update the model-free value representation of meat-
eating, resulting over time in an aversion to the action of meat-eating over and above 
any aversion to animal suffering.  
But, in the real world, rewards and punishments often result from a sequence of 
actions. For instance, receiving an acceptance letter from university leads to going to 
university and going to university leads to a number of rewards such as becoming 
educated, skilled, and/or employed. Through model-based reasoning one might be 
motivated to apply to university because this sequence of causal relations leads to the 
rewards we aim to obtain. But, since applying to university does not directly lead to any 
rewards, it cannot through associative pairing acquire value. So, how might model-free 
algorithms help us to decide whether to apply to university? Temporal difference 
reinforcement learning (TDRL; Sutton, 1988) enables a model-free algorithm to guide 
behavior towards rewards that require a sequence of two or more actions. TDRL assigns 
value to a behavioral option that does not directly yield a reward/punishment, but rather 
alters the probability of attaining a reward/punishment by leading to another behavioral 
option that yields the reward/punishment (as in the above case). So by treating 
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intermediate actions as rewards, TDRL leads the agent through sequences of actions to 
distant rewards. 
In the moral domain, TDRL appears to play some role too – for example, when 
we condemn the formation of malicious intent or desires. That is, (Option B) carrying 
out a plan to murder S leads with probability P1 to S‘s death, but (Option A) desiring or 
intending to murder S leads to (Option B) carrying out a plan to murder S with 
probability P2. TDRL treats Option B as inherently morally wrong, and thereby enables 
us to ascribe moral wrongness to the Option A, rather than treating it as a mere 
antecedent to B. 
Even while these techniques enable model-free algorithms to update their value 
representations in beneficial ways, and retain their computational frugality, it is clear 
that model-free algorithms remain error-prone by comparison to model-based 
evaluations. As effective as they are in maximizing rewards when environments are 
stable over time, they are much more likely to err when deployed in conditions that 
differ from those in which the association was established. That is, when these 
associations are brought online in novel environmental contexts, such as consensual 
sibling incest cases or trolley-type dilemma contexts, model-free approaches typically 
lead to notable prediction error. Here, only a model-based analysis of expected 
outcomes can yield an accurate judgment of the value of the target behavior. 
  
6.6. Evaluative simulation in action 
So far in this chapter, I have discussed the origin of our aversions to actions and 
outcomes, and the cognitive processes by which they are engaged in decision-making 
and behavioral choice. In this final section, I want to examine a question I have set aside 
up to this point concerning the role of aversions specifically on moral evaluation: Why 
do our personal aversions to actions (―It would be disturbing for me to have an 
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incestuous relationship.‖) shape moral judgments about others‘ behavior (―It is wrong 
for Jenny and Rick to have an incestuous relationship.‖), above and beyond influencing 
individual behavior and decision-making (―I would not have an incestuous 
relationship.‖)? 
First of all, it is worth pointing out that we rather ubiquitously simulate the 
behavior of others, and we do so often in order to understand them (Goldman, 2006). 
We spontaneously yawn when others yawn, cry when others cry, and other times we 
more deliberately ―put ourselves in another person‘s shoes‖. Therefore, assuming that a 
certain moral transgression (when considered as an action plan for the self) produces an 
aversive response, and that we rather spontaneously simulate others particularly to 
understand their behavior, it is reasonable to suppose that another‘s performance of said 
moral transgression should result in a comparable, aversive response in the self (as 
posited by evaluative simulation). 
Second, evaluative simulation might arise rather naturally also due to the 
broader merits of model-free thought reviewed already. As we saw, model-free 
evaluation is less cognitively demanding than is model-based evaluation (generally). 
And this should presumably be true of action-based valuation in moral cognition, 
whether these processes contribute to the regulation of own behavior (―I should not 
push the fat man off the footbridge‖) or the evaluation of third-party behavior (―It is 
morally wrong for Suzy to push the fat man off the footbridge‖). On a related note, 
while the outcomes of a given action can be temporally and spatially distant from their 
corresponding causal agent, in normal cases actions are immediately visible and easily 
attributable to the causal agent. Therefore, just as we routinely regulate our own 
behavior by assessing aversions to performing actions (rather than on the value of its 
outcomes) because it is cognitively ‘easier’, we may tend to judge others‘ behavior 
through a similar process (i.e., evaluative simulation) for the same reason.  
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These considerations point toward the heuristic value of evaluative simulation 
(see Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005). This strategy enables us to determine 
whether other people‘s behavior is harmful or immoral – with remarkable ease and 
success – without having to consider the numerous outcomes that result from it. But, the 
above considerations do not yet explain why individuals would be motivated to morally 
judge others in the first place.  
This specific discussion quite naturally adopts an evolutionary perspective. As 
we saw early in Chapter 2, it is a common feature of System 1 cognitive processes that 
they arose relatively early in our evolutionary history, and can be understood by 
pointing to one or more adaptive advantages they are thought to have bestowed 
individuals in ancestral environments.  
So, the presumption that a certain psychological faculty is automatic and 
unconscious prompts speculation about its evolutionary origin and function. In these 
final paragraphs of my dissertation, I will set aside the emphasis on providing a 
mechanistic account of evaluative focus, to instead comment on its putative functional 
role. In other words, what adaptive advantages might have promoted the selection of 
evaluative simulation as a strategy for third-party moral evaluation? Why – from the 
functional perspective, once again – might people judge what is right or wrong for 
others on the basis of what feels right or wrong for themselves? So, in closing, I will 
make some brief and indeed speculative remarks on the evolutionary basis of evaluative 
simulation. I will suggest a few advantages that evaluative simulation would have 
bestowed on individuals in early, social communities, promoting its selection as a 
psychological adaptation. Specifically, I will argue that evaluative simulation (1) 
promotes conformity to group norms, (2) reduces risk of infection from external 
pathogens, and (3) boosts interpersonal trust. The purpose of this exercise is not to 
convince the reader of the details of my suggestions, but rather to chart new terrain at 
176 
the intersection of morality and evolution, putting forth a series of related hypotheses 
for which the evidence, though favorable, provides only indirect support.  
6.6.1. Incentivizing conformity, fostering homogeneity 
It is clear that upholding moral standards can demand a great effort, especially in 
circumstances that pit moral values against other prudential interests. Behaving in 
congruence with one‘s moral views frequently demands self-control and the exertion of 
willpower, as Aristotle famously defended. Contemporary psychological research 
vindicates this perspective, showing that willpower is a limited resource which is 
consumed in circumstances that require self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998).  
In this sense, the judgment of others – both of blame and of praise – might 
provide an added incentive to behave normatively. Indeed, it is patently clear that 
people modify their behavior in the presence of others, often in order to exhibit more 
socially desirable traits. Therefore, the projection of internalized aversions onto others‘ 
introduces an added incentive (for them) to inhibit moral violations and, therefore, 
should have the effect of promoting conformity to prevailing moral standards in the 
community. In this way, a community of moralizing individuals should achieve greater 
conformity to its shared normative standards than a non-moralizing community, in 
which individuals are left to self-regulate their behavior.  
We find suggestive evidence for this effect in United States culture, where 
tobacco smoking has recently been subjected to heavy moralization. Retrospective 
reports indicate that disgust directed at smoking has increased in recent times, along 
with scientific knowledge about its harmfulness (Rozin & Singh, 1999). However, 
Rozin and Singh (1999) found that it was the strength of one‘s disgust aversion, and not 
beliefs about the harmfulness of smoking, that most robustly predicted attitudes of 
moral condemnation towards smoking behavior. This finding suggests, as the authors 
argue, that the associative pairing of an action to the feeling of disgust leads to 
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moralization of the action. Critically though, owing to this process of moralization, rates 
of smoking appear to have decreased dramatically in the United States (Saad, 2012), by 
comparison to other countries where smoking is not as notoriously moralized (Helweg-
Larsen & Nielsen, 2009). We might think of this function as that of providing an 
incentive to meet normative standards.  
The failure to conform comes at a high personal cost to the wrongdoer, since 
when we condemn someone‘s immoral behavior (―It was wrong for Jenna to steal 
Sally‘s packed lunch‖), we often form parallel impressions about them and their 
character (―Jenna is selfish and vicious‖; see Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006; Funder, 2004; 
Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). This characteristic arises remarkably early 
in life (Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003), and across a variety of cultures (Fiske, 
Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Moreover, these character 
evaluations apparently play a critical role in our decisions about who to interact with 
(Gintis, Henrich, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2008; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg & 
Nowak, 2009). This observation brings us to a distinct, but related, function of 
evaluative simulation: constituting one‘s moral ingroup. To see why, consider the 
following hypothetical scenario: 
A small-scale community lives on a remote island. Early in the history of this 
society, many people contracted a deadly virus and died as a result of eating the 
rather delicious meat of an abundant boar. The islanders soon ceased to eat the 
animal‘s meat, which restored normal mortality rates in the community.  
To avoid future risks to the community, children were told stories of the nasty 
animal – which became known as the vilebeast (―vile beast‖) – and how it was 
planted on the island by the Devil. Within a few generations, the islanders were 
avoiding the animal altogether. Even the sight of a vilebeast was disturbing to 
most. The premature death of an islander, particularly during periods of food 
scarcity, would often prompt rumors as to whether he or she had been ―taken by 
the vilebeast‖. One day, a group of people are observed eating what most 
certainly is a vilebeast stew. 
In Universe A, the islanders practice evaluative simulation, so they judge the 
group‘s behavior to be morally reprehensible. Unless the minority conforms to the 
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group‘s prevailing norm, they will be ostracized from the community. In Universe B, 
the islanders practice outcome assessment, and so judgments of the group‘s behavior 
depend on outcome information that is not immediately accessible.  
As noted before, evaluative simulation holds the advantage of determining group 
membership with marked ease. The mere performance of devious behavior is a sign of 
outgroup membership. As it were, in many cases, these devious actions do 
probabilistically result in negative outcomes, but in a minority of cases deviant behavior 
will turn out harmless (e.g., if the vilebeast eaters were immune to the virus, or had 
discovered how to examine their game for signs of the virus). So, whereas deviant 
behavior will be eradicated in Universe A, it will be tolerated to the extent that it is 
harmless in Universe B.  
This conclusion can be (albeit simplistically) modeled by defining the 
homogeneity of the islander population as the probability that an ingroup member 
follows all moral rules. Suppose also that the islanders follow a one-strike policy: In 
Universe A the evaluative simulators will excise an individual after breaking a moral 
rule, while in Universe B outcome assessors will do so after the individual causes a 
morally bad outcome (by comparison to other outcomes he/she could have brought 
about by acting differently at that time). Once again, the homogeneity of the islander 
community in Universe A will invariably be 1, since no individual can break a moral 
rule and belong to the ingroup. Meanwhile, in Universe B, the homogeneity of the 
islander community will depend on the combined probability that following a moral rule 
leads to the morally preferable outcome, ∏   
 
 .  
For simplicity‘s sake, let‘s suppose that the islanders have a total of twenty 
moral rules (―ye shall not eat vilebeast‖, ―ye shall not curse the leader‘s name‖, ―ye 
shall open your house to other islanders during the monsoon season‖, and so on), and 
that – for every moral rule – following the rule leads to the morally preferable outcome 
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with a probability of .97, i.e., almost every time. This reduces the homogeneity in 
Universe B to almost half (.54). In other words, we would expect just under half of the 
population to engage in at least one form of harmless deviance! There are some flagrant 
simplifications in this exercise, but the generalization still holds: evaluative simulation 
brings about a remarkable degree of homogeneity (by comparison to outcome-based 
judgment). 
Circumstantial evidence lends support to this idea. As we saw in Chapter 5, 
evaluative simulation is relatively more popular among political conservatives than 
among liberals. We should therefore observe that conservative individuals prefer more 
homogeneous moral communities than do liberal individuals. To examine this question, 
I re-analyzed a 2003 study on religious diversity from the Association of Religion Data 
Archives (ARDA, 2003), comparing the responses of 992 Republican voters (i.e., 
conservatives) to the responses of 785 Democratic and Green party voters (i.e., liberals). 
On all twenty items, Republican voters were more likely to value religious and cultural 
homogeneity than were Democratic and Green party voters (.21 < all Cohen‘s ds < .64; 
see Supplementary Analysis 4). For instance, they were more likely to object to their 
children marrying a Muslim ―who had a good education and came from a good family‖, 
or to oppose the construction of a Hindu temple in their neighborhood. Similarly, 
conservative participants were more likely to believe that immigration should be 
limited, and that immigrants should be acculturated (i.e., ―give up their foreign ways 
and learn to be like other Americans‖) and non-Christians converted to Christianity. At 
a broader level, Republican voters tended to hold the belief that religious diversity has 
not been ―good for America‖, and that it is a threat to traditional values. A separate 
household survey confirms that conservatives are more likely than are liberals to prefer 
living in an area where most people share their political views, race, and religion (Pew 
Research, 2008).  
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Therefore, the collective exercise of evaluative simulation may give rise to 
relatively homogeneous moral communities. This was suggested by an initial thought 
experiment, and then tentatively supported by recent sociological surveys. In future 
work, the precise relationship between evaluative simulation and community 
homogeneity should be examined more directly however. Does racial, cultural and 
religious homogeneity arise in conservative-dominated areas with geographical county 
as the unit of analysis, for example? In addition, it is important to delve further into the 
mechanism by which the communal exercise of evaluative simulation yields 
homogeneous groups. I suggested that through evaluative simulation individuals will 
tend to value normative behavior and derivatively others who behave in congruence 
with their own norms. Conversely, they will punish even harmless deviance from 
normative standards by exclusion from the ingroup. Whether this model explains the 
proposed relationship between evaluative simulation and community homogeneity is a 
matter that awaits more systematic investigation.  
6.6.2. The value of moral homogeneity 
What is the adaptive advantage of community homogeneity, then, which would 
lead to the selection of evaluative simulation as a psychological adaptation?  What is the 
value of homogeneity over heterogeneity in social networks (such that homogeneity 
might have been an adaptive feature of ancestral communities)?  
In the Phaedrus, Plato famously noted that ―similarity begets friendship‖. 
Indeed, a number of recent proposals concerning the evolutionary origin of morality 
converge on the role of homogeneity in strengthening social networks. For instance, 
proponents of the green beard hypothesis, like Dawkins (1976) and Frank (1988), argue 
that the emergence of moral behavior might have depended on a genetic adaptation that 
yielded (a) a phenotypic signal of membership in the moral community, and (b) a 
tendency to behave altruistically towards carriers of the phenotypic signal. In other 
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words, the success of moral comunities would require some sort of phenotypic 
homogeneity, such as a green beard, that signals the disposition toward prosocial 
behavior. Meanwhile, Johan Koeslag (1990, 1997) argued that koinophilia – or the 
widespread psychological adaptation leadings individuals to prefer interaction with 
others who display normal traits – helps to explain numerous evolutionary phenomena, 
potentially including the origin of human cooperation. Since mutations of a certain 
phenotypic or behavioral feature can co-exist, evolutionary pressures cause ecologically 
beneficial features to dominate while disadvantageous counterparts become increasingly 
rare. Therefore, predominance of a trait in a population is associated with adaptiveness 
just as rarity is associated with maladaptiveness. This phenomenon, Koeslag thought, 
might explain why we are unusually attracted to average faces (Langlois & Roggman, 
1990; Apicella, Marlowe, Fowler, & Christakis, 2012), even from an early age 
(Rubenstein, Kalakanis, & Langlois, 1999), and why animals are speciated into 
phenotypic clusters (Koeslag, 1990).  
These accounts converge on the role of homogeneity in the origin and success of 
ancestral, moral communities. In this section, I will point towards two principal virtues 
of homogeneous social networks, i.e., disease management and social trust, which 
plausibly derive from the collective exercise of evaluative simulation and might 
contributed to the success of ancestral moral communities. 
Managing disease and contagion 
Consider again the case of the islanders and their prohibition of vilebeast-eating. 
As we noted, in Universe B, (where outcome assessment is the predominant approach to 
moral evaluation) the islanders suspend their moral judgment of the deviants until the 
outcomes of the action are observed. This is evidently disadvantageous for the 
community, insofar as it introduces a risk of contagion to the community.  
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Therefore, one putative function of evaluative simulation is to prevent the 
introduction of contagious and maladaptive behavior to the community. Some evidence 
supports this: The prevalence of religiosity and authoritarianism, and the strength of 
family ties – all well-known correlates of social conservatism and evaluative simulation 
– are predicted by levels of pathogen stress, both in comparisons between different 
countries and between different states in the United States of America (Fincher & 
Thornhill, 2012; Murray, Schaller, & Suedfeld, 2013). Areas with high levels of parasite 
stress tend to be inhabited by more religious and authoritarian societies than are seen in 
areas with less parasite stress (even after controlling for potential confounds such as 
human freedom and economic development).  
This implies that societies in high parasite stress regions exhibit greater 
emphasis on loyalty-, authority- and especially purity-related norms. So, binding 
concerns might arise as a response to greater infection risk in conditions of heightened 
parasite stress. This suggests a role for evaluative simulation in managing disease stress, 
in two principal ways: (1) by thwarting contagion within the ingroup through the 
condemnation of various purity-related transgressions, and (2) reducing infection risk 
from foreign pathogens by eschewing contact with dissimilar, outgroup members. In 
sum, where contagion might be a major concern, the kind of flat prohibition of deviant 
behavior facilitated by evaluative simulation is a better, i.e., more adaptive, approach to 
evaluating others. 
Boosting social trust  
Finally, another proposed advantage of community homogeneity is the resulting 
increase in social trust (see Hamlin, Mahajan, Liberman, & Wynn, 2013; Mitchell, 
Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). Sociological surveys comparing social diversity across 
several United States (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007) and cross-national 
(Delhey & Newton, 2005) locations provide some support for this supposition: 
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Diversity is associated with decreased public engagement and social trust, whereas 
homogeneity seemingly favors public engagement and social trust. 
Koeslag (1997) provides a neat explanation for this, by considering the Iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). As noted earlier, according to the theory of koinophilia, 
individuals prefer others with predominant rather than rare characteristics – essentially 
because most mutations reduce fitness. In an IPD game, this preference has the effect of 
increasing the fitness of the common strategy, and stabilizing almost any strategy that 
has become the local norm.
22
 In a similar sense, the green beard hypothesis (Dawkins, 
1976; Frank, 1988) argues that the players‘ phenotypic expression of a green beard in an 
IPD game should yield social trust, essentially, because it enables the expectation of 
other players‘ cooperation.  
Koenslag‘s (1997) explanation hinges on the possibility of group-level selection, 
i.e., that a behavior (in this case, the spontaneous projection of aversions) can spread in 
a population because of the benefits it bestows on the group (in this case, conformity to 
prevailing norms, disease management, and social trust) despite incurring a fitness cost 
at the level of the individual. Adaptationist views of morality, like the one I am 
defending, often make this assumption (Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Haidt, 2012; Henrich, 
2004; Wilson & Wilson, 2008). Still, as we saw in the green beard view, community 
homogeneity might be expected to result even on a gene-level explanation. Therefore, a 
psychological adaptation that – like evaluative simulation –fosters homogeneity in the 
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 Different, partially isolated communities of individuals will therefore evolve different 
strategies (some more cooperative than others) and defend its strategy against 
alternatives that may arise through mutation or contact with other communities. E.g., 
selfish individuals will be ostracized from cooperative communities, because of their 
deviant and unusual behavior, and the advantage of exploiting their cooperative peers 
outweighed by the costs of ostracism, not finding a mate, and so on. Finally, by the 
very nature of cooperation, groups that happen to stabilize a cooperative strategy will 
be fitter than groups who have stabilized defection (Koeslag, 1997). 
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community could help to explain the evolution of cooperation and social trust, either at 
group-level or gene-level selection.  
Still, much more work is required to test the various hypotheses I have outlined 
in this section. I hope only to have highlighted some future avenues of research at the 
intersection of morality and evolution. First and foremost, it is plausible that 
communities governed by evaluative simulation exhibit heightened homogeneity. In 
addition, several proposals converge on the hypothesis that community homogeneity 
played a role in the emergence of morality in ancestral communities, and I highlighted 
two possible reasons why: (1) improved disease management, and (2) heightened social 
trust. My argument hinged on a variety of evolutionary suppositions for which direct 
evidence is notoriously difficult to ascertain. So in this chapter I have sought to test 
these ideas indirectly through proxy evidence about religious and conservative 
communities. To the extent that religious and conservative individuals employ 
evaluative simulation, and construct homogeneous moral ingroups, they might reflect 
the mechanisms by which the collective exercise of evaluative simulation contributed to 
the emergence of ancestral, moral communities. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
I will conclude by way of a final restatement of the theory I defend in light also 
of evidence from the neighboring disciplines discussed in this chapter. According to the 
dual process theory of evaluative foci, moral judgments are the product of the interplay 
between two neurocognitive systems. A System 2, marked by activation in the anterior 
cingulate cortex and dorsolateral sections of the prefrontal cortex, conducts a model-
based assessment of the value of the outcomes derived from each action. This system 
depends on the assignment of value to certain outcomes that are deemed morally 
relevant, most notably, the welfare of other humans. Meanwhile, a System 1 – 
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implemented most clearly by a network that features the amygdala and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex – conducts an evaluative simulation of moral behavior, engaging 
model-free representations of the value associated to the target actions. These model-
free value representations implicated in action-based assessments might arise in a 
number of ways: some through associative learning from fundamental moral concerns 
such as distress, and societal contempt, while others we may be innately predisposed to 
acquire.  
Throughout this chapter I have sought to embed the theory of evaluative foci in a 
broader multidisciplinary context, ranging from neuroscience, through artificial 
intelligence and animal cognition, to evolutionary theory. I aimed to show that the 
psychological-behavioral account of moral judgment I developed in Chapters 2 through 
5 holds its ground in light of evidence from a broader range of disciplines. The purpose 
here was twofold: First, as I argued in Chapter 1, naturalistic theories in philosophy 
ought to hinge on evidence from the full range of scientific disciplines that are relevant 
to the question of philosophical interest. Second, I have defended a dual-process theory 
of moral judgment and – as I laid out in Chapter 2 – dual-process accounts must fulfill 
certain desiderata. In this chapter, I focused on three such features introduced in Chapter 
2: parallel processing, computational load, and evolutionary primacy.  
We observed that the neuroscience of moral judgment and political orientation 
demonstrates the double dissociation of two neurocognitive systems, corresponding to 
action and outcome-based moral judgments. Therefore, the individual differences in 
moral and political attitudes discussed in Chapter 5 may be the result of differences in 
the reliance on, and interplay between, these neurocognitive processes. Further, the 
studies on computational models of decision-making demonstrate that action-based 
(model-free) evaluation generally imposes a lighter computational load, and yet is more 
prone to yielding errors, than outcome-based evaluation. Lastly, the evolutionary 
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considerations presented towards the end suggest that action-based evaluations of self 
and others in the community might have posed a few adaptive advantages on members 
of ancestral communities, in maintaining homogeneity and thereby managing disease 
threat and building social trust. Together, the computational and evolutionary 
perspectives strongly suggest that model-free evaluations arose as useful heuristics for 
the regulation of own behavior and the spontaneous evaluation of others. 
In turn, this exercise revealed why reason would result in the preference for 
outcome- over action-based moral assessments. As most heuristics, model-free moral 
evaluation is prone to prediction errors when deployed in novel circumstances. In other 
words, in circumstances that are unusual – by comparison, either to the world in which 
our innate predispositions were forged or to the conditions in which we acquired action-
based value associations – these value representations are likely to produce suboptimal 
results. Reflective individuals may be more likely to notice this tendency of our moral 
minds, and opt for a model-based assessment of outcomes in order to make better, more 
moral, decisions. 
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Gary carefully smears his own feces all over his body. He looks at himself in the 
mirror and thoroughly washes himself off after a short while. 
Comical portrait 
An artist paints a comical portrait of a religious icon completely naked. She 
never shows anyone the portrait and throws it away. 
Kiss uncle 
A young man French-kisses his uncle at a family party. Everyone at the party, 
including the young man and his uncle, finds it very funny. 
Urine  
Brooke stands on the roof of her house and urinates on her best friend, who is 
standing below, at her friend‘s request. 
Pubic hair sandwich 
Ken shaves his pubic hair, gathers it and eats it in a sandwich. He enjoys the 
taste but decides never to do it again. 
Two-inch tail 
Carly gets plastic surgery that adds a two-inch tail to the end of her spine. 
Sell soul 
An old woman signs a piece of paper that says ―I hereby sell my soul, after my 
death, to whoever has this piece of paper‖. She makes a paper plane out of the note and 
flicks it out her apartment window. 
Chicken 
A man goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a whole chicken.  Before 
cooking it, he has sexual intercourse with the chicken carcass. Then he cooks it and eats 
it. 
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Appendix B 
Submarine (Personal) 
Gary is the captain of a military submarine.  An onboard explosion has caused 
Gary to lose most of the air supply and has injured one of Gary‘s crew who is quickly 
losing blood.  The injured crew member is probably going to die from his wounds no 
matter what happens. There isn‘t enough air for the whole crew.  The only way to save 
the other crew members is to shoot dead the injured crew member so that there will be 
just enough air for Gary and the rest of the crew to survive.  
Gary shoots the injured crew member. The injured crew member dies and there 
is enough air for Gary and the rest of the crew to survive. 
 
Virus (Personal) 
A deadly virus is spreading around the world, killing thousands of people. Kevin 
is a scientist.  He has invented two chemicals. One of them kills the virus.  The other is 
a deadly poison.  Kevin doesn‘t know which chemical is which because the labels on his 
containers got mixed up. Once he figures out which is which Kevin can use the good 
chemical to save thousands of lives, but the only way to find out is to test each chemical 
on someone.  If Kevin does this, one of the people will die, but he will then be able to 
start saving many other people‘s lives. 
Kevin tests both chemicals on his assistants. One of his assistants dies within 
minutes. Kevin figures out which chemical is the poison and which is the good 
chemical. He delivers the chemical in time to save many other people's lives. 
 
Jungle (Personal) 
Anne is part of a group studying animals in the jungle.  The group includes eight 
children.  Anne‘s group is captured by terrorists who keep you all locked up for several 
days.  One of the terrorists likes Anne.  He tells Anne that the leader plans to kill 
everyone the next day. He says he will help Anne escape, under one condition.  To 
make sure she won‘t go to the police, the terrorist wants to videotape Anne killing one 
of the other adults.  If Anne accepts his offer, the other adults will die but Anne and the 
eight children will escape. 
Anne accepts the offer. She kills one of the other adults while the terrorists 




Brooke is on a big boat at sea.  There is a fire on the boat and everyone has to 
get off.  People get into the lifeboats.  All the lifeboats, including Brooke‘s, have too 
many people in them. The sea is getting rough, and water is coming in over the sides. If 
nothing is done, the lifeboat will sink and everyone on board will die.  However, there is 
an injured man who will not survive in any case.  If Brooke throw that man overboard 
the boat will stay afloat and the remaining passengers will be saved.  
Brooke pushes the injured man off the lifeboat and he drowns in the sea. The 
lifeboat is now light enough to float and the remaining passengers are saved. 
 
Climbers (Personal) 
Ken is the leader of a mountain climbing group that is stranded in the 
wilderness.  Ken‘s group includes a family of six that needs a certain vitamin very 
badly.  Some people‘s kidneys contain large amounts of this vitamin. There is one 
person in Ken‘s party who has the vitamins in his kidneys.  The only way to save the 
lives of the six members of this family is to remove one of this man‘s kidneys and give 
it to the six people.  The man will not die, but his health will suffer.  He is opposed to 
this plan, but Ken has the power to do as he sees fit.  
Despite the man's refusal, Ken removes one of the man's kidneys. The man 
suffers from the operation but, thanks to the man's kidney, the family members survive. 
 
Enemy Doctor (Personal) 
The enemy has taken over Carly‘s village.  Carly has two children, ages five and 
eight.   There is an enemy doctor who performs painful experiments on humans that 
always lead to death. He intends to perform experiments on one of Carly‘s children, but 
he will allow Carly to choose which of his children he will experiment on.  If Carly 
refuses to bring one of his children to him, he will find them both and experiment on 
both of them.  
Carly agrees to bring one of her children to the doctor in order to save her other 
child. The doctor experiments on Carly's child and he dies. The other child is saved. 
 
Vaccine (Impersonal) 
Gary works for the government‘s public health office.  Scientists have made a 
new vaccine to fight a deadly disease, and Gary must decide whether the government 
will tell people to use it. The vaccine works well to prevent the deadly disease, and it 
will save many lives if the vaccine is distributed.  However, a small number of people 
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will be killed by an allergic reaction with the vaccine itself.  There is no way to predict 
who will have this reaction.  So, if Gary agrees to distribute the vaccine, some people 
will surely be killed by it. 
Gary agrees to distribute the vaccine and the vaccine saves many lives of people 
fighting the deadly disease. The vaccine also kills a few people who are allergic to it. 
 
Bombing campaign (Impersonal) 
Kevin has been appointed general of an army during a large war that has lasted 
several years.  Kevin‘s army has gradually gained ground, and he is finally about to win.  
Now, Kevin has to decide his closing strategy. He could order large-scale bombing of 
the opposing side‘s home country, which will defeat their army quickly, but will also 
lead to many unavoidable civilian deaths.  Or, he could order a ground war in which 
these civilian deaths will be avoided.  However, the enemy will force more of its own 
civilians into combat during the long ground war, which will ultimately lead to more 
deaths than the quicker bombing campaign. 
Kevin orders the quicker bombing campaign. As expected, the enemy admits 




Anne is the mayor of a large city.  A deranged man has set up explosives in two 
large buildings in Anne‘s city and come to her office with the detonator. Both buildings 
have thousands of people working in them who would be killed. The deranged man has 
tied Anne up so that she cannot move.  He intends to blow up one of the buildings, but 
he will allow Anne to flip a coin to determine which of the two buildings he will blow 
up.  If Anne refuses to flip the coin, he will blow up both buildings, which will result in 
more total deaths. 
Anne agrees to flip the coin. The deranged man blows up one of the buildings 
and deactivates the bomb in the other building. 
 
Gang violence (Impersonal) 
Brooke is a member of Congress.  She and the other members of congress are 
deciding whether to adopt a new social policy intended to decrease organized crime and 
gang violence in urban and rural areas. The new policy would increase the number of 
raids on the homes of gang members and members of crime families in order to round 
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these suspects up.  There are sure to be some innocent civilians killed in these raids 
during gun battles with the police, but by rounding these criminals up, many more 
innocent civilians will be saved. 
Brooke casts her vote in favor of the new social policy. The policy is passed. 
Organized crime and gang violence are reduced significantly but the police report some 
innocent civilians are killed in these raids. 
 
Gas leak (Impersonal) 
Ken is the late-night watchman in a hospital.  Due to an accident in a factory 
next door, deadly gas is coming into the hospital. In one room of the hospital, there are 
three patients.  In another room, there are seven patients.  If Ken does nothing, the 
fumes will reach the three patients and kill them.  The only way to save the three 
patients is to close a vent so that the fumes go into the room with the seven patients, but 
then the seven patients will die. 
In order to save the seven patients, Ken leaves the vent open. The deadly gas 
travels to the room with three patients and the three patients die. The seven patients in 
the other room survive. 
 
Motorboat (Impersonal) 
Carly is driving a motorboat in the bay when she notices a couple of swimmers 
in trouble.  The two swimmers are drowning at the end of a channel in front of her, and 
they need help immediately to survive.  As she boats towards them, she sees another 
swimmer drowning much closer, not far from the side of her boat. If Carly stops to save 
the one swimmer to the side, she will not be able to get to the two other swimmers in 
time to save them. If she continues to speed towards the two swimmers, however, the 
one swimmer beside her will drown. 
Carly decides to speeds towards the two swimmers. She reaches them in time to 
save them, but in the meantime the one swimmer drowns. 
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Appendix C 
Feces (Agent) 
Gary works at an adult video store. On his way to work today, Gary grabs a 
bagel and a cup of coffee. Once he arrives at the store, he puts his coat in the back room 
and then heads out front to help some customers.  
Around midday there is a lull in customers and Gary decides to go and grab a 
sandwich for lunch from the café across the street. When he returns to the video store he 
has a conversation with one of his co-workers to pass the time. After the conversation, 
Gary decides that he will fulfill his fantasy of smearing feces all over his body after the 
store closes at 9 pm.  
Closing time arrives and after making sure all of the customers have left, Gary‘s 
co-worker counts the register and locks up the store. Meanwhile, Gary goes to the 
bathroom and defecates. 
 
Feces (Bystander) 
Steve works at an adult video store. On his way to work today, Steve grabs a 
bagel and a cup of coffee. Once he arrives at the store, he puts his coat in the back room 
and then heads out front to help some customers.  
Around midday there is a lull in customers and Steve decides to go and grab a 
sandwich for lunch from the café across the street. When he returns to the video store he 
has a conversation with one of his co-workers to pass the time. After the conversation, 
his co-worker says that he will fulfill his fantasy of smearing feces all over his body 
after the store closes at 9 pm.  
Closing time arrives and Steve‘s co-worker goes to the bathroom and defecates. 




Julie is an artist who lives in the heart of Boston with her husband and two 
children. One spring morning, Julie wakes up early to meet a friend and fellow artist at a 
nearby café for breakfast. Julie decides to buy a cup of coffee and a blueberry muffin 
before she sits down with her friend.  
They discuss collaborating on a new project and a proposed budget for the 
project. On the way to the art studio, Julie notices city staff putting up decorations to 
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celebrate the upcoming religious holiday. When they arrive at the art studio, Julie‘s 
friend begins to brew a pot of tea.  
As her friend is making the tea, Julie prepares her workstation and says she 
wants to draw a portrait of the religious icon she saw on the way to the studio. However, 
she would depict him nude and make the portrait rather comical with the religious 
leader‘s genitalia appearing grossly enlarged. 
 
Blasphemy (Bystander) 
Meg is an artist who lives in the heart of Boston with her husband and two 
children. One spring morning, Meg wakes up early to meet a friend and fellow artist at a 
nearby café for breakfast. Meg decides to buy a cup of coffee and a blueberry muffin 
before she sits down with her friend.  
They discuss collaborating on a new project and a proposed budget for the 
project. On the way to the art studio, Meg‘s friend notices city staff putting up 
decorations to celebrate the upcoming religious holiday. When they arrive at the art 
studio, Meg starts brewing a pot of tea.  
As she is making the tea, Meg‘s friend prepares her workstation and talks about 
wanting to draw a portrait of the religious icon she saw on the way to the studio. 
However, she says that she would depict him nude and make the portrait rather comical 
with the religious leader‘s genitalia appearing grossly enlarged. After listening to her 
friend talk, Meg pours herself some tea and sits down to work. 
 
Chicken (Agent) 
Bill is a middle-aged postman and delivers mail to the residents of a small town 
in Michigan. On his way home, Bill goes to the supermarket to buy his weekly groceries 
where he runs into his friend. Bill invites his friend over for beers and a game of poker 
that same night. Bill hadn‘t seen his friend in some time and was very excited for the 
night to begin. 
Bill‘s friend arrives at Bill‘s house and they play few games of poker and drink a 
few beers. Afterwards, Bill and his friend get to talking about sex and discussing some 
of their most exciting sexual experiences.  
Bill‘s friend says ―It‘s getting late; I should head home.‖ Once his friend has 
left, Bill realizes that he is hungry and decides to roast the whole chicken that he bought 
at the supermarket. However, before cooking it, Bill would like to have sex with the 
chicken carcass. 
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Chicken (Bystander) 
Evan is a middle-aged postman and delivers mail to the residents of a small town 
in Michigan. On his way home, Evan goes to the supermarket to buy his weekly 
groceries where he runs into his friend. Evan‘s friend invites him over for beers and a 
game of poker that same night. Evan hadn‘t seen his friend in some time and was very 
excited for the night to begin. 
Evan arrives at his friend‘s house and they sit down to play few games of poker 
and drink a few beers. Afterwards, Evan and his friend get to talking about their 
personal lives and discussing some of their most exciting sexual experiences. 
 Evan feels that it‘s getting late and that he should go home. Once Evan has left, 
Evan‘s friend decides to roast the whole chicken that he bought at the 
supermarket. However, before cooking it, Evan‘s friend decides to have sex with the 
chicken carcass.  
 
Incest (Agent) 
Eric is a businessman and has a very hectic schedule. Usually he is on top of 
things, but this week was really intense for him. Eric wakes up on Saturday morning 
and is happy that it is the weekend. However, he soon realizes that he hasn‘t gotten a 
present to take to his cousin's birthday party that afternoon.  
Eric hastily throws on some clothes and heads to a nearby Target where he buys 
a gift. Eric rushes to the car and drives to the party. Many of Eric‘s family members are 
at the party and once he arrives they all sit down to a big barbecue lunch. The lunch is 
very enjoyable, filled with talking, laughter, and plenty of margaritas.  
After lunch is finished, Eric‘s sister puts on some music and everyone starts to 
dance and continue to drink. His sister then starts to play a game of cards with some of 




Sally is a businesswoman and has a very hectic schedule. Usually she is on top 
of things, but this week was really intense for her. Sally wakes up on Saturday morning 
and is happy that it is the weekend. However, she soon realizes that she hasn‘t gotten a 
present to take to her cousin's birthday party that afternoon.  
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Sally hastily throws on some clothes and heads to a nearby Target where she 
buys a gift. Sally rushes to the car and drives to the party. Many of Sally‘s family 
members are at the party and once she arrives they all sit down to a big barbecue lunch. 
The lunch is very enjoyable, filled with talking, laughter, and plenty of margaritas.  
After lunch is finished, Sally puts on some music and everyone starts to dance 
and continue to drink. Out of the blue, her brother exclaims that he wants to 
passionately French kiss their uncle while Sally is playing a game of cards with some of 
her relatives. 
 
Sell Soul (Agent) 
Martha is an old woman who lives alone in an apartment in Brooklyn, New 
York. One day, Martha goes online and orders a book about witchcraft. The day the 
book is delivered to her apartment, Martha invites her niece over for lunch.  
When her niece arrives, Martha tells her about the new book she bought. She 
tells her niece that she wants to sell her soul and that the book explains how to do it. 
Martha then walks over to the dresser, grabs a piece of paper, and shows it to her niece. 
Martha takes back the paper and reads the note, ―I hereby sell my soul, after my death, 
to whoever has this piece of paper‖. Martha begins to explain her plan as her niece 
finishes setting the table for lunch. Martha says she wants to sign the bottom, put it in a 
sealed envelope and leave it on the steps of a haunted warehouse. 
 
Sell Soul (Bystander) 
Lily is a young woman who lives alone in an apartment in Brooklyn, New York. 
One day, while Lily is working at her computer, she gets a call from her aunt asking if 
she would come over for lunch later that day.  
Lily arrives at her aunt‘s house and her aunt tells her about the new book on 
witchcraft she bought. She tells Lily that she wants to sell her soul and that the book 
explains how to do it. Lily‘s aunt then walks over to the dresser, grabs a piece of paper, 
and shows it to Lily.  
Lily reads the note, ―I hereby sell my soul, after my death, to whoever has this 
piece of paper‖. She gives the piece of paper back to her aunt and her aunt says she 
wants to sign the bottom, put it in a sealed envelope and leave it on the steps of a 
haunted warehouse. As her aunt is speaking, Lily finishes setting the table for lunch. 
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Urine (Agent) 
Brooke is a 17 year-old student at a prep school in Providence, Rhode Island. 
One weekend, Brooke‘s parents leave town to celebrate their anniversary at the hotel 
where they were married. Brooke‘s parents are usually very strict and don‘t allow her to 
have friends over. Brooke decides to capitalize on her parents‘ absence and invites her 
two best friends over for dinner and a movie.  
As they make dinner together, the girls discuss some of the hot gossip going 
around their school. After dinner, they go to the couch and watch a movie. Brooke says 
that the night has been amazing so far, but suggests they head up to the roof to make 
things even more exciting.  
Brooke‘s friends agree and follow her to the roof, where they sit for a long time 
and watch the stars. As they are talking, Brooke realizes she has to pee and tells her 
friends that she needs to use the bathroom. Brooke‘s friend Anna confesses that she has 
always wanted to be urinated on. Brooke thinks this is a good idea and tells Anna that 
she would be willing to urinate on her. 
 
Urine (Bystander) 
Ellie is a 17 year-old student at a prep school in Providence, Rhode Island. One 
weekend, Ellie gets a call from her best friend. Her friend‘s parents are out of town for 
their anniversary and she wanted to know if Ellie could come over to her place for 
dinner and a movie. She tells Ellie to bring their other friend Anna with her.  
As they make dinner together, the girls discuss some of the hot gossip going 
around their school. After dinner, they go to the couch and watch a movie. One of 
Ellie‘s friends says that the night has been amazing so far, but suggests they head up to 
the roof to make things even more exciting.  
Ellie agrees and follows her friends to the roof, where they sit for a long time 
and watch the stars. As the girls are talking, Ellie‘s best friend exclaims that she needs 
to pee. Anna then confesses that she has always wanted to be urinated on. Ellie's friend 
says she thinks this is a good idea and would be willing to urinate on Anna.  
 
Hair sandwich (Agent) 
After a two-hour chemistry lecture, Ken and his roommate head back to their 
dorm room. When they arrive at the room they throw their backpacks in a corner, jump 
on the couch, and turn on the TV, which goes straight to the Food Network. 
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Ken is hungry and sees that the special is on rhubarb and cauliflower. 
―Delicious!‖ exclaims his roommate. Ken frowns and says, ―That‘s disgusting! I would 
rather eat my own pubic hair.‖ As the episode continues, Ken starts to get really hungry 
and begins thinking about trying his own pubic hair.  
During the next commercial break, Ken gets up off the couch and goes to the 
bathroom to shave his pubic hair. Meanwhile, his roommate heads to the kitchen to 
microwave a pizza. When the pizza is cooked, he takes it back to the common room and 
begins to eat. While Ken‘s roommate is finishing his lunch and getting ready for class, 
Ken collects his pubic hair and takes it with him to the kitchen. 
 
Hair sandwich (Bystander) 
After a two-hour chemistry lecture, Dave and his roommate head back to their 
dorm room. When they arrive at the room they throw their backpacks in a corner, jump 
on the couch, and turn on the TV, which goes straight to the Food Network.  
Dave is hungry and sees that the special is on rhubarb and cauliflower. 
―Delicious!‖ Dave exclaims. His roommate frowns and says, ―That‘s disgusting! I 
would rather eat my own pubic hair.‖ As the episode continues, Dave‘s roommate starts 
to get really hungry and begins thinking about trying his own pubic hair.  
During the next commercial break, his roommate gets up off the couch and goes 
to the bathroom to shave his pubic hair. Meanwhile, Dave heads to the kitchen to 
microwave a pizza. When the pizza is cooked, he takes it back to the common room and 
begins to eat. While his roommate collects the pubic hair and takes it to the kitchen, 
Dave finishes his lunch in the common room and gets ready for his afternoon class. 
 
Two-inch tail (Agent) 
Carly is a first year student in business school. When Carly and her sister were 
growing up they loved animals in general, but they were particularly obsessed with 
dogs. All that Carly and her sister wanted was a dog, but her mother was allergic so they 
were never allowed to have one.  
Now that Carly lives alone, she decides that it is the perfect time to buy a puppy. 
Carly heads to the nearest pet shop and picks out an adorable golden retriever. When 
she gets home, she immediately calls her sister, knowing that the news will make her 
sister very happy. Carly asks her to come over before work to play with the puppy.  
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As the two are playing with the dog, Carly can‘t stop wishing that she had a little 
tail. While Carly‘s sister gets ready to head to work, Carly makes up her mind and calls 
a plastic surgeon about getting a tail. 
 
Two-inch tail (Bystander) 
Janet is a first year student in business school. When Janet and her sister were 
growing up they loved animals in general, but they were particularly obsessed with 
dogs. All that Janet and her sister wanted was a dog, but her mother was allergic so they 
were never allowed to have one.  
Now that Janet lives alone, she decides that it is the perfect time to buy a puppy. 
Janet heads to the nearest pet shop and picks out an adorable golden retriever. When 
Janet gets home, she immediately calls her sister, knowing that the news will make her 
sister very happy. Janet asks her sister to come over before work to play with her new 
puppy.  
As the two are playing with the dog, Janet‘s sister can‘t stop wishing that she 
had a little tail. So she calls the plastic surgeon about getting a tail while Janet gets 






Gary is the captain of a military submarine. He receives orders from his 
superintendent to return to base. ―Thank goodness! The war has been dragging on for 
too long‖ Gary thinks to himself, with a sigh of relief. The last couple of weeks out at 
sea have been nerve-wracking for Gary and his unit. So Gary is looking forward to 
being back on land, resting for a few days and getting in touch with his family. 
When the submarine is only a few hours away from the base, Gary who was 
resting in his bunk bed and his unit are caught by a loud, onboard explosion. The tremor 
wakes Gary up. He looks around the submarine to see what has happened and to make 
sure everyone is alright. Rick, one of the soldiers in Gary‘s unit, is seriously injured 
lying on the floor. The shrapnel from the explosion has wounded Rick and he is quickly 
losing blood. While the medic examines Rick, Gary looks around the submarine for any 
damage the explosion may have caused. The explosion has ruined the pressurized air 
compartment. Gary examines the air compartment gauge and realizes that they have lost 
much of their air supply in the explosion. Gary determines that there isn‘t enough air for 
the whole crew to make it back to the base. 
Meanwhile, Rick is bleeding profusely. The medic in the squadron who was 
examining Rick‘s injuries alerts Gary: ―His abdominal aorta is severed. I don‘t know 
whether he‘ll make it!‖ The medic has done everything he could possibly do onboard to 
treat Rick. Gary realizes that Rick is severely injured and that he may not survive the 
rest of the trip back to the base where his injuries can be properly treated. 
The only way to save the other crew members is to shoot Rick dead so that there 
will enough air for the rest of the crew to survive. 
 
Submarine (Victim) 
Rick is a soldier on board a military submarine. He receives notice from his 
captain that they are returning to base. ―Thank goodness! The war has been dragging on 
for too long‖ Rick thinks to himself, with a sigh of relief. The last couple of weeks out 
at sea have been nerve-wracking for Rick and his unit. So Rick is looking forward to 
being back on land, resting for a few days and getting in touch with his family. 
When the submarine is only a few hours away from the base, Rick who was 
resting in his bunk bed and his unit are caught by a loud, onboard explosion. The 
shrapnel from the explosion impacts on Rick, who falls off his bed landing on the floor. 
Rick is seriously injured and is quickly losing blood. While the medic examines Rick, 
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the captain looks around the submarine for any damage the explosion may have caused. 
The explosion has ruined the pressurized air compartment. The captain examines the air 
compartment gauge and realizes that they have lost much of their air supply in the 
explosion. The captain determines that there isn‘t enough air for the whole crew to 
make it back to the base. 
Meanwhile, Rick is bleeding profusely. The medic in the squadron who was 
examining Rick‘s injuries alerts the captain: ―His abdominal aorta is severed. I don‘t 
know whether he‘ll make it!‖ The medic has done everything he could possibly do 
onboard to treat Rick. The captain realizes that Rick is severely injured and that he may 
not survive the rest of the trip back to the base where his injuries can be properly 
treated. 
The only way to save the other crew members is to shoot Rick dead so that there 
will enough air for the rest of the crew to survive. 
 
Submarine (Bystander) 
Jake is a soldier on board a military submarine. He receives notice from his 
captain that they are returning to base. ―Thank goodness! The war has been dragging on 
for too long‖ Jake thinks to himself, with a sigh of relief. The last couple of weeks out at 
sea have been very stressful for Jake and his unit. So Jake is looking forward to being 
back on land, resting for a few days and getting in touch with his family. 
When the submarine is only a few hours away from the base, Jake who was 
resting in his bunk bed and his unit are caught by an onboard explosion. The tremor 
wakes Jake up. He looks around the submarine to see what has happened and to make 
sure everyone is alright. Rick, one of the soldiers in Jake‘s unit, is seriously injured 
lying on the floor. The shrapnel from the explosion has wounded Rick and he is quickly 
losing blood. Jake examines his injuries and alerts the captain of the situation: ―His 
abdominal aorta is severed. I don‘t know whether he‘ll make it!‖ Jake has done 
everything he could possibly do onboard to treat Rick. Rick is severely injured and that 
he may not survive the rest of the trip back to the base where his injuries can be 
properly treated. 
Meanwhile, Gary, the captain, looks around the submarine for any damage the 
explosion may have caused. The explosion has ruined the pressurized air compartment. 
Gary examines the air compartment gauge and realizes that they have lost much of their 
air supply in the explosion. Gary determines that there isn‘t enough air for the whole 
crew to make it back to the base. 
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The only way to save the other crew members is to shoot Rick dead so that there 
will enough air for the rest of the crew to survive. 
 
Virus (Agent) 
Early one morning, the phone rings as Kevin is having breakfast before work. 
He sets down his silverware and answers the phone. It‘s his assistant, ―Kevin, an 
epidemic of Xteria has broken out. Come straight to the lab!‖. So Kevin quickly gathers 
his belongings, jumps in the car and heads to work. On his drive to the lab, Kevin thinks 
back on his career as a scientist. It had always been calm and uneventful, but now it had 
come time for his work as a scientist to have an impact on the world. 
When Kevin arrives, he is greeted by the security guard and let in to the 
compound. In the lab, a confidential message from his informant awaits: ―the outbreak 
of Xteria is spreading around the country. Thousands presumed dead‖. It has been a 
while since Kevin developed the antidote for Xteria so Kevin couldn‘t remember which 
specific freezer the antidote was stored in. ―It‘s the middle freezer‖, Kevin remembers. 
Besides the antidote, the middle freezer stores a deadly poison that Kevin had 
recently developed. Kevin opens the freezer and notices that the labels on his samples 
are missing. An assistant rearranging the lab had neglected to move the labels with the 
samples. There is no way for Kevin to know which is the antidote and which is the 
poison. Once he figures out which is which, Kevin can use the antidote to save 
thousands of lives. 
While Tim is working on the computer, Kevin fills up a syringe with one of the 
chemicals. If Kevin injects the chemical in Tim‘s arm while Tim is distracted, Tim may 
suffer cardiac arrest and die but Kevin will find out which container holds the antidote 
and distribute the antidote to several national hospitals and save many lives. 
 
Virus (Victim) 
Early one morning, the phone rings as Tim is having breakfast before work. He 
sets down his silverware and answers the phone. It‘s Kevin, his boss: ―Tim, we have an 
emergency. Come straight to the lab!‖ So Tim quickly gathers his belongings, jumps in 
the car and heads to work. On his drive to the lab, Tim thinks back on his internship at 
the pharmaceutical lab. It had always been calm and uneventful, but now it had come 
time for his work as a scientist to have an impact on the world. 
When Tim arrives, he is greeted by the security guard and let in to the 
compound. In the lab, Kevin awaits with orders. ―Good morning, Tim. An outbreak of 
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Xteria is spreading around the country. Thousands are presumed dead.‖ At Kevin‘s 
request, Tim sits down at the computer to correspond with the headquarters and 
organize the deployment of the antidote in the following hours. 
Besides the antidote, the middle freezer stores a deadly poison that Kevin had 
recently developed. Kevin opens the freezer and notices that the labels on his samples 
are missing. An assistant rearranging the lab had neglected to move the labels with the 
samples. There is no way for Kevin to know which is the antidote and which is the 
poison. Once he figures out which is which, Kevin can use the antidote to save 
thousands of lives. 
While Tim is working on the computer, Kevin fills up a syringe with one of the 
chemicals. If Kevin injects the chemical in Tim‘s arm while Tim is distracted, Tim may 
suffer cardiac arrest and die but Kevin will find out which container holds the antidote 
and distribute the antidote to several national hospitals and save many lives. 
 
Virus (Bystander) 
Early one morning, while Rick is on his route, his pager rings. His pager never 
usually rings at this hour. It‘s Kevin, the head scientist: ―Rick, we have an emergency. 
I‘m on my way to the lab.‖ So Rick runs to the main building to unlock Kevin‘s lab, 
wondering what could have happened. It had always been calm and uneventful at the 
lab, but now it had come time for the lab‘s work to have an impact on the world. 
When Kevin and his assistant Tim arrive, Rick lets them into the complex and 
accompanies them into the lab. In the lab, Rick stands vigilant and awaits orders from 
Kevin. Kevin eventually confides ―An outbreak of Xteria is spreading around the 
country. Thousands are presumed dead.‖ While Kevin searches for the antidote in the 
freezer, Rick props himself against the front door, checking his pager repeatedly. 
Besides the antidote, the freezer stores a deadly poison that Kevin had recently 
developed. Kevin opens the freezer and notices that the labels on his samples are 
missing. An assistant rearranging the lab had neglected to move the labels with the 
samples.There is no way for Kevin to know which is the antidote and which is the 
poison. Once he figures out which is which, Kevin can use the antidote to save 
thousands of lives. 
Rick notices that Kevin is filling up a needle with one of the two unlabeled 
chemicals while Tim is working on the computer. If Kevin injects the chemical in Tim‘s 
arm while Tim is distracted, Tim may suffer cardiac arrest and die but Kevin will find 
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out which container holds the antidote and distribute the antidote to several national 
hospitals and save many lives. 
 
Jungle (Agent) 
Anne is part of a group of five staff and eight students researching animals in the 
jungle. The group has been gathering good data. As the trip is nearing its end, a few 
members who are eager to collect more data have suggested that the group venture 
further into the jungle in search of another bonobo colony. Anne is enthusiastic about 
the project so she vehemently agrees. The next morning, Anne packs up her tent, 
gathers her belongings and sets foot towards the depths of the jungle with the rest of the 
group. 
A few hours into their hike, the group stops to take a break by a freshwater pond. 
Anne is crouched over the pond rinsing her face and splashing water over her head 
when she feels a hand covering her mouth and a gun pressed against her temple. A 
group of terrorists has ambushed them. Anne and the researchers acquiesce and they are 
led at gunpoint to the terrorists‘ settlement deep in the jungle.  
At the site, they are kept locked up for several days. One afternoon, one of the 
principal terrorists comes in to the shed where the researchers are locked up and points 
at Anne. ―Come with me‖. Outside the terrorist tells Anne that the leader plans to kill 
everyone the next day. ―Let‘s negotiate‖, he says. The terrorist promises to help Anne 
escape under one condition.  To make sure she won‘t go to the police, the terrorist wants 
to videotape Anne killing one of the other adults.  If Anne accepts his offer, the other 
adults will all die but Anne and the eight students will be released. 
 
Jungle (Victim) 
Kayla is part of a group of five staff and eight students researching animals in 
the jungle. The group has been gathering good data. As the trip is nearing its end, a few 
members who are eager to collect more data have suggested that the group venture 
further into the jungle in search of another bonobo colony. Kayla is enthusiastic about 
the project so she vehemently agrees. The next morning, Kayla packs up her tent, 
gathers her belongings and sets foot towards the depths of the jungle with the rest of the 
group. 
A few hours into their hike, the group stops to take a break by a freshwater pond. 
Kayla is crouched over the water rinsing her face and splashing water over her head 
when she feels a hand covering her mouth and a gun pressed against her temple. A 
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group of terrorists has ambushed them. Kayla and the researchers acquiesce and they are 
led at gunpoint to the terrorists‘ settlement deep in the jungle. 
At the site, they are kept locked up for several days. One afternoon, one of the 
principal terrorists comes in to the shed where the researchers are locked up and points 
at Anne, one of the researchers. ―Come with me‖. Outside the terrorist is conversing 
with Anne. Kayla overhears the terrorist tell Anne that the leader plans to kill everyone 
the next day. ―Let‘s negotiate‖, he says. The terrorist promises to help Anne escape 
under one condition.  To make sure she won‘t go to the police, the terrorist wants to 
videotape Anne killing Kayla.  If Anne accepts his offer, the other adults will all die but 
Anne and the eight students will be released. 
 
Jungle (Bystander) 
Joey is a servant, held captive by some terrorists in the jungle. He was captured 
a few years back and has been living on the site ever since. Joey is afraid to leave 
because he knows the terrorists could easily find him in the jungle and kill him if he 
tries to escape.  
One afternoon, while Joey is cleaning the toilet, the terrorists come back with a 
group of several men, women and children, held at gunpoint. The group of hostages, 
made up of five adults and eight children, is locked in one of the garages and left there 
for several days. Over the years, Joey has seen many groups of foreigners held hostage 
at the site, some of them killed and others eventually released. This only reinstilled 
Joey‘s fear at the prospect of trying to escape. 
The group is kept locked up for several days. One afternoon, Joey observes as 
one of the principal terrorists walks into the garage where the researchers are locked up. 
―Come with me‖. The terrorist walks out with one of the adults in the group and 
converses with her. Joey eavesdrops on the conversation as he pretends to work the 
armory. He overhears the terrorist tell Anne that the leader plans to kill everyone the 
next day. ―Let‘s negotiate‖, he says. He will help her escape under one condition.  To 
make sure she won‘t go to the police, the terrorist wants to videotape her killing one of 
the other adults.  If she accepts his offer, the other adults will all die but her and the 
eight children will escape. 
 
Lifeboat (Agent) 
Brooke is enjoying a pleasant vacation on a cruise ship with her husband. 
They‘ve had a scrumptious dinner and a few cocktails when they decide to go atop 
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where a live band is playing. A few dances into the night, Brooke and her husband start 
to smell fire. ―Uh oh!‖ they think to themselves. Immediately the fire alarm starts 
ringing. The band stops playing mid-song and a terrible announcement plays over the 
speaker system: ―Everybody line up on the sides of the ship! A staff member will assist 
you onto the lifeboats.‖ Brooke and her husband along with several other frantic people 
rush to the closest lifeboat and line up nearby. People are quarreling, Brooke and her 
husband are getting very nervous as the smoke and the flames on one end of the boat 
become clearly visible. 
A staff member helps Brooke, her husband and several others onto the lifeboat 
and lowers the lifeboat into the water. They try rowing away from the ship but the 
lifeboat is carrying too many passengers. Brooke notices that the sea is getting rough, 
and water is rushing in over the sides of their lifeboat. All the lifeboats, including 
Brooke‘s, are over their capacity limit. If nothing is done, it is very likely that Brooke‘s 
lifeboat will sink and everyone on board will die in the rough waters. 
Brooke sees there is an old man in her lifeboat. He looks very feeble and he may 
not survive in any case.  If Brooke throws the old man overboard, the old man will die 
but the boat will stay afloat and the remaining passengers will be saved. 
 
Lifeboat (Victim) 
Al is celebrating his retirement by taking a vacation on a cruise ship with his 
wife. They‘ve had a scrumptious dinner and a few cocktails when they decide to go atop 
where a live band is playing. A few dances into the night, Al and his wife start to smell 
fire. ―Oh no!‖ they think to themselves. Immediately the fire alarm starts ringing. The 
band stops playing mid-song and a terrible announcement plays over the speaker 
system: ―Everybody line up on the sides of the ship! A staff member will assist you 
onto the lifeboats.‖ Al, who has coronary difficulties, goes into shock. He is shaking 
vigorously and his heart rate is lowering rapidly. Al‘s wife is crying as she helps Al to 
the nearest lifeboat, where they line up next to several other frantic people. People are 
quarreling and Al is getting very nervous and sweating as the smoke and the flames on 
one end of the boat become clearly visible. 
A staff member helps Al, his wife and several other people onto the lifeboat and 
lowers the lifeboat into the water. They try rowing away from the ship but the lifeboat is 
carrying too many passengers. Al notices that the sea is getting rough, and water is 
rushing in over the sides of their lifeboat. All the lifeboats, including Al‘s, are over their 
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capacity limit. If nothing is done, it is very likely that Al‘s lifeboat will sink and 
everyone on board will die in the rough waters. 
Al may not survive in any case. A woman sees that Al looks very feeble. If the 
woman throws Al over board, Al will die but the boat will stay afloat and the remaining 
passengers will be saved. 
 
Lifeboat (Bystander) 
Diane is enjoying a pleasant vacation on a cruise ship with her husband. They‘ve 
had a scrumptious dinner and a few cocktails when they decide to go atop where a live 
band is playing. A few dances into the night, Diane and her husband start to smell fire. 
―Uh oh!‖ they think to themselves. Immediately the fire alarm starts ringing. The band 
stops playing mid-song and a terrible announcement plays over the speaker system: 
―Everybody line up on the sides of the ship! A staff member will assist you onto the 
lifeboats.‖ Diane and her husband along with several other frantic people rush to the 
closest lifeboat and line up nearby. People are quarreling, Diane and her husband are 
getting very nervous as the smoke and the flames on one end of the boat become clearly 
visible. 
A staff member helps Diane, her husband and several other people onto the 
lifeboat and lowers the lifeboat into the water. They row away from the boat with great 
difficulty since their lifeboat is at maximum capacity. Diane notices that a nearby 
lifeboat has too many people in it. The sea is getting rough, and water is rushing in over 
the sides of the other lifeboat. If nothing is done, it is very likely that the nearby lifeboat 
will sink and everyone on board will die in the rough waters. 
Diane sees there is an old man on the nearby lifeboat who looks very feeble and 
may not survive in any case. If the woman sitting next to the old man throws him over 
board, the old man will die but the boat will stay afloat and the remaining passengers 
will be saved. 
 
Climbers (Agent) 
Ken is the leader of a mountain climbing group. Ken has led the group through a 
week-long hike. Adverse weather conditions, with heavy snow and winds, have 
stranded the group in a mountain pass far away from the base camp. After several days 
stranded in the mountain pass, food provisions are running low and the group‘s health 
has severely deteriorated. In particular, there is a family of six who are suffering from 
severe malnutrition and may not survive for much longer. They share a specific dietary 
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condition and need a steady supply of a certain vitamin to survive. They had packed 
enough vitamin pills for the length of their trip, but due to the unexpected delay they 
have depleted their supplies. 
Prior to the trip, Ken had checked the medical background and vital statistics of 
all the members of the climbing group. As such, he knows that Darrel, one of group‘s 
members, is in good health and likely contains large amounts of this vitamin in his 
kidneys. That night, Ken suggests that Darrel give up one of his kidneys to save the 
family. He believes that if he operates on the man and extracts his kidney to feed it to 
the family, he will be able to save the family. Their vitamin levels will stabilize and they 
will be safe until they can get back to base camp. 
Darrel absolutely refuses and goes to sleep. In the middle of the night, Ken 
wakes up and considers whether to operate on Darrel. If Ken extracts one of Darrel‘s 
kidneys in his sleep and feeds it to the family in the morning, the family of six will be 
saved but Darrel will likely die. 
 
Climbers (Victim) 
Darrel is part of a mountain climbing group, taking part in a week-long hike. 
Adverse weather conditions, with heavy snow and winds, have stranded the group in a 
mountain pass far away from the base camp. After several days stranded in the 
mountain pass, food provisions are running low and the group‘s health has severely 
deteriorated. In particular, there is a family of six who are suffering from severe 
malnutrition and may not survive for much  longer. They share a specific dietary 
condition and need a steady supply of a certain vitamin to survive. They had packed 
enough vitamin pills for the length of their trip, but due to the unexpected delay they 
have depleted their supplies. 
Prior to the trip, Darren‘s medical background and vital statistics had been 
checked along with the other members of the climbing group. As such, Darren knows 
that he likely contains large amounts of this vitamin in his kidneys. That night, the 
group leader, Ken, suggests to Darrel that he give up one of his kidneys to save the 
family. If Ken operates on Darrel and extracts his kidney to feed it to the family, he will 
be able to save the family. Their vitamin levels will stabilize and they will be safe until 
they can get back to base camp. 
Darrel absolutely refuses and goes to sleep. In the middle of the night, Ken 
wakes up and considers whether to operate on Darrel. If Ken extracts one of Darrel‘s 
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kidneys in his sleep and feeds it to the family in the morning, the family of six will be 
saved but Darrel will likely die. 
 
Climbers (Bystander) 
Silvia is part of a mountain climbing group, taking part in a week-long hike. 
Adverse weather conditions, with heavy snow and winds, have stranded the group in a 
mountain pass far away from the base camp. After several days stranded in the 
mountain pass, food provisions are running low and the group‘s health has severely 
deteriorated. In particular, there is a family of six who are suffering from severe 
malnutrition and may not survive for much longer. They share a specific dietary 
condition and need a steady supply of a certain vitamin to survive. They had packed 
enough vitamin pills for the length of their trip, but due to the unexpected delay they 
have depleted their supplies. 
Prior to the trip, the medical background and vital statistics of all the members in 
the climbing group had been checked. As such, Silvia and others know that one of 
group‘s members, Darrel, is in good health and likely contains large amounts of this 
vitamin in his kidneys. That night, the group leader suggests that Darrel give up one of 
his kidneys to save the family. The group leader believes that if he operates on Darrel 
and extracts his kidney to feed it to the family, he will be able to save the family. Their 
vitamin levels will stabilize and they will be safe until they can get back to base camp. 
Darrel absolutely refuses and goes to sleep. In the middle of the night, Silvia 
wakes up and sees the group leader is also awake. He is considering whether to operate 
on Darrel. If the group leader extracts one of Darrel‘s kidneys in his sleep and feeds it to 
the family in the morning, the family of six will be saved but Darrel will likely die. 
 
Enemy doctor (Agent) 
The enemy has taken over Carly‘s village. Carly and her two children are 
sequestered in one of the village‘s square with many other villagers. Enemy troops are 
patrolling the square to ensure that the villagers don‘t try to break free. Among the 
enemy is an infamous doctor who is known for his depraved experimentation with 
humans. He takes civilians hostage and tests the chemicals he develops on them. Most 
of the doctor‘s chemicals are biological weapons so they are fatal. Several villagers 
have been taken away to the laboratory by the doctor‘s minion and have not been seen 
again. 
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One afternoon, as Carly is sitting hand-cuffed under a tree, a limousine rolls up 
to the square. It‘s the enemy doctor. Carly presumes that the doctor is here to collect 
more specimens to take back to the lab. After making his rounds and selecting a few 
villagers, the doctor approaches Carly and stops. He has a proposition for Carly: ―I see 
you have two children.‖ Carly looks up at the doctor, terrified, and he continues, 
―Choose one to give to me and the other will survive. Give me neither and they will 
both die.‖ The doctor steps back into his limousine and is driven away by his chauffeur. 
All night Carly wonders what to do. She knows she cannot possibly escape the 
square with so many troops. She can either offer one of her children to the doctor in 
order to save the other or not offer either, and see them both taken away. Carly cannot 
sleep thinking about the impending decision. The next morning, the doctor drives up in 
his limousine. 
 
Enemy doctor (Victim) 
The enemy has taken over Anna‘s village. Anna is in the village square with her 
mother, little sister and many other villagers who have also been sequestered. Enemy 
troops are patrolling the square to ensure that the villagers don‘t try to break free. 
Among the enemy is an infamous doctor who is known for his depraved 
experimentation with humans. He takes civilians hostage and tests the chemicals he 
develops on them. Most of the doctor‘s chemicals are biological weapons so they are 
fatal. Several villagers have been taken away to the laboratory by the doctor‘s minion 
and have not been seen again.               
One afternoon, as Anna is sitting hand-cuffed on her mother‘s lap, a limousine 
rolls up to the square. It‘s the enemy doctor. He is here to collect more specimens to 
take back to the lab. After making his rounds and selecting a few villagers, the doctor 
approaches Anna and stops. He has a proposition for Anna‘s mother: ―I see you have 
two children.‖ Anna and her mother look up at the doctor, terrified, and he continues, 
―Choose one to give to me and the other will survive. Give me neither and they will 
both die.‖ The doctor steps back into his limousine and is driven away by his chauffeur. 
Anna is too young to understand but her mother looks agitated. They cannot 
possibly escape the square with so many troops. Anna‘s mother can either offer one of 
her children to the doctor in order to save the other or see them both taken away. The 
next morning, Anna wakes up to the sound of the doctor‘s limousine driving up to the 
square. 
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Enemy doctor (Bystander) 
The enemy has taken over Joe‘s village. Joe and his family are sequestered in 
one of the village‘s square with many other villagers. Enemy troops are patrolling the 
square to ensure that the villagers don‘t try to break free. Among the enemy is an 
infamous doctor who is known for his depraved experimentation with humans. He takes 
civilians hostage and tests the chemicals he develops on them. Most of the doctor‘s 
chemicals are biological weapons so they are fatal. Several villagers have been taken 
away to the laboratory by the doctor‘s minion and have not been seen again. 
One afternoon, as Joe is sitting hand-cuffed under a tree, a limousine rolls up to 
the square. It‘s the enemy doctor. Joe presumes that the doctor is here to collect more 
specimens to take back to the lab. After making his rounds and selecting a few villagers, 
the doctor approaches a woman sitting near Joe and stops. The doctor has a proposition 
for the woman: ―I see you have two children.‖ She looks up at the doctor, terrified, and 
he continues, ―Choose one to give to me and the other will survive. Give me neither and 
they will both die.‖ The doctor steps back into his limousine and is driven away by his 
chauffeur. 
Joe is relieved that the doctor did not approach him, and he wonders what he 
would do in the woman‘s situation. She cannot possibly escape the square with so many 
troops. She can either offer one of her children to the doctor in order to save the other or 
not offer either, and see them both taken away. The next morning, the doctor drives up 






A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be 
killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course.  Evan is on a footbridge over the 
tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen.  Next to Evan on this 
footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. 
The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is for Evan to push this 
stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the 
trolley.  The stranger will die if Evan does this, but the five workmen will be saved. 




Enemy soldiers have taken over Laura's village.  They have orders to kill all 
remaining civilians.  Laura and some of her townspeople have sought refuge in the 
cellar of a large house.  Outside Laura hears the voices of soldiers who have come to 
search the house for valuables. 
Laura's baby begins to cry loudly.  She covers his mouth to block the sound.  If 
she removes her hand from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the 
soldiers who will kill her, her child, and the others hiding out in the cellar.  To save 
herself and the others Laura must smother her child to death. 
 Laura smothers her child in order to save herself and the other townspeople. 
 
Lifeboat 
Doug is on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the ship has to be 
abandoned. The lifeboats are carrying many more people than they were designed to 
carry.  The lifeboat Doug is in is sitting dangerously low in the water—a few inches 
lower and it will sink. 
The seas start to get rough, and the boat begins to fill with water.  If nothing is 
done it will sink before the rescue boats arrive and everyone on board will die.  
However, there is an injured person who will not survive in any case.  If Doug throws 
that person overboard the boat will stay afloat and the remaining passengers will be 
saved. 
Doug throws this person overboard in order to save the lives of the remaining 
passengers. 
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Supplementary Analyses 
Supplementary Analysis 1 
Correlation table: Evaluative foci by demographics. 
  AF OF ES OA 
Age -0.114 -.205*** -0.07 0.086 
Gender .135* -0.032 .134* 0.022 
Education -0.085 -0.027 -0.066 0.034 
Religiosity .175** 0.049 0.054 -0.042 
Social .212*** -.141** .159*** -.193*** 
Fiscal .132** -0.04 .120** -0.081 
Psychology -0.062 -0.067 -0.014 0.018 
Philosophy -.210*** -0.021 -0.09 0.041 
Notes. Zero-order correlations. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. AF: Action focus; 
OF: Outcome focus; ES: Evaluative simulation; OA: Outcome assessment. 
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Supplementary Analysis 2 
Multiple regression models by foundation. 
Predictor B SE B β t P 
Action focus .260 .062 .185 4.21 .001 
Outcome focus .535 .064 .369 8.33 .001 
Political orientation -.018 .021 .037 -.87 .385 





Predictor B SE B β t P 
Action focus .208 .059 .155 3.54 .001 
Outcome focus .460 .061 .333 7.55 .001 
Political orientation -.095 .020 -.204 -4.78 .001 





Predictor B SE B β t P 
Action focus .348 .065 .229 5.39 .001 
Political orientation .161 .022 .304 7.15 .001 





Predictor B SE B β t P 
Action focus .496 .063 .310 7.90 .001 
Political orientation .218 .021 .392 9.98 .001 
Multiple regression analysis on Authority foundation. F(2,473) = 96.73, p < .0001, r
2
 = 
   235 
.290. 
 
Predictor B SE B β t P 
Action focus .775 .075 .371 10.41 .001 
Political orientation .340 .026 .468 13.12 .001 





B = un-standardized beta coefficient, SE B = standard error, b = standardized beta 
coefficient, t = t-test statistic, P = significance value. 
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Supplementary Analysis 3 
Multiple regression models by foundation. 
Predictor B SE B β t P 
Evaluative simulation .099 .024 .181 4.16 .001 
Outcome assessment .187 .025 .336 7.54 .001 
Political orientation -.007 .022 -.016 -.36 .719 





Predictor B SE B β t P 
Evaluative simulation .084 .022 .162 3.78 .001 
Outcome assessment .155 .023 .291 6.61 .001 
Political orientation -.088 .021 -.190 -4.31 .001 





Predictor B SE B β t P 
Evaluative simulation .058 .026 .098 2.25 .025 
Political orientation .174 .023 .329 7.59 .001 





Predictor B SE B β t P 
Evaluative simulation .088 .026 .142 3.45 .001 
Political orientation .237 .023 .425 10.35 .001 
Multiple regression analysis on Authority foundation. F(2,473) = 65.29, p < .0001, r
2
 = 
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.216. 
 
Predictor B SE B β t P 
Evaluative simulation .132 .031 .163 4.22 .001 
Political orientation .370 .028 .508 13.16 .001 





B = un-standardized beta coefficient, SE B = standard error, b = standardized beta 






Supplementary Analysis 4 
 Mean (SD)*   Cohen’s 
Item Cons. Lib. χ2 t d 
SET_MUS. Making it harder for Muslims to settle in the 




23.27 - .24 
RED_IMMG. Passing a law to reduce the number of 




56.98 - .36 
DIV_GOOD (reverse scored). Religious diversity has been 






- 5.29 .25 
TENCMMND. The public schools should teach children 






- 10.9 .52 
FOR_LRN. Foreigners who come to live in America 
should give up their foreign ways and learn to be like other 





- 8.14 .39 
AMR_LIFE. Nothing in other countries can beat the 






- 9.21 .45 
STRO_MUS: In the next few years, would you welcome 
or not welcome each of the following groups becoming a 
stronger presence in the United States: Muslims. (1: Not 





- 7.75 .37 
STRO_BUD: In the next few years, would you welcome or 
not welcome each of the following groups becoming a 
stronger presence in the United States: Buddhists. (1: Not 





- 6.77 .32 
GODSWORD: Do you think God’s word is revealed in 
any other writings besides the Bible, such as the sacred 





71.1 - .46 
BECOMECH: In your view, how important is it for 
Christians to encourage people from other faiths—-such as 
Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists—-to become Christians?( 





- 7.33 .49 
ALLTRUTH (reverse scored): All major religions, such 
as Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam contain 






- 6.52 .32 
ALLGOOD (reverse scored): All major religions, such as 
Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam are equally 
good ways of knowing about God. (1: Disagree strongly – 





- 11.6 .55 
CHR_ONLY: Christianity is the only way to have a true 






- 10.2 .48 
CHR_BEST: Christianity is the best way to understand 







- 10.2 .53 
MARRYMUS: Suppose you had a child who wanted to 
marry a Muslim who had a good education and came from 





- 9.96 .64 
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MARRYHIN: Suppose you had a child who wanted to 
marry a Hindu who had a good education and came from a 
good family. How would you feel about this? Would you... 





- 6.91 .46 
HINTEMPL: Suppose some Hindus wanted to build a 
large Hindu temple in your community. Would this bother 
you a lot, bother you a little, not bother you, or be 






- 6.04 .40 
MUS_MOSQ: Suppose some Muslims wanted to build a 
large Muslim mosque in your community. Would this 
bother you a lot, bother you a little, not bother you, or be 






- 5.46 .37 
THREAT: Would you agree or disagree that these new 
groups are a threat to our traditional values? (1: Agree 





- 9.15 .43 
NEEDLEAR (reverse scored): Would you agree or 
disagree that we all need to learn something about these 






- 4.48 .21 
 All group comparisons (t-tests and χ2 tests) significant at p < .00001. 
 
